

1 Lori Jordan Isley
Bernardo Rafael Cruz
2 COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES
3 6 South Second Street, Suite 600
4 Yakima, WA 98901
(509) 575-5593

5 Matt Adams
6 Glenda M. Aldana Madrid
7 Leila Kang
8 NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT
615 Second Avenue, Suite 400
9 Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 957-8611

10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
11 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

12 ANTONIO SANCHEZ OCHOA,
13

14 Plaintiff,

15 vs.

16 ED W. CAMPBELL, Director of Yakima
17 County Department of Corrections;
18 SCOTT HIMES, Chief of the Yakima County
Department of Corrections; and
YAKIMA COUNTY.

19 Defendants.
20

No. 1:17-CV-03124-SMJ

PLAINTIFF'S CROSS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

September 6, 2018
With Oral Argument: 10:30 a.m.
Richland, WA

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants Yakima County, Campbell, and Himes (collectively, “Yakima County” or “the County”) unlawfully seized Plaintiff Antonio Sanchez Ochoa by placing an immigration hold on him upon receiving an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) warrant in his name. The County did so pursuant to a policy it had in place since May 2014 of continuing to detain persons with ICE warrants in their files after they posted bail or completed their charges by re-designating them as being “turned over” to ICE custody.

In its motion for summary judgment, *see* ECF No. 59, the County alleges this administrative transfer was performed pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) with the federal government, but the IGA does not permit administrative transfers of custody. Indeed, the County previously admitted this, arguing a temporary restraining order (TRO) was unnecessary because the IGA did not authorize it to simply re-designate Mr. Sanchez’s custody if he posted bail. Yet just days after Mr. Sanchez filed his motion seeking a TRO, the County refused to release two individuals who posted bail, instead purporting to transfer their custody and unlawfully holding them until ICE appeared over two days later. The County only ceased this policy and practice after this Court granted Mr. Sanchez’s request for a TRO the following week. ECF No. 32.

1 The County's policy and practice of placing immigration holds pursuant to
2 ICE warrants and depriving detainees of their right to pretrial release indisputably
3 violates the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Mr. Sanchez thus moves
4 for partial summary judgment on Yakima County's liability under 42 U.S.C.
5 § 1983 for detaining him in violation of his civil rights.
6

7 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

8 At all relevant times, Yakima County was the local government entity
9 responsible for the Yakima County Department of Corrections (DOC) and running
10 of the Yakima County Jail. ECF No. 77, Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶1.
11 Defendant Campbell, as the Director of the Yakima County DOC, had final
12 policymaking authority for all DOC policies. *Id.* ¶2. Defendant Himes, as Chief of
13 the Yakima County DOC, was responsible for establishing, implementing, and
14 supervising DOC policies. *Id.* ¶3.
15

16 On May 4, 2017, Mr. Sanchez was arrested and booked into Yakima County
17 Jail on charges of violating offenses under state law. That day, an ICE officer
18 interviewed him at Yakima County Jail, issued a Form I-200 Administrative
19 Warrant ("I-200" or "ICE/immigration warrant"), and delivered a copy of the I-200
20 to Yakima County. Upon receiving the I-200, the County recorded an immigration
21 hold on its publicly-available jail roster. *See* ECF No. 60 ¶¶11-16; ECF No. 77
22 ¶¶4-9. Although the Yakima County Superior Court set bail for Mr. Sanchez, he
23

1 was unable to secure the services of bail bonds agencies because they understood
2 Mr. Sanchez could not be released due to the County’s immigration hold. *See* ECF
3 No. 77 ¶¶10-11.

4 It is now undisputed that Yakima County’s “immigration hold” policy and
5 practice, which was in place from May 2014 until July 31, 2017, consisted of
6 “transferring” County detainees with an I-200 in their files into ICE custody as
7 soon as they were entitled to be released from County custody. *See* ECF No. 77
8 ¶¶26-29; *see also* ECF No. 62 ¶3 (Defendant Himes declaring that people
9 “formerly incarcerated on state law charges [are] *administratively transferred to*
10 *federal custody* under the IGA upon being released on their local charges”)
11 (emphasis added). This transfer, also referred to as a “turnover,” was an
12 administrative procedure, as the individual was never physically released from
13 Yakima County custody. *See* ECF No. 77 ¶¶30, 34.

14 Yakima County unilaterally conducted this transfer procedure. A federal
15 immigration official was not required to be present in order to effectuate the
16 transfer from local custody to ICE custody. *See id.* ¶¶35, 37. To the contrary,
17 Defendant Himes testified, as the County’s Rule 30(b)(6) deponent, that ICE
18 officers are generally not present when the re-designation or “turnover” occurs. *See*
19 ECF No. 78, Second Maltese Dec., Ex. Q, Himes Dep. at 44:4-9 (stating ICE was
20 not required to present, and that he was “not aware of any time they have”); *see*
21
22
23

1 also ECF No. 77 ¶36. The County’s policy did not even require any contact with
2 an immigration official at the time of this purported transfer to federal custody. It
3 was the County’s policy and custom to notify ICE of the turnover *after* the
4 individual had allegedly been placed into ICE’s custody. See ECF No. 77 ¶37.

5
6 The IGA does not authorize Yakima County to conduct such administrative
7 transfers. See *id.* ¶¶56-60. In fact, the federal government has expressly disavowed
8 that an IGA allows local authorities to unilaterally transfer a detainee in state
9 custody into federal custody. See ECF No. 67-3 at 3-4 (“Until an immigration
10 officer—or a state or local officer who has been delegated immigration officer
11 authority under a 287(g) [8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)] agreement—arrests the detainee, the
12 IGSA is not triggered, and the detainee *remains in state custody.*”) (emphasis
13 added). There exists no formal agreement between Yakima County and the federal
14 government under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). ECF No. 77 ¶61. Yakima County officers,
15 therefore, are not authorized to arrest or detain individuals for civil immigration
16 violations.
17

18
19 It is undisputed that prior to July 31, 2017, the County noted the receipt of
20 an I-200 for an individual as an immigration hold in its electronic Jail Management
21 System, which populated a publicly-available online jail roster. ECF No. 41 ¶7;
22 ECF No. 64 ¶2. Moreover, there is no dispute that bail bonds agencies refused to
23 provide bail bonds services to individuals who were in the County’s custody but

1 had an “immigration hold” placed on them, as they knew such individuals would
2 not actually be released from Yakima County Jail after posting bail. *See* ECF No.
3 66 ¶34. For the same reason, at least some of the County’s employees customarily,
4 and actively, discouraged individuals from posting bail. *See id.* ¶32.

6 II. ARGUMENT

7 A. Summary judgment on liability is appropriate.

8 Summary judgment is warranted where “the movant shows that there is no
9 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
10 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[F]acts must be viewed in the light most
11 favorable to the non-moving party only if there is a genuine dispute as to those
12 facts.” *Ricci v. DeStefano*, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (internal quotation marks and
13 citation omitted). A non-moving party “must set forth specific facts showing that
14 there is a genuine issue for trial.” *Demarest v. City of Leavenworth*, 876 F. Supp.
15 2d 1186, 1189 (E.D. Wash. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

17 B. Yakima County’s “immigration hold” policy violates the Fourth 18 Amendment.

19 Mr. Sanchez satisfies all four prongs necessary to demonstrate his
20 entitlement to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: “(1) a violation of rights protected by
21 the Constitution or created by a federal statute, (2) proximately caused (3) by a
22
23

1 conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acting under color of state law.” *Crumpton v. Gates*, 947
2 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991).

3 **1. Yakima County is a “person” acting under color of state law.**

4 It is undisputed that Yakima County is a “person” subject to liability under §
5 1983, *Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York*, 436 U.S. 658, 690
6 (1978), and that the County, in the course of its interaction with Mr. Sanchez, acted
7 under color of state law, ECF No. 32 at 40.

8 **2. Yakima County’s immigration hold policy deprived Mr. Sanchez
9 of his right to be free from unreasonable seizures.**

10 Yakima County violated Mr. Sanchez’s Fourth Amendment rights by
11 placing an immigration hold on him, thus effecting a seizure independent of the
12 local charges justifying its initial detention of him. The County’s violations of Mr.
13 Sanchez’s constitutional rights were pursuant to its longstanding immigration hold
14 policy, rendering it liable to Mr. Sanchez under § 1983. *See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs*
15 *v. Brown*, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997) (holding that “a municipality is held liable
16 [under § 1983] only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly
17 constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be
18 those of the municipality”). The inquiry into “fault and causation is
19 straightforward” where “a particular municipal action *itself* violates federal law, or
20
21
22
23

1 directs employees to do so.” *Brown*, 520 U.S. at 404-405. In this case, Yakima
2 County’s policy violated the Constitution on its face.

3 **a. The County had a policy of seizing individuals based on the**
4 **receipt of I-200s.**

5 It is undisputed that at all times relevant to this action, the County had a
6 policy of detaining individuals at Yakima County Jail “past the time of their local
7 charges” in reliance on I-200s. ECF No. 78, Ex. T, Himes email at YAK-I.D.
8 00015. “A policy is a deliberate choice to follow a course of action ... made from
9 among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing
10 final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” *Tsao v. Desert Palace,*
11 *Inc.*, 698 F.3d 1128, 1143 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations
12 omitted).

14 The County admits that, since May 2014, it had a policy of “document[ing]
15 the receipt of [I-200s] for the purpose of ensuring that when inmates are released
16 from the County’s custody, either by posting bail or upon the termination of their
17 local charges, they are released to ICE.” ECF No. 59 at 5. The record further
18 establishes that the County “released” individuals to federal immigration custody
19 by maintaining them in custody. Rather than actually releasing them, the County
20 used a purely administrative procedure to unilaterally re-designate the individuals
21 as being transferred from County custody to ICE custody, *without* even the
22
23

1 presence of an ICE officer. *See* ECF No. 77 ¶¶33-37. Defendant Campbell, as final
2 policymaker for the County, admitted he approved the policy after Defendant
3 Himes “conferr[ed] with [Yakima County’s] legal department” about it following
4 the *Miranda-Olivares v. Clackmas Cnty.*, No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL
5 1414305 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014), decision. ECF No. 78, Ex. R, Campbell Dep. at
6 27:10-12; *see also* ECF No. 77 ¶27. Therefore, the County’s immigration hold
7 policy reflects a deliberate choice by policymakers within the County.
8

9 In addition, as part of its immigration hold policy, the County also had a
10 custom of discouraging, and thereby preventing, individuals from posting bail.
11 ECF No. 77 ¶¶38-40. In Mr. Sanchez’s case, as in the case of countless others, the
12 immigration hold prevented him from even accessing bail bonds services in the
13 first place, for bail bonds agencies refused to work with individuals with
14 immigration holds based on the understanding they would not actually be released
15 from Yakima County jail. ECF No. 77 ¶¶10-11, 41. That the County would not
16 have released Mr. Sanchez if he posted bail, absent the TRO issued by this Court,
17 demonstrates that the County’s immigration hold deprived him of his right to
18 pretrial release and unlawfully prolonged his detention.
19
20

21 **b. An I-200 did not furnish the probable cause necessary for**
22 **the County to place an immigration hold on Mr. Sanchez.**
23

1 The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and
2 seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Specifically, the Fourth Amendment prohibits
3 government officials from detaining an individual in the absence of a probable
4 cause finding made “by a neutral and detached magistrate.” *Gerstein v. Pugh*, 420
5 U.S. 103, 112 (1975); *Manuel v. City of Joliet*, 137 S. Ct. 911, 917 (2017) (drawing
6 from *Gerstein* to explain that “a pretrial restraint on liberty is unlawful unless a
7 judge (or grand jury) first makes a reliable finding of probable cause”); *see also*
8 *Coolidge v. New Hampshire*, 403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1971) (finding a warrant
9 issued by the Attorney General to be invalid because he was in charge of
10 prosecution and not a neutral magistrate).

11
12
13 Even where an initial arrest was justified by probable cause, the Fourth
14 Amendment requires a valid warrant to be issued by a neutral magistrate in order
15 to continue detaining an individual. *Melendres v. Arpaio*, 695 F.3d 990, 1001 (9th
16 Cir. 2012) (“While the seizures of the named plaintiffs based on traffic violations
17 may have been supported by reasonable suspicion, any extension of their detention
18 must be supported by additional suspicion of criminality.”); *see also Morales v.*
19 *Chadbourne*, 793 F.3d 208, 217 (1st Cir. 2015) (“Because Morales was kept in
20 custody for a new purpose after she was entitled to release, she was subjected to a
21 new seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes—one that must be supported by a
22 new probable cause justification.”). Thus, regardless of whether the County’s
23

1 initial seizure of Mr. Sanchez was supported by his state law charges, the County
2 was not authorized to extend Mr. Sanchez’s detention by placing an immigration
3 hold, and thereby preventing his pretrial release, unless it had probable cause to do
4 so.

5
6 What is more, the County publicly posted notice of its immigration hold on
7 Mr. Sanchez, indicating to bail bonds agencies that the County would not release
8 him even if bail were posted on his state law charges, and instead, that it would
9 continue to detain him for a separate cause of confinement—the immigration hold.
10 ECF No. 77 ¶¶8-9, 41. The difficulty Mr. Sanchez experienced in accessing bail
11 bonds services was an intentional and expected result of the immigration hold. *Cf.*
12 *Mendia v. Garcia*, 768 F.3d 1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the plaintiff
13 sufficiently established injury by alleging that “but for the immigration detainer, he
14 would have posted bail with the assistance of a bail bondsman”). The County’s
15 deliberate placement of the immigration hold on Mr. Sanchez thus constituted a
16 legally cognizable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, as it is a “governmental
17 termination of freedom of movement *through means intentionally applied.*”
18 *Brower v. Cty. of Inyo*, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989); *see also, e.g., Miranda-Olivares*,
19 2014 WL 1414305 at *9 (explaining that county’s “continuation of [plaintiff’s]
21 detention based on the ICE detainer” was “a subsequent and new prolonged
22
23

1 warrantless, post-arrest, pre-arraignment custody”) (internal quotation marks and
2 citation omitted).

3 The County acknowledged the sole basis of its decision to place an
4 immigration hold on Mr. Sanchez was the I-200. As the record indisputably
5 establishes, the purpose of the hold was to ensure that when he posted bail or
6 completed his state charges he would not be released, but rather, re-designated as a
7 federal detainee. By placing an immigration hold, the County was prolonging his
8 detention even though he was otherwise entitled to pretrial release under bail.
9

10 The County cannot demonstrate that this prolonged detention was supported
11 by probable cause. Although the I-200 states that there is probable cause for a
12 designated immigration officer to detain a noncitizen, unlike a judicial warrant, it
13 was issued by an ICE officer without any review by a neutral judge or magistrate.
14 *See* ECF No. 62-2 at 16 (I-200 signed by DHS Supervisory Detention Deportation
15 Officer); 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2).¹ Yet, “probable cause for the issuance of an arrest
16 warrant must be determined by someone independent of police and prosecution.”
17 *Gerstein*, 420 U.S. at 118. Like the Attorney General who oversaw the
18
19

20
21
22 ¹ The immigration officer simply checked prepopulated boxes without
23 providing *any* information specific to Mr. Sanchez. *See* ECF No. 62-2.

1 investigation and prosecution in *Coolidge*, ICE officers are in charge of
2 investigating and prosecuting immigration violations and thus do not constitute
3 neutral finders of probable cause. *See Coolidge*, 403 U.S. at 453; *see also Gerstein*,
4 420 U.S. at 114 (“[T]he detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if
5 the Fourth Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded
6 interference with liberty.”); *El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, 579 F. Supp.
7 2d 249, 275-76 (D. Conn. 2008) (treating as “warrantless” an arrest pursuant to an
8 administrative warrant signed by an ICE agent, who was not a “neutral magistrate
9 (or even a neutral executive official)”).

11
12 Federal law does not otherwise authorize the County to take any
13 enforcement action based on the I-200. The I-200 is directed only to “immigration
14 officer[s]” authorized by statute to serve immigration warrants, and does not even
15 purport to direct or authorize state, county, or other local officials to place an
16 immigration hold or perform any other immigration enforcement activity. *See* ECF
17 No. 7-1. The statute and controlling regulations confirm that the County does not
18 have authority to take any enforcement action based on the I-200, as they provide
19 an enumerated list of individuals who are authorized to execute immigration arrest
20 warrants, limiting enforcement to a select group of federal immigration officers.
21 *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (“Any officer or employee of the [DHS] authorized under
22 regulations prescribed by the [Secretary] shall have power . . .”); 8 C.F.R. §
23

1 287.5(c)(1) (only “immigration officers who have successfully completed basic
2 immigration law enforcement training are hereby authorized and designated to
3 exercise the arrest power conferred by [8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2)] . . . ”); 8 C.F.R. §
4 287.5(e)(3) (enumerating the types of immigration officers who have completed
5 training that are authorized “to execute warrants of arrest [Form I-200] for
6 administrative immigration violations issued under [8 U.S.C. § 1226] . . . ”); 8
7 C.F.R. § 236.1(b)(1) (cross-referencing §§ 287.5(e)(2) & (3) to specify the
8 immigration officers who may issue and serve I-200s); 8 C.F.R. § 241.2(b) (cross-
9 referencing § 287.5(e)(3) as the same trained immigration officer criteria for
10 “execut[ing] a warrant of removal [Form I-205]”). The only exception is for state
11 officials who undergo a special training and certification program under 8 U.S.C. §
12 1357(g). But the County had no such agreement with DHS. ECF No. 77 ¶61. Thus,
13 the County had no authority to place a hold based on an I-200 in the first instance,
14 as it conceded at the TRO hearing last July. *See* ECF No. 67-1 at 36:18-24.
15
16

17 **c. Nor was the immigration hold authorized by the IGA.**

18 In its motion for summary judgment filings, the County tellingly does not
19 argue that the I-200 authorizes it to conduct an administrative transfer of detainees
20 into federal custody, but rather, relies on its IGA with the federal government as
21 the source of authority for its immigration hold policy. *See* ECF No. 60 ¶4. This
22 position squarely contradicts the County’s previous recognition that the IGA does
23

1 not authorize it to “retain [Mr. Sanchez] in custody and simply switch his status”
2 upon accepting bail. ECF No. 67-1 at 17:13-18:3 (specifying that the IGA
3 “contemplates that [the County] release him to an appropriate official, such as, an
4 ICE official or U.S. Marshal, and that person, then, can reenter them”). This
5 dramatic change in position further underscores the unlawful nature of the
6 County’s actions.

8 The IGA does not authorize the County to arrest Mr. Sanchez, extend his
9 detention, or place him under federal immigration custody. To the contrary, the
10 IGA specifically requires the County “to accept federal detainees *only upon*
11 presentation by a law enforcement officer of the Federal Government.” ECF No.
12 62-1 at 13 (emphasis added). The U.S. government, for its part, has disavowed that
13 the IGA provides authority for anything beyond this. *See* ECF No. 67-3 at 7
14 (asserting that an IGA “authorizes local law enforcement to house [noncitizens] at
15 the request of ICE, *after ICE takes physical custody* of those [noncitizens] and then
16 decides to book those [noncitizens] into the local facility as ICE detainees”)
17 (emphasis added); ECF No. 67-3 at 3 n.3 (clarifying that “the “existence” of an
18 IGA does not “deputize state law enforcement to unilaterally perform the functions
19 of a federal immigration officer”); *see also* ECF 77 ¶¶59-62.

22 No provision of the IGA authorizes the County to prolong the detention of
23 an individual in its custody solely in reliance on an I-200, or to unilaterally

1 “transfer” them into federal immigration custody when the individual is otherwise
2 entitled to release from county custody. ECF No. 77 ¶58. If the IGA were to
3 authorize Yakima County to do so, it would violate the Immigration and
4 Nationality Act, implementing regulations, and controlling caselaw, all of which
5 make clear that absent an agreement under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), County officers are
6 not authorized to enforce administrative warrants.
7

8 **d. The County’s immigration hold was also not authorized by**
9 **Washington law.**

10 Nor can the County find a source of authority for its immigration hold policy
11 under state law, as there is no basis in Washington State law for the County to
12 perform immigration enforcement activities. No state laws provide authority for
13 state and county enforcement officers to investigate, let alone detain, persons based
14 on allegations of civil immigration violations. *See* WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7 (“No
15 person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
16 authority of law.”); *see also Ramirez-Rangel v. Kitsap County*, No. 12-2-09594-4,
17 2013 WL 6361177, at *2 (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 2013) (declaring that Article
18 1, § 7 of the Washington State Constitution “forbids local enforcement officers
19 from prolonging a detention to investigate or engage in questioning about an
20 individual’s immigration status, citizenship status and/or national origin”); ECF
21 No. 78, Ex. U, Br. for the State of Washington as Amicus Curiae, *Sanchez Ochoa*
22
23

1 *v. Campbell*, No. 17-35679, 2018 WL 1548228 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 2018), ECF No.
2 21 AT §§ IV.A-B (arguing that law enforcement agencies in Washington are not
3 generally authorized to enforce federal civil immigration laws and lack the
4 authority to detain individuals solely for civil immigration enforcement). *Cf. Lunn*
5 *v. Commonwealth*, 78 N.E. 3d 1143, 1156-58 (Mass. 2017) (finding that no
6 Massachusetts state law authorizes officers to make arrests for federal civil
7 immigration matters and that state officers do not have inherent authority to carry
8 out detention requests made by DHS); *Cisneros v. Elder*, No. 2018-CV-30549,
9 Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, at 5-7 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 19, 2018)
10 (holding that I-200 did not authorize local sheriff to effect a seizure under
11 Colorado’s warrantless-arrest statute, which only authorized warrantless arrests
12 for, inter alia, criminal offenses) (Attachment 1).

15 III. CONCLUSION

16 For all of the foregoing reasons, it is undisputed that Yakima County
17 violated Mr. Sanchez’s Fourth Amendment rights when it placed an immigration
18 hold on him pursuant to its unlawful immigration hold policy. Mr. Sanchez is thus
19 entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and he respectfully requests the Court to
20 grant his motion for partial summary judgment.
21

22 DATED this 3rd day of August, 2018.
23

1 COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES

NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT
RIGHTS PROJECT

2
3 s/Lori Isley
Lori Jordan Isley, WSBA #21724

s/Matt Adams
Matt Adams, WSBA #28287

4
5 s/Bernardo Cruz
Bernardo Cruz, WSBA #51382

s/Glenda M. Aldana Madrid
Glenda M. Aldana Madrid, WSBA
#46987

6
7 s/Leila Kang
Leila Kang, WSBA #48048

8
9 COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES
6 South Second Street, Suite 600
10 Yakima, WA 98901
Phone: (509) 575-5593
11 lori.isley@columbialegal.org
bernardo.cruz@columbialegal.org

NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT
RIGHTS PROJECT
615 Second Avenue, Suite 400
Seattle, WA 98104
Phone: (206) 957-8611
matt@nwirp.org
glenda@nwirp.org
leila@nwirp.org


12
13
14 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of August 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:

Lori Jordan Isley	lori.isley@columbialegal.org, cheli.bueno@columbialegal.org, elvia.bueno@columbialegal.org
Bernardo R. Cruz	bernardo.cruz@columbialegal.org
Matt Adams	matt@nwirp.org
Glenda M. Aldana Madrid	glenda@nwirp.org, sydney@nwirp.org
Leila Kang	leila@nwirp.org
Kenneth W. Harper	kharper@mjbe.com, julie@mjbe.com, kathy@mjbe.com
Quinn N. Plant	qplant@mjbe.com, janet@mjbe.com, julie@mjbe.com, kathy@mjbe.com, sbeyer@mjbe.com
Erez Reuveni	erez.r.reuveni@usdoj.gov
Timothy M. Durkin	USAWAE.TDurkinECT@usdoj.gov

And I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the following non-CM/ECF participants: None.


Sydney Maltese