

Honorable Ricardo S. Martinez

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

Conceley del Carmen MENDEZ ROJAS, Elmer
Geovanni RODRIGUEZ ESCOBAR, Lidia
Margarita LOPEZ ORELLANA, and Maribel
SUAREZ GARCIA, on behalf of themselves as
individuals and on behalf of others similarly
situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Jeh JOHNSON, Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security, in his official capacity;
Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General of the
United States, in her official capacity; Thomas S.
WINKOWSKI, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, in his official capacity; Leon
RODRIGUEZ, Director of U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, in his official capacity; R.
GIL KERLIKOWSKE, Commissioner of U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, in his official
capacity; and Juan P. OSUNA, Director of the
Executive Office for Immigration Review, in his
official capacity,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:16-cv-01024-RSM

**MOTION FOR CLASS
CERTIFICATION**

NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:
August 19, 2016

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

I. MOTION AND PROPOSED CLASS DEFINITION

1 Plaintiffs are asylum seekers who challenge Defendants’ failure to provide them, and
2 the classes they move to represent, with notice of the statutory requirement that an asylum
3 seeker must apply for asylum within one year of arrival in the United States (the one-year
4 deadline), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), as well as Defendants’ failure to provide a mechanism that
5 ensures that an asylum seeker is able to comply with that deadline. Defendants’ policies and
6 practices infringe on Plaintiffs’ and putative class members’ statutory and regulatory rights to
7 apply for asylum, often depriving them of those rights altogether, and also violate their right to
8 due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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11 Plaintiffs fled to the United States seeking refuge from the persecution they faced in
12 their countries of origin. When they presented themselves to officers of Customs and Border
13 Protection (CBP)—a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—at the
14 border or encountered them shortly after crossing the border, all Plaintiffs informed DHS of
15 their fear of return or their desire to seek refuge. Yet neither CBP nor other DHS Defendants
16 provided any of them with notice of the statutory obligation to file an asylum application (Form
17 I-589) within one year of their arrival. Moreover, both DHS Defendants and the Executive
18 Office for Immigration Review (EOIR)—a component of the Department of Justice (DOJ)—
19 failed to provide them with a guaranteed mechanism by which to submit their applications
20 within the statutory period. In order for Plaintiffs to have a meaningful opportunity to apply for
21 asylum, federal immigration and constitutional law necessitate both that the DHS Defendants
22 provide Plaintiffs, and the classes they seek to represent, with notice of the one-year deadline
23 and that all Defendants implement uniform procedural mechanisms for compliance with the
24 deadline.
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1 The questions presented in this case—whether the DHS Defendants are obligated to
 2 provide Plaintiffs with notice of the one-year deadline when released from DHS custody, and
 3 whether the DHS and DOJ Defendants must provide a mechanism that ensures that Plaintiffs
 4 are able to apply for asylum in a timely manner—can and should be resolved on a class-wide
 5 basis. The proposed classes and subclasses, moreover, satisfy the requirements set forth in
 6 Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, Plaintiffs request
 7 that the Court certify the following classes and subclasses, with the following Plaintiffs as class
 8 and subclass representatives:¹

10 **CLASS A (“Credible Fear Class”):** All individuals who have been
 11 released or will be released from DHS custody after they have been found to
 12 have a credible fear of persecution within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. §
 13 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) and did not receive notice from DHS of the one-year
 14 deadline to file an asylum application as set forth in 8 U.S.C. §
 15 1158(a)(2)(B).

16 **A.I.:** All individuals in Class A who *are not* in removal proceedings and
 17 who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after
 18 one year of their last arrival.

19 **A.II.:** All individuals in Class A who *are* in removal proceedings and who
 20 either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one
 21 year of their last arrival.

22 Plaintiffs Elmer Geovanni Rodriguez Escobar and Concely del Carmen Mendez Rojas move to
 23 be appointed as representatives of Class A. Plaintiff Rodriguez moves to be appointed as
 24 representative of Subclass A.I., while Plaintiff Mendez moves to be appointed as representative
 25 of Subclass A.II.

26 ¹ For purposes of all four subclasses, an individual has “applied” for asylum when her application on Form
 27 I-589 is accepted, and not subsequently rejected, by either Defendant U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
 28 (USCIS) or Defendant EOIR. An application is rejected by USCIS where USCIS refuses to accept it or
 subsequently issues a rejection notice. An application is rejected by EOIR where EOIR refuses to accept it.
 Pursuant to current EOIR policy, an application is not “filed” if it is accepted for “lodging” purposes only. *See*
 Imm. Ct. Practice Manual 3.1(b)(iii)(A).

1 **CLASS B (“Other Entrants Class”):** All individuals who have been or will
2 be detained upon entry; express a fear of return to their country of origin; are
3 released or will be released from DHS custody without a credible fear
4 determination; are issued a Notice to Appear (NTA); and did not receive
5 notice from DHS of the one-year deadline to file an asylum application set
6 forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B).

7 **B.I.:** All individuals in Class B who *are not* in removal proceedings and who
8 either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one
9 year of their last arrival.

10 **B.II.:** All individuals in Class B who *are* in removal proceedings and who
11 either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one
12 year of their last arrival.

13 Plaintiffs Maribel Suarez Garcia and Lidia Margarita Lopez Orellana move to be appointed as
14 representatives of Class B. Plaintiff Lopez moves to be appointed as representative of Subclass
15 B.I., while Plaintiff Suarez moves to be appointed as representative of Subclass B.II.²

16 Within each Class and Subclass, the relevant Plaintiffs and putative class members
17 present common legal claims. The difference between the two Classes centers on the two
18 different ways in which the DHS Defendants process asylum seekers upon entry. Class A
19 consists of individuals whom DHS initially placed in “expedited removal” proceedings and
20 who, as part of that process, passed an initial screening relative to their asylum claim (a
21 “credible fear” screening). Because they demonstrated a credible fear of returning to their
22 countries of origin, they were taken out of expedited removal proceedings. DHS subsequently
23 released them from detention. Class B consists of individuals who, upon arrival into the United
24 States, expressed to DHS a fear of returning to their countries of origin and whom DHS
25 released into the country; DHS did not give them a credible fear screening but instead issued

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28 ² Due to an inadvertent scrivener’s error, the proposed definitions of subclasses A.I., B.I., and B.II. differ from their definitions in the complaint, Dkt. 1, in that they substitute the word “yet” for “at all.”

1 them an NTA for removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Neither Class includes
2 individuals who filed a timely application for asylum.

3 Moreover, each Class is divided into two Subclasses based on whether the individual is
4 in removal proceedings. Those in Subclasses A.I. and B.I. face barriers to timely filing their
5 asylum applications because the DHS Defendants have not implemented a uniform procedural
6 mechanism to ensure that their asylum applications will be accepted and treated as timely filed.
7 Those in Subclasses A.II. and B.II. face barriers to timely filing their asylum applications
8 because the DOJ Defendants have not implemented uniform procedural mechanisms to ensure
9 that their asylum applications will be treated as timely filed with the immigration court
10 presiding over their removal proceedings.
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13 Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of these classes, requiring the
14 DHS Defendants to provide notice of the one-year deadline and all Defendants to establish and
15 implement uniform procedural mechanisms that allow asylum applicants to comply with the
16 deadline.
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18 **II. BACKGROUND**

19 **A. Plaintiffs' Legal Claims**

20 Although the Court need not engage in “an in-depth examination of the underlying
21 merits” at this stage, it may analyze the merits to the extent necessary to determine the
22 propriety of class certification. *Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp.*, 657 F.3d 970, 983 n.8 (9th
23 Cir. 2011); *see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551-52 (2011). For that
24 reason, Plaintiffs provide a brief summary of their merits claims here. *See also* Dkt. 1.
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26 Plaintiffs are asylum seekers who fled persecution in their countries of origin, and who
27 expressed a fear of persecution or desire to apply for asylum to DHS officers upon their arrival
28 in the United States. Class A Plaintiffs not only expressed a fear of persecution, but they were

1 also found by Defendant U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)—a component of
2 DHS—to have a “credible fear of persecution” if deported to their country of origin, and were
3 subsequently released from DHS custody to await an opportunity to pursue an asylum
4 application in removal proceedings. Class B Plaintiffs similarly expressed a fear of persecution
5 or desire to apply for asylum to DHS officers upon their arrival into the United States, and DHS
6 released them into the country to await an opportunity to pursue an asylum application in
7 removal proceedings. Significantly, the DHS Defendants failed to notify Plaintiffs and the
8 putative class members they seek to represent that, under the Immigration and Nationality Act
9 (INA), there is a one-year deadline for filing their asylum applications. *See* 8 U.S.C. §
10 1158(a)(2)(B). Nor were Plaintiffs provided with a guaranteed procedural mechanism to
11 ensure that they could timely submit their applications, as, inter alia, EOIR only allows
12 applicants to file asylum applications in open court and many such applicants do not receive a
13 court date until *after* the one-year deadline. *See* Dkt. 1 ¶¶52-58. Plaintiffs contend that the
14 DHS Defendants’ failure to notify them of the one-year deadline and all Defendants’ failure to
15 create and implement uniform procedural mechanisms to timely submit their asylum
16 applications violates the INA, governing regulations, and Plaintiffs’ due process rights.

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20 “It is undisputed that all [noncitizens] possess” a statutory “right” to apply for asylum.
21 *Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh*, 919 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing 8 U.S.C. §
22 1158(a) (1988); *Jean v. Nelson*, 727 F.2d 957, 982 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), *aff’d as*
23 *modified*, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); and *Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith*, 676 F.2d 1023, 1038-39 (5th
24 Cir. 1982)). This statutory right stems from the Refugee Act of 1980, “in which Congress
25 sought to bring United States refugee law into conformity with the 1967 United Nations
26 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (UN Protocol).” *Orantes-Hernandez*, 919 F.2d at
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1 551; *see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 424 (1987) (noting “[t]he Act’s
2 establishment of a broad class of refugees who are eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum .
3 . . . mirrors the provisions of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
4 which provided the motivation for the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980”).

5 The Refugee Act “expressly declared that its purpose was to enforce the ‘historic policy
6 of the United States to respond to urgent needs of the persons subject to persecution in their
7 homelands,’ and to provide ‘statutory meaning to our national commitment to human rights and
8 humanitarian concerns.’” *Orantes-Hernandez*, 919 F.2d at 552. Prior to this, “there was no
9 specific statutory basis for United States asylum policy with respect to [noncitizens] already in
10 the country.” *Id.* (quoting *Cardoza-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. at 433). Through § 201(b) of the
11 Refugee Act, Congress first enacted the asylum statute, currently located at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a),
12 and directed the Attorney General to “establish a procedure for [a noncitizen] physically
13 present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry . . . to apply for asylum”
14 *Id.*; *see also* Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(b), 94 Stat. 102 (1980).

15 “Congressional intent was to create a ‘uniform procedure’ for consideration of asylum claims
16 which would include an opportunity for [noncitizens] to have asylum applications ‘considered
17 outside a deportation and/or exclusion hearing setting.’” *Orantes-Hernandez*, 919 F.2d at 552
18 (citation omitted).

19 In *Orantes-Hernandez*, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a class-wide affirmative injunction
20 on behalf of Salvadoran asylum seekers who, as Plaintiffs do here, challenged the
21 government’s interference with their right to apply for asylum. In affirming the injunction on
22 other grounds, the Ninth Circuit noted that other circuits had agreed that it would be unlawful
23 “if [noncitizens] who indicated they feared persecution if returned home were not advised of
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1 the right to seek asylum.” 919 F.2d at 556-57 (citing *Jean*, 727 F.2d at 981-83 & n.35). “[I]f
2 [immigration] officials were refusing to inform [noncitizens] of their right to seek asylum even
3 if they did indicate that they feared persecution if returned to their home countries . . . this
4 would constitute a clear violation of the Refugee Act, and remedial action would be justified . .
5 . . .” *Id.* at 557 (quoting *Jean*, 727 F.2d at 983 n.35).

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7 Plaintiffs and putative class members possess the statutory right to apply for asylum
8 recognized by all courts, including the Supreme Court in *Cardoza-Fonseca* and the Ninth
9 Circuit in *Orantes-Hernandez*. They indicated to the DHS Defendants that they feared
10 persecution in their countries of origin. Indeed, for those within Class A, DHS already has
11 determined that they possess a credible fear of persecution. Nonetheless, DHS failed to inform
12 them of the one-year deadline, and the DHS and DOJ Defendants have failed to provide them
13 with a guaranteed procedural mechanism to timely apply for asylum. As a result, Defendants
14 deprived Plaintiffs and putative class members of their statutory right to apply for asylum.
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16 In addition, this lack of notice and lack of a uniform procedural mechanism violate
17 Plaintiffs’ due process rights. It is well-settled that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
18 Amendment protects citizens and noncitizens physically present in the United States. *See, e.g.,*
19 *Landon v. Plasencia*, 459 U.S. 21, 32-33 (1982); *Mathews v. Diaz*, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).

20 Because Plaintiffs have a statutory right to apply for asylum, they are entitled to due process in
21 the pursuit of that right. *See Wilkinson v. Austin*, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (stating that due
22 process requires compliance with fair procedures prior to any deprivation of an individual’s
23 protected liberty or property interest). In this case, due process requires Defendants to notify
24 Plaintiffs of the one-year deadline. *See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339
25 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
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1 proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
2 circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
3 opportunity to present their objections.”). Due process also requires that Defendants provide a
4 procedural mechanism that ensures that Plaintiffs are able to timely file their asylum
5 application. *See Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

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7 **B. Named Plaintiffs’ Factual Backgrounds**

8 Plaintiff Rodriguez is a 37-year-old asylum seeker from Honduras. Mr. Rodriguez
9 entered the United States in July 2014 and established a credible fear of persecution in an
10 interview with USCIS. Subsequently, DHS released him from custody with an NTA, the
11 charging document in removal proceedings, but did not inform him of the one-year deadline.
12 DHS has not placed Mr. Rodriguez in removal proceedings yet. He only learned of the
13 deadline when he sought counsel for his immigration case. His attempts to comply with the
14 one-year deadline have been unsuccessful, however, as both USCIS and EOIR have rejected
15 his asylum application—USCIS rejected it on the assumption that Mr. Rodriguez was in
16 removal proceedings, so the application had to be filed with EOIR; EOIR rejected the
17 application Mr. Rodriguez attempted to lodge because he is not actually in removal
18 proceedings. As a result, he has been unable to file, or even lodge, his asylum application. *See*
19 *Dkt. 1 ¶¶60-66.*

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22 Plaintiff Mendez is a 30-year-old asylum seeker from the Dominican Republic. Ms.
23 Mendez entered the United States in September 2013 and established a credible fear of
24 persecution in an interview with USCIS. Subsequently, DHS released her from custody with
25 an NTA, but did not inform her of the one-year deadline. She only learned of the deadline
26 when she sought counsel for her immigration case—*after* one year had already passed. As she
27 had not yet been placed in removal proceedings, Ms. Mendez attempted to file an asylum
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1 application with USCIS, but USCIS rejected it on the assumption that she already was in
2 removal proceedings. Only after this rejection—and more than one year after she entered the
3 country—did DHS file the NTA with the immigration court, allowing Ms. Mendez to finally
4 lodge her asylum application with the San Antonio Immigration Court. Her first immigration
5 court hearing will be in August 2016. *See* Dkt. 1 ¶¶67-74.

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7 Plaintiff Lopez is a 37-year-old asylum seeker from Guatemala. In February 2014, she
8 arrived at a Texas port of entry with two of her children and told the inspecting officers that she
9 was afraid to return to Guatemala. DHS served Ms. Lopez and her children with NTAs and
10 released them from custody with the requirement that they check in with DHS on a regular
11 basis. DHS did not inform her of the one-year deadline. Ms. Lopez checked in with DHS on
12 four occasions between March 2014 and September 2015, yet at no point did DHS inform her
13 of the one-year deadline. In October 2015, she was issued a notice of hearing for November
14 2015 in the San Antonio Immigration Court. Ms. Lopez did not learn of the one-year deadline
15 until she consulted an immigration attorney in December 2015. She lodged her asylum
16 application with the court in January 2016, nearly two years after she arrived in the United
17 States. The immigration judge subsequently terminated her removal proceedings, and she filed
18 an asylum application affirmatively with USCIS in February 2016. USCIS has not yet
19 scheduled an interview regarding her asylum application. *See* Dkt. 1 ¶¶75-81.

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22 Plaintiff Suarez is a 29-year-old asylum seeker from Mexico. She and her five young
23 children arrived at a California port of entry in November 2013. Upon her arrival, Ms. Suarez
24 informed DHS that she was afraid to return to Mexico and that she was seeking asylum in the
25 United States. She provided DHS with a sworn statement regarding her fear of returning to
26 Mexico. Shortly afterwards, DHS released her and her children from custody with NTAs, and
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1 paroled them into the country to await a removal hearing. At no point did DHS inform Ms.
2 Suarez of the one-year deadline. She first learned of this requirement more than a year later,
3 when she sought counsel. She then promptly lodged her application with the San Francisco
4 Immigration Court. Ms. Suarez is scheduled for an individual hearing in May 2017. *See* Dkt. 1
5 ¶¶82-87.

7 III. THE COURT SHOULD CERTIFY THE CLASSES.

8 The statutory, regulatory, and constitutional violations Plaintiffs assert have tremendous
9 adverse consequences. The DHS Defendants' failure to advise of the one-year deadline and all
10 Defendants' failure to create a meaningful process that ensures that Plaintiffs and putative class
11 members are able to timely apply for asylum, has or will result in Plaintiffs and putative class
12 members effectively being denied the right to apply for asylum—a critical protection.
13 Plaintiffs thus seek certification of the aforementioned classes and subclasses under Rule
14 23(b)(2), to enjoin Defendants' unlawful policies.

16 Courts in the Ninth Circuit routinely certify classes challenging the adequacy of policies
17 and procedures under the immigration laws. *See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith*, 541 F.
18 Supp. 351, 370-72 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (certifying provisional nationwide class of Salvadoran
19 asylum seekers challenging certain Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) policies and
20 procedures including, inter alia, its failure to advise them of their right to apply for asylum);
21 *Walters v. Reno*, 1996 WL 897662, at *5-8 (W.D. Wash. 1996), *aff'd*, 145 F.3d 1032, 1045-47
22 (9th Cir. 1998), *cert. denied, Reno v. Walters*, 526 U.S. 1003 (1999) (certifying nationwide
23 class of individuals challenging adequacy of notice in document fraud cases); *Rodriguez v.*
24 *Hayes*, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2010) (reversing district court order denying class certification
25 for class of immigration detainees subject to prolonged detention); *Khoury v. Asher*, 3 F. Supp.
26 3d 877 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (certifying class and ordering declaratory relief for immigration
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1 detainees held in immigration custody without bond hearings); *A.B.T. v. U.S. Citizenship and*
 2 *Immigration Services*, 2013 WL 5913323 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 4, 2013) (certifying nationwide
 3 class and approving settlement amending practices by EOIR and USCIS that precluded asylum
 4 applicants from receiving employment authorization); *Roshandel v. Chertoff*, 554 F. Supp. 2d
 5 1194 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (certifying district-wide class of delayed naturalization cases);
 6 *Gonzales v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec.*, 239 F.R.D. 620, 627-29 (W.D. Wash. 2006)
 7 (certifying Ninth Circuit wide class challenging USCIS policy contradicting binding
 8 precedent), *preliminary injunction vacated*, 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007) (establishing new
 9 rule and vacating preliminary injunction but no challenge made to class certification); *Ali v.*
 10 *Ashcroft*, 213 F.R.D. 390, 408-11 (W.D. Wash. 2003), *aff'd*, 346 F.3d 873, 886-89 (9th Cir.
 11 2003), *vacated on other grounds*, 421 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2005) (certifying nationwide class of
 12 Somalis challenging legality of removal to Somalia in the absence of a functioning
 13 government).³

14 Certification of such classes under Rule 23(b)(2) is unsurprising. The rule was intended
 15 to “facilitate the bringing of class actions in the civil-rights area,” 7AA WRIGHT & MILLER,
 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1775, at 71 (3d ed. 2005), especially those—like the
 17 present case—seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. What is more, class actions in the
 18 immigration arena often involve claims on behalf of class members who would not have the
 19 ability to present their claims absent class treatment. This rationale applies with particular
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 25 ³ See also *Barahona-Gomez v. Reno*, 236 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding district court had
 26 jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief in certified class action challenging unlawful immigration directives issued by
 27 EOIR); *Gete v. INS*, 121 F.3d 1285, 1299-1300 (9th Cir. 1997) (vacating denial of class certification in challenge
 28 to notice and standards in INS vehicle forfeiture procedure); *Gorbach v. Reno*, 181 F.R.D. 642, 644 (W.D. Wash.
 1998), *aff'd on other grounds*, 219 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (certifying nationwide class of persons
 challenging validity of administrative denaturalization proceedings); *Santillan v. Ashcroft*, No. C 04-2686 MHP,
 2004 WL 2297990, at *8-12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2004) (certifying nationwide class of lawful permanent residents
 challenging delays in receiving documentation of their status).

1 force to civil rights suits like this one, where, absent class certification, there likely will be no
2 opportunity to resolve the legal claim at issue. Putative class members are recent immigrants to
3 this country who have fled danger, many of whom do not understand English and have little to
4 no understanding of U.S. immigration or constitutional law. A large percentage of these
5 asylum seekers are indigent and many are unrepresented, and thus lack the legal counsel
6 necessary to even contemplate, much less raise, the type of claim brought here. Finally, the
7 core issues here, like the class actions cited above, involve questions of law, rather than
8 questions of fact, and are thereby well suited for resolution on a class-wide basis. *See, e.g.,*
9 *Unthaksinkun v. Porter*, No. C11-0588JLR, 2011 WL 4502050, at *15 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 28,
10 2011) (concluding that since all class members were subject to the same notice process, its
11 ruling as to the legal sufficiency of the process “would apply equally to all class members”).
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14 In reviewing whether to certify a nationwide class, courts consider whether (1) there are
15 similar cases currently pending in other jurisdictions, and (2) the plaintiffs are challenging a
16 nationwide policy or practice. *See, e.g., Arnott v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.*, 290
17 F.R.D. 579, 589 (C.D. Cal. 2012); *Clark v. Astrue*, 274 F.R.D. 462, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
18
19 There are no other similar cases currently pending in other jurisdictions. And as noted above,
20 nationwide classes challenging immigration policies and practices are regularly certified given
21 that immigration policy is based on uniform, federal law. Further, nationwide certification is
22 required in this case in order to effectuate Congress’s intent to “create a ‘uniform procedure’
23 for consideration of asylum claims.” *Orantes-Hernandez*, 919 F.2d at 552 (citation omitted).
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25 Moreover, this issue can only be addressed on a nationwide level. It would be
26 unworkable to limit the scope of certification to anything other than a nationwide class. The
27 putative classes consist of individuals released by DHS after presenting themselves at the
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1 border or being apprehended near the border. Upon release, they travel to all parts of the
 2 country to reunite with family members or other supportive community members. Thus, any
 3 challenge to Defendants’ practices and policies relating to a failure to provide notice and
 4 procedural mechanisms to the individuals they release necessarily must apply to the entire
 5 nation. Certification that is not nationwide in scope would result in Defendants continuing to
 6 give defective notice and inadequate application procedures to affected noncitizens by virtue of
 7 their location—an arbitrary and unjust result. *See Gorbach v. Reno*, 181 F.R.D. 642, 644
 8 (W.D. Wash. 1998), *aff’d*, 219 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding certification of a nationwide
 9 class particularly fitting because “anything less that [sic] a nationwide class would result in an
 10 anomalous situation allowing the INS to pursue denaturalization proceedings against some
 11 citizens, but not others, depending on which district they reside in”).

14 **A. This Action Satisfies the Class Certification Requirements of Rule 23(a).**

15 A class “may be divided into subclasses that are each treated as a class.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
 16 23(c)(5). Each subclass “must independently meet the requirements of Rule 23.” *Buus v.*
 17 *WAMU Pension Plan*, 251 F.R.D. 578, 581 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (citing Rule 23(c)(5) and *Betts*
 18 *v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd.*, 659 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1981)). Here, the classes
 19 and the subclasses meet the requirements of Rule 23.

21 **1. The Proposed Class Members Are so Numerous That Joinder Is
 22 Impracticable.**

23 Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the class be “so numerous that joinder of all members is
 24 impracticable.” “[I]mpracticability’ does not mean ‘impossibility,’ but only the difficulty or
 25 inconvenience of joining all members of the class.” *Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Est., Inc.*,
 26 329 F.2d 909, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1964) (citation omitted). No fixed number of class members is
 27 required. *Perez-Funez v. District Director, Immigration & Naturalization Service*, 611 F.
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1 Supp. 990, 995 (C.D. Cal. 1984). Courts generally find this requirement is satisfied even when
2 relatively few class members are involved.⁴

3 The proposed classes are numerous. According to statistics for Fiscal Year 2016 from
4 the Asylum Division of Defendant USCIS, thousands of noncitizens express a fear of
5 persecution to the DHS Defendants upon their arrival into the United States each month.⁵
6 During that same year, the Asylum Division determined that 36,324 individuals who were
7 originally detained and placed in expedited removal proceedings had a “credible fear” of
8 persecution if returned to their home countries.⁶ Upon information and belief, the vast
9 majority, if not all, of these 36,324 individuals are putative Class A members; as such, joinder
10 of all such members would be entirely unreasonable, if not virtually impossible. Consequently,
11 Defendant USCIS’s own data make clear that putative Class A is far too numerous to make
12 joinder practicable.
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15 In addition, the supporting declarations filed by several immigration attorneys from
16 across the country further demonstrate that both Class A and Class B membership is too
17 numerous for joinder. *See* Declaration of Genevra W. Alberti ¶¶3-6 (Missouri legal services
18 attorney noting, inter alia, that she currently represents more than 30 asylum seekers who were
19 released by DHS with an NTA after expressing fear at the border and not given notice of the
20 one-year deadline); Declaration of Yuk Man Maggie Cheng ¶¶5, 8, 12-15 (Seattle legal
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24 ⁴ *See, e.g., Arkansas Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. Of Educ.*, 446 F.2d 763, 765-66 (8th Cir. 1971) (finding 17 class
25 members sufficient); *McCluskey v. Trs. Of Red Dot Corp. Employee Stock Ownership Plan & Trust*, 268 F.R.D.
26 670, 674-76 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (certifying class with 27 known members); *Jones v. Diamond*, 519 F.2d 1090,
27 1100 (5th Cir. 1975) (class membership of 48); *Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc.*, 555 F.2d 270, 275
28 (10th Cir. 1977) (41-46 class members).

⁵ *See* Asylum Division, USCIS, “Credible Fear Workload Report Summary: FY 2016 Total Caseload,” at 1
available at
<https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20Engagements/CredibleFearReasonableFearStatisticsNationalityReports.pdf> (last visited Jul. 7, 2016).

⁶ *Id.*

1 services attorney remarking, inter alia, that in a five-month time span, the asylum unit of
2 NWIRP’s Seattle office interviewed “at least 21 asylum seekers who were not informed by
3 DHS of the one-year deadline upon their release from custody,” including eight such
4 individuals who had been released without a credible fear interview); Declaration of Ilana
5 Greenstein ¶¶3-15 (Massachusetts attorney recounting, inter alia, that in her 18 years of
6 experience, she has “never had a client who has received a written or oral advisal of the one-
7 year deadline” from DHS); Declaration of Jennifer Rotman ¶¶5-6, 8, 10-13 (Oregon attorney
8 observing that, of “dozens” of asylum-seeking clients who have expressed fear at the border,
9 she is not aware of any who were informed of the one-year deadline, and detailing difficulties
10 with filing asylum applications stemming from jurisdictional issues); Declaration of Patricia
11 Freshwater ¶¶5-17 (Texas attorney describing, inter alia, her representation of at least a dozen
12 individuals who have been released from DHS custody without being told of the one-year
13 deadline, despite passing a credible fear interview or expressing a fear of return, and the
14 challenges she has faced in filing her clients’ asylum applications in a timely manner);
15 Declaration of Elise Harriger ¶¶6-13 (Texas legal services attorney who serves several hundred
16 asylum seekers annually declaring that “DHS does not tell asylum seekers about the deadline”
17 despite having multiple interactions with them, and relating obstacles to filing individuals’
18 asylum applications); Declaration of Vanessa Allyn ¶¶2-15 (Maryland-licensed legal services
19 attorney describing asylum seekers’ overwhelming lack of awareness of one-year deadline and
20 the veritable “Gordian knot” that often results from complications associated with filing asylum
21 applications in a timely manner).⁷ Cf. *Ali*, 213 F.R.D. at 408 (noting that “the Court does not
22 need to know the exact size of the putative class, ‘so long as general knowledge and common
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⁷ These declarations will be filed concurrently herewith.

1 sense indicate that it is large” (quoting *Perez-Funez*, 611 F. Supp. at 995)); Newberg on Class
2 Actions § 3:13 (noting that “it is well settled that a plaintiff need not allege the exact number or
3 specific identity of proposed class members”).

4 Numerosity is not a close question here; however, even were it so, the Court should
5 certify the class. *See Stewart v. Associates Consumer Discount Co.*, 183 F.R.D. 189, 194 (E.D.
6 Pa. 1998) (“[W]here the numerosity question is a close one, the trial court should find that
7 numerosity exists, since the court has the option to decertify the class later pursuant to Rule
8 23(c)(1).”). Defendants are in possession of the precise number of proposed class members,
9 but Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the number of current and future class members, and the
10 numerous reasons why it would be impractical to join them, make class certification
11 appropriate as the classes are “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed.
12 R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).

13 2. The Classes Present Common Questions of Law and Fact.

14 Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there be questions of law or fact that are common to the
15 class. “[A]ll questions of fact and law need not be common” to satisfy the commonality
16 requirement, however. *Ellis*, 657 F.3d at 981 (quoting *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d
17 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998)). One shared legal issue can suffice. *See, e.g., Rodriguez*, 591 F.3d
18 at 1122 (“[T]he commonality requirements asks [sic] us to look only for some shared legal
19 issue or a common core of facts.”).

20 “Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have
21 suffered the same injury.’” *Wal-Mart*, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (citation omitted). To establish the
22 existence of a common question of law, the putative class members’ claims “must depend upon
23 a common contention” that is “of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—
24 which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the
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1 validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” *Id.* Thus, “[w]hat matters to class certification
2 . . . is not the raising of common ‘questions’ . . . but, rather the capacity of a classwide
3 proceeding to generate common *answers* apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” *Id.*
4 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

5 Challenges to the adequacy of a uniform notice given to a group of people are routinely
6 certified as class actions, since the sufficiency of notice is a question common to the entire
7 class, as is the answer. *See, e.g., Walters*, 145 F.3d at 1046 (“What makes the plaintiffs’ claims
8 suitable for a class action is the common allegation that the INS’s procedures provide
9 insufficient notice.”); *Unthaksinkun*, 2011 WL 4502050 at *12 (certifying class challenging
10 legality of notice of termination of health benefits after finding, inter alia, that commonality
11 existed where “[a]ll class members were offered the same [notice] process,” because any
12 finding that “this process was insufficient” would mean the process “was insufficient as to all
13 class members”); *Buus*, 251 F.R.D. at 584 (certifying subclasses asserting unlawful notice after
14 concluding, inter alia, that commonality existed because “[t]he members of each proposed
15 subclass presumably received identical notices”).

16 The commonality standard is more liberal in civil rights suits “challeng[ing] a system-
17 wide practice or policy that affects all of the putative class members.” *Armstrong v. Davis*, 275
18 F.3d 849, 868 (9th Cir. 2001), *abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. California*, 543 U.S.
19 499, 504-05 (2005). “[C]lass suits for injunctive or declaratory relief,” like this case, “by their
20 very nature often present common questions satisfying Rule 23(a)(2).” 7A WRIGHT, MILLER &
21 KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1763 at 226.

22 In the instant case, the proposed Class and Subclass members allege common harms: a
23 violation of their statutory right to apply for asylum, which necessarily includes notice of the
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1 statutory deadline to file the application, and a meaningful opportunity to comply with that
2 deadline. Their entitlement to these rights is based on a common core of facts. All members of
3 Class A and Class B are individuals who expressed a fear of persecution or desire to apply for
4 asylum and were released from DHS custody to await removal proceedings. All were released
5 from such custody *after* DHS became aware of their fear of persecution in their home countries.
6 These facts entitle *all* of them to the opportunity to apply for asylum. *See Orantes-Hernandez*,
7 919 F.2d at 553 (“It is undisputed that all [noncitizens] possess . . . a right [to apply for asylum]
8 under the [Refugee] Act.”). They also are entitled to *notice* of the statutory deadline for doing
9 so. *See id.* at 556 (“[N]otice should be given to those [noncitizens] who indicate that they fear
10 persecution if they were to be returned home.”).
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13 Whether these alleged harms exist implicates common factual questions:

14 **i.** Whether the DHS Defendants have a policy or practice of failing to advise
15 asylum seekers found to have a credible fear of persecution of the one-year deadline;

16 **ii.** Whether the DHS Defendants have a policy or practice of failing to advise
17 asylum seekers of the one-year deadline when it releases them from custody after they
18 have expressed a fear of persecution;

19 **iii.** Whether the DHS Defendants have a policy or practice of failing to provide
20 asylum seekers who are not in removal proceedings and are released from custody with
21 a meaningful mechanism to comply with the one-year deadline;

22 **iv.** Whether the DHS and DOJ Defendants have a policy or practice of failing to
23 provide asylum seekers who are in removal proceedings and are released from custody
24 with a meaningful mechanism to comply with the one-year deadline.

25 *All* of the putative members within each subclass make the same legal claims—that the
26 immigration laws and the Constitution require two things with respect to the right to apply for
27 asylum: notice of the one-year deadline and the provision of a meaningful opportunity to
28 comply with the deadline. These legal questions are common to *all* members of each subclass.
The shared common facts within each subclass will ensure that the answers as to the legality of

1 these challenged policies and practices will be the same for all who fall within each subclass,
2 and will thus “drive the resolution of the litigation.” *Ellis*, 657 F.3d at 981 (quoting *Wal-*
3 *Mart*, 131 S. Ct. at 2551). Should Plaintiffs prevail with respect to any of the subclasses, *all*
4 who fall within the subclass will benefit; they all will be entitled to such notice and/or an
5 application mechanism. The subclasses are therefore sufficiently common.

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7 Factual variations as to, for example, the manner in which individual class members
8 were treated by DHS or EOIR, or as to the merits of the asylum claims of individual members,
9 are insufficient to defeat commonality where a uniform policy exists that treats all such
10 members in the same way. In a similar action challenging the adequacy of notice provided by
11 the immigration authorities to certain noncitizens at risk of removal—a failure that also resulted
12 in the noncitizens’ loss of the chance to argue the merits of their defenses in a removal
13 hearing—the district court announced,

14
15 [E]ven though the individual factual circumstances may vary among class
16 members, the commonality requirement is satisfied in a suit such as this
17 where it is alleged that the defendants have acted in a uniform manner with
18 respect to the class. The existence of a policy of providing information not
19 reasonably calculated to apprise non-[E]nglish speakers of their rights
20 would, if such a policy exists, affect all members of the proposed class.

21 *Walters*, 1996 WL 897662 at *6 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
22 court’s finding of commonality, remarking that, as in this case, “[w]hat makes the plaintiffs’
23 claims suitable for a class action is the common allegation that the INS’s procedures provide
24 insufficient notice.” *Walters*, 145 F.3d at 1046.⁸

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28 ⁸ Moreover, even if *some* class members happened by chance to be told of the one-year deadline, this is not
enough to defeat commonality where the DHS Defendants have *no* policy or practice of providing such notice (and
Defendants have not established or implemented a mechanism for timely filing). *See Walters*, 145 F.3d at 1045-46.

1 Plaintiffs are not asking this Court to determine whether they or any putative class
 2 member should be granted asylum; they are simply requesting that this Court review whether
 3 Defendants are required to institute policies and practices providing appropriate notice along
 4 with a meaningful opportunity to submit their applications pursuant to the law. As such, the
 5 questions presented apply equally to all class members regardless of other factual differences.
 6

7 In sum, the questions of law presented here are particularly well-suited to resolution on
 8 a class-wide basis, as “the court must decide only once whether the application” of Defendants’
 9 policies and practices “does or does not violate” the law. *Troy v. Kehe Food Distribs., Inc.*,
 10 276 F.R.D. 642, 654 (W.D. Wash. 2011); *see also LaDuke v. Nelson*, 762 F.2d 1318, 1332 (9th
 11 Cir. 1985) (holding that the constitutionality of an INS procedure “plainly” created common
 12 questions of law and fact).⁹ Because all putative Class and Subclass members allege the same
 13 injuries and raise the same set of common questions, and because the remedy as to future class
 14 members will be the same for all main class members, and the remedy for those who already
 15 have been released by DHS will be Subclass-specific, *see* Section III.A.3, *infra*, this Court
 16 should find the commonality requirement satisfied here.
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19 **3. The Claims of the Named Plaintiffs Are Typical of the Claims of the**
 20 **Members of the Proposed Classes and Subclasses.**

21 Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the claims of the class representatives be “typical of the
 22 claims . . . of the class.” To establish typicality, “a class representative must be part of the class
 23 and ‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class members.” *Gen. Tel. Co.*
 24 *of the Southwest v. Falcon*, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (citation omitted). Factual differences
 25 among class members do not defeat typicality in a case dealing with a uniform policy or
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28 ⁹ As such, resolution on a class-wide basis also serves a purpose behind the commonality doctrine:
 practical and efficient case management. *Rodriguez*, 591 F.3d at 1122.

1 practice, provided that “the unnamed class members have injuries similar to those of the named
2 plaintiffs and that the injuries result from the same, injurious course of conduct.” *Armstrong*,
3 275 F.3d at 869; *see also Unthaksinkun*, 2011 WL 4502050 at *13 (same); *La Duke*, 762 F.2d
4 at 1332 (“The minor differences in the manner in which the representative’s Fourth
5 Amendment rights were violated does not render their claims atypical of those of the class.”);
6 *Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch.*, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1342 (W.D. Wash. 1998) (“When it is
7 alleged that the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both the named plaintiff and
8 the class sought to be represented, the typicality requirement is usually satisfied, irrespective of
9 varying fact patterns which underlie individual claims.”) (citation omitted).

11 Here, the claims of the Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of their putative class
12 members. Each proposed Class A Plaintiff, just like each Class A member, is an asylum seeker
13 who was found to possess a credible fear of persecution and was released from DHS custody
14 after that determination, yet was not given notice by DHS of the one-year deadline or access to
15 a uniform mechanism that ensures the opportunity to timely apply. Both class representatives
16 and class members are thus victims of the “same, injurious course of conduct”: their actual or
17 feared injury—missing their window to apply for asylum—stems from the DHS Defendants’
18 failure to notify them of the one-year deadline to apply for asylum and all Defendants’ failure
19 to create and implement a uniform mechanism for compliance. Similarly, every Class B
20 Plaintiff, along with every class B member, was in DHS custody and expressed a fear of
21 persecution; they were released from custody without notice of the one-year deadline or access
22 to a uniform mechanism in which to timely apply for asylum. Those Plaintiffs, too, are typical
23 of the class members they seek to represent: both have been injured by the DHS Defendants’
24 failure to afford them adequate notice and all Defendants’ failure to create and implement a
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1 uniform mechanism for compliance.

2 Similarly, each Subclass A.I. Plaintiff and Subclass A.I. member, as well as each
3 Subclass B.I. Plaintiff and Subclass B.I. member, has been injured by DHS's failure to provide
4 a guaranteed, uniform mechanism for them to timely file an asylum application, and all share
5 the need for such a mechanism to exist outside the removal proceedings context.
6

7 Additionally, each Subclass A.II. Plaintiff and Subclass A.II. member, as well as each
8 Subclass B.II. Plaintiff and Subclass B.II. member, has been injured by Defendants' failure to
9 provide a uniform mechanism for them to timely file an asylum application within the context
10 of pending removal proceedings. They share a need for a common remedy.
11

12 Because the Plaintiffs and the proposed classes and subclasses raise common legal
13 claims and are united in their interest and injury, the element of typicality is met.

14 **4. The Named Plaintiffs Will Adequately Protect the Interests of the**
15 **Proposed Classes, and Counsel Are Qualified to Litigate this Action.**

16 Rule 23(a)(4) requires that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
17 the interests of the class." "Whether the class representatives satisfy the adequacy requirement
18 depends on 'the qualifications of counsel for the representatives, an absence of antagonism, a
19 sharing of interests between representatives and absentees, and the unlikelihood that the suit is
20 collusive.'" *Walters*, 145 F.3d at 1046 (citations omitted).

21 **a. Named Plaintiffs**

22 Plaintiffs each seek relief on behalf of their respective Subclass as a whole and have no
23 interest antagonistic to those of other Subclass members; they will thus fairly and adequately
24 protect the interests of the Subclass they seek to represent. Their mutual goal is to declare
25 Defendants' challenged policies and practices unlawful and to obtain declaratory and injunctive
26 relief that would not only cure this illegality but remedy the damage to all Subclass members.
27

28 They thus seek a remedy for the same injuries, and all share an interest in having a meaningful

1 opportunity to apply for asylum. Thus, the interests of the representatives and of the class
2 members are aligned.

3 **b. Counsel**

4 Plaintiffs' counsel are adequate. Counsel are considered qualified when they can
5 establish their experience in previous class actions and cases involving the same field of law.

6 *See Lynch v. Rank*, 604 F. Supp. 30, 37 (N.D. Cal. 1984); *Marcus v. Heckler*, 620 F. Supp.
7 1218, 1223-24 (N.D. Ill. 1985); *Adams v. Califano*, 474 F. Supp. 974, 979 (D. Md. 1979).

8 Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys from the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, Dobrin &
9 Han PC, the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, and the American
10 Immigration Council. Counsel have a demonstrated commitment to protecting the rights and
11 interests of noncitizens and, among them, have considerable experience in handling complex
12 and class action litigation in the immigration field. *See* Declaration of Matt Adams;
13 Declaration of Vicky Dobrin; Declaration of Hilary Han; Declaration of Mary Kenney; and
14 Declaration of Trina Realmuto.¹⁰ These attorneys have represented numerous classes of
15 immigrants in actions that successfully obtained class relief. Plaintiffs' counsel will zealously
16 represent both named and absent class members.

17 **B. This Action Also Satisfies the Requirements of Rule 23(b)(2).**

18 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), under which Plaintiffs seek certification,
19 requires that "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply
20 generally to the class." It also "requires 'that the primary relief sought is declaratory or
21 injunctive.'" *Rodriguez*, 591 F.3d at 1125 (citation omitted). "The rule does not require [the
22 court] to examine the viability or bases of class members' claims for declaratory and injunctive
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¹⁰ These declarations will be filed concurrently herewith.

1 relief, but only to look at whether class members seek uniform relief from a practice applicable
2 to all of them.” *Id.* This suit satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2), as Defendants have a
3 nationwide policy of inaction that is injurious to the rights and interests of the Plaintiffs and
4 putative class members.

5 Despite being aware of the notice defects and the lack of mechanism to apply for
6 asylum, the DHS Defendants have failed to provide Plaintiffs and putative class members with
7 adequate notice of the one-year deadline, and all Defendants have refused to provide a
8 mechanism for Plaintiffs and putative class members to comply with that deadline. *See, e.g.*,
9 Cheng Decl. ¶11; Allyn Decl. ¶8. “The only appropriate remedy, if these allegations are
10 established, is declaratory judgment and final injunctive relief.” *Walters*, 1996 WL 897662 at
11 *7. Defendants’ actions in this case violate Plaintiffs’ and proposed class members’ statutory,
12 regulatory, and constitutional right to apply for asylum and demonstrate that Defendants have
13 acted “on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
14 relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15 23(b)(2); *see also Rodriguez*, 591 F.3d at 1126 (finding that class of noncitizens detained
16 during immigration proceedings met Rule 23(b)(2) criteria because “all class members’ [sic]
17 seek the exact same relief as a matter of statutory or, in the alternative, constitutional right”);
18 *see also Parsons v. Ryan*, 754 F.3d 657, 688 (9th Cir. 2014) (Rule 23(b)(2) “requirements are
19 unquestionably satisfied when members of a putative class seek uniform injunctive or
20 declaratory relief from policies or practices that are generally applicable to the class as a
21 whole”). Hence, the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) are met.

22 IV. CONCLUSION

23 Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant this Motion and enter the attached
24 proposed certification order.

1
2 Dated this 21st day of July, 2016.

3 Respectfully submitted,

4 s/Matt Adams
5 Matt Adams, WSBA No. 28287

s/Vicky Dobrin
Vicky Dobrin, WSBA No. 28554

6 s/Glenda Aldana
7 Glenda M. Aldana Madrid, WSBA No. 46987

s/Hilary Han
Hilary Han, WSBA No. 33754

8 Northwest Immigrant Rights Project
9 615 Second Avenue, Suite 400
10 Seattle, WA 98104
11 (206) 957-8611
12 (206) 587-4025 (fax)

Dobrin & Han, PC
705 Second Avenue, Suite 610
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 448-3440
(206) 448-3466 (fax)

13 s/Trina Realmuto
14 Trina Realmuto, *pro hac vice*
15 National Immigration Project
16 of the National Lawyers Guild
17 14 Beacon Street, Suite 602
18 Boston, MA 02108
19 (617) 227-9727
20 (617) 227-5495 (fax)

s/Mary Kenney
Mary Kenney, *pro hac vice*
American Immigration Council
1331 G Street, NW, Suite 200
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 507-7512
(202) 742-5619 (fax)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Glenda M. Aldana Madrid, hereby certify that on July 21, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing motion, proposed order, corporate disclosure statement, and supporting declarations with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system. In addition, I sent a copy of these documents by U.S. first class mail, postage prepaid, to each of the following:

JEH JOHNSON
c/o Office of the General Counsel
Department of Homeland Security
Mail Stop 3650
Washington, DC 20528

R. GIL KERLIKOWSKE, Commissioner of
CBP
c/o Office of the General Counsel
Department of Homeland Security
Mail Stop 3650
Washington, DC 20528

THOMAS S. WINKOWSKI, Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary for ICE
c/o Office of the General Counsel
Department of Homeland Security
Mail Stop 3650
Washington, DC 20528

LEON RODRIGUEZ, Director of USCIS
c/o Office of the General Counsel
Department of Homeland Security
Mail Stop 3650
Washington, DC 20528

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General of
the United States
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001

JUAN OSUNA, Director, Executive Office
for Immigration Review
c/o Executive Office for Immigration Review
Office of the Director
5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2600
Falls Church, VA 20530

United States Attorney's Office
Western District of Washington
Attn: Civil Process Clerk
700 Stewart Street, Suite 5220
Seattle, WA 98101-1271

Executed in Seattle, Washington, on July 21, 2016.

s/ Glenda M. Aldana Madrid

Glenda M. Aldana Madrid, WSBA No. 46987
NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT
615 2nd Avenue, Suite 400
Seattle, WA 98104
Tel: (206) 957-8646