
From: PERRY, CHRISTOPHER M
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 10:20 AM
To: Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO); WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO); HOWE, RANDY J; FORET, VERNON T; CONROY, DONALD E
Subject: RE: Hardened Ops

10-4

Thanks,

Chris

Christopher Perry
Director Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Detroit Field Office
211 West Fort Street, Suite 1200
Detroit, Michigan 48226
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C))
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 10:04 AM
To: PERRY, CHRISTOPHER (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)); HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); FORET, VERNON T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); CONROY, DONALD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Hardened Ops

Chris,

Your actions are spot on. Just left C1's office with similar direction.

*Todd C. Owen
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs & Border Protection*

~~This document and any attachment(s) may contain restricted, sensitive, and/or law enforcement sensitive information belonging to the U.S. Government. It is not for release, review, retransmission, dissemination, or use by anyone other than the intended recipient.~~

From: PERRY, CHRISTOPHER M (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 8:56 AM
To: Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)); WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)); HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); FORET, VERNON T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); CONROY, DONALD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: FW: Hardened Ops

EAC, DEAC, and XD's:

FYSA. Wanted to make sure you are aware we are actively engaged based on the events unfolding given some of the unique characteristics of my AOR. Our BS team and organic intel group is coordinating with the ports related to increased operational tempo/intel dissemination, SRT involved, (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E). Will keep you posted as necessary.

Thanks,

Chris

Christopher Perry
Director Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Detroit Field Office
211 West Fort Street, Suite 1200
Detroit, Michigan 48226

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 8:33 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PERRY, CHRISTOPHER M
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; Detroit Field Office W (b) (7)(E) >; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); DETROITINTELLIGENCEGROU (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Hardened Ops

Good morning,

I'm sure you are all aware of the activity going on overseas and the tension rising (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E)

The DIG is going to monitor DHS and DOD communications on secured network and will push out updates as they are received.

(b) (7)(E)

The DIG will be staffed over the weekend to monitor secure communications.

As of now, there are no specific threats to the AoR.

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Supervisory CBP Officer, Border Security
Detroit Field Office
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Office

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Mobile



From: Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO)
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 10:20 AM
To: BROPHY, ROSE M; CAMPBELL, CARL S (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E); DRAGANAC, JOSEP (b) (7)(E); FASANO, ADELE (b) (7)(E); FORET, VERNON T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HARRIGER, KEVIN C; HOFFMAN, TODD A; (b) (7)(E); HOWE, RANDY J (b) (7)(E); HUNOLT, KIRBY; LAMM, CLINT; MANCHA, HECTOR; MARICICH, ANNE L; MARTEL, CARLOS C; MILLER, TROY A; MURDOCK, JUDSON W; OVERACKER, THOMAS F; Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO); PERRY, CHRISTOPHER M (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E); SABATINO, DIANE J; SKINNER, BRADD M.; STAKES, DONALD R (b) (7)(E); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(E); WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO); (b) (7)(E) YANDO, DONALD F
Subject: Heightened Vigilance

DFOs,

As a result of last evening's events with the drone strike against Iranian leadership, it is prudent at this time to heighten our vigilance against any potential retaliation in the homeland. There is no specific intelligence at this time indicating any such threat here, but none the less, please increase your security awareness at our facilities to better safeguard our employees. I ask that you engage your local LE and IC partners through your TFOs or liaison officers to ensure awareness of any local concerns. (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E) . (b) (7)(E)
Lastly, should a domestic incident occur (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Commissioner Morgan would like to speak with senior CBP leadership at 4pm EST today, and a meeting invite will be forthcoming.

Please acknowledge receipt of this message. Thank you.

*Todd C. Owen
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs & Border Protection*

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From: FORET, VERNON T
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 12:10 PM
To: OCKER, RONALD J; FERRARA, WILLIAM
Cc: HOWE, RANDY J
Subject: RE: C1/C2 one pager
Attachments: Iran.docx

Ron,

OFO paper attached.

Vernon Foret
Executive Director
National Targeting Center
Customs and Border Protection

From: OCKER, RONALD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 11:48 AM
To: FERRARA, WILLIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); FORET, VERNON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: RE: C1/C2 one pager

Sir,

I have not received any input to consolidate.

Ron Ocker
Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner
Office of Intelligence, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Office number (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile number (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Alternate Mobile number (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: FERRARA, WILLIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 11:47 AM
To: OCKER, RONALD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); FORET, VERNON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Cc: HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: C1/C2 one pager

Ron/Vernon,

The timeline for the one pager has moved up significantly. The C2 wants the list of all that we are doing by 1400 hours.

Thanks,


Bill

William A. Ferrara
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Operations Support
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

U.S. Customs and Border Protection
National Targeting Center
January 3, 2020

Issue: Information Regarding Iran and Actions Taken Prior to U.S. Airstrike on Iranian Military Leader

On January 2, 2020, the United States successfully targeted General Qassem Soleimani, the head of Iran's elite Quds Force via an airstrike in Baghdad. Prior to this event the National Targeting Center (NTC) had implemented a number of actions in response to the Department of State's designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Tier I Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).



(b) (7) (E)

- There are currently no direct flights between Iran and the U.S.

Counter Network Division

- NTC supports and enforces the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) licensing and sanctions programs by targeting, detaining, and when necessary seizing shipments of restricted commodities and shipments destined to sanctioned countries or entities.
- NTC assists th (b) (7)(E) [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted].
- NTC continues to suppo (b) (7)(E) [redacted], as well as the laundering of funds generated from these sales.

Conclusion

The NTC has taken various actions in response to the IRGC’s designation as a Tier 1 FTO and will continue to coordinate with the Intelligence Community (IC) to modify operations based on additional information obtained through the IC, CBP inspections, or in working with our international, federal, and state/local partners (b) (7)(E) [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

Historical Data (through June 2019)

(b) (7) (E)

Land Border



From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of WATCH CBP INTEL
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 7:26 PM
To: WATCH CBP INTEL
Cc: OI-CETD-Leadership
Subject: (U//~~FOUO~~) Intelligence Alert -- Strikes against Key Iranian Interests Necessitate Vigilance for Response
Attachments: CBP Intel Alert Strikes against Key Iranian Interests Necessitate Vigilance for Response.pdf



03 January 2019

(U) Reporting Notice: This product was prepared by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Office of Intelligence. It was coordinated with CBP's Office of International Affairs.

(U//LES) Strikes against Key Iranian Interests Necessitate Vigilance for Response

(U//LES) Iran has publically stated that it will respond to the U.S. military strike on 2 January that killed Iranian Major General Qassim Suleimani at Baghdad International Airport. Many consider Suleimani to be the second most influential individual in Iran, second only to the Ayatollah, highlighting his importance to the regime.

- (U//LES) In the strike, the United States also reportedly killed the head of the pro Iran militia Kataib Hizballah (KH), Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, and several other senior pro Iran figures in Iraq. KH was responsible for numerous attacks on U.S. and Iraqi forces, often at Iran's behest.
- (U//LES) General Suleimani was the head of Iran's Quds Force (QF) of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and key to nearly every significant operation by Iranian intelligence and military forces over the past two decades to (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED]
- (U//LES) The IRGC, with the Quds Force (QF) in the lead, is the key Iranian liaison with LH, the strongest paramilitary organization in Lebanon (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED]


(U//LES) While Suleimani's death removes a critical leader, the significant experience of his replacement—Brigadier General Esmail Ghani—likely wi (b) (7)(E) Iranian leaders have

vowed for revenge against the United States, which will likely increas (b) (7)(E)

~~(U) (U) Warning: The information contained herein remains under the control of the Department of Homeland Security, (DHS), through U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). This document contains information that is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO) and may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It should be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need to know without prior approval of an authorized CBP official. The information marked LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE (LES) in this document can be distributed further within DHS (and its contractors), U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, public safety or protection officials on a need-to-know basis; however, it may not be distributed outside DHS without authorization from the originating office. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the LES caveat may not be used in legal proceedings without first receiving authorization from the originating agency. Recipients are prohibited from subsequently posting this information marked LES on a website or an unclassified network.~~

- (U//LES) Ghani joined the IRGC in 1980, served in the 1980 88 war with Iraq, and joined QF after the war. The Ayatollah has described Ghani as one of the “most decorated commanders” during the Iran Iraq war (b) (7)(E)
- (U//LES) The strike on 2 January was the latest escalation between the U.S. and Iran after a rocket attack on an Iraqi military base attributed to an Iran backed militia, killing an American contractor in late December. Recent U.S. retaliation included airstrikes on an Iranian backed militia that killed 24 and prompted outrage among some who saw that attack as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty.
- (U//LES) Due to heightened tensions, the U.S. State Department has urged American citizens to leave Iraq immediately. With a vast network of proxies, Iran has the capability to strike against U.S. assets, personnel and allies in the region.

(U//LES) *We urge CBP officials to remain vigilant against threats related to Iran* (b) (7)(E)



(U) **Feedback:** For general comments or questions related to the dissemination of this document, please e-mail the CBP National Intelligence Watch inbox at (b) (7)(E) or call (b) (7)(E).

From: HOWE, RANDY J
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 9:19 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); SITROOM; OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Fwd: Operational Actions/Significant Encounters- Reporting
Attachments: 20200103 Iran (with AMO and INA).docx; ATT00001.htm

Action please. Please advise the Field of this reporting requirement. Field Liaison will consolidate for OFO.

Randy J. Howe
Executive Director, Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)"
Date: January 3, 2020 at 21:05:52 EST
To: "HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)", "WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO)"
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >, "FORET, VERNON T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)"
Subject: Fwd: Operational Actions/Significant Encounters- Reporting

Randy, pls have Ops take for action.

Thank you.

Todd C. Owen
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Begin forwarded message:

From: "FERRARA, WILLIAM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)"
Date: January 3, 2020 at 6:58:51 PM EST
To: "Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)", "SMITH, BRENDA
BROCKMAN (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)", "YOUNG, EDWARD E"
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)", "HUFFMAN, BENJAMINE C"
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)", "SCOTT, RODNEY S"
<RODNEY.S.SCOTT@CBP.DHS.GOV>
Cc: "OCKER, RONALD J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)"
>
Subject: Operational Actions/Significant Encounters- Reporting

All:

OS is required to provide the C1 and C2 with updates to the operational actions taken by your office and significant encounters/incidents related the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader. I would ask that you provide the SITROOM with a quick note highlighting the significant action(s) or encounter(s) by 1200 each day. Negative reports are **NOT** required.

I have attached the document that was submitted today to the C1 and C2. This document will be used as the base document where the daily updates will simply be placed on the top of this document.

Let me know if you have any questions.

Bill

William A. Ferrara
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Operations Support
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

U.S. Customs and Border Protection
National Targeting Center
January 3, 2020

Issue: Information Regarding Iran and Actions Taken Prior to U.S. Airstrike on Iranian Military Leader

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(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7) (E)

- There are currently no direct flights between Iran and the U.S.

Counter Network Division

- NTC supports and enforces the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) licensing and sanctions programs by targeting, detaining, and when necessary seizing shipments of restricted commodities and shipments destined to sanctioned countries or entities.
- NTC assists th (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
- NTC continues to suppo (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED], as well as the laundering of funds generated from these sales.

Conclusion

The NTC has taken various actions in response to the IRGC’s designation as a Tier 1 FTO and will continue to coordinate with the Intelligence Community (IC) to modify operations based on additional information obtained through the IC, CBP inspections, or in working with our international, federal, and state/local partners (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]

Historical Data (through June 2019)

(b) (7) (E)

Land Border



Office of Intelligence

- To facilitate rapid update exchanges, OI made positive contact with partners in the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (I&A, TSA ICE, and USCIS) and US Intelligence Community (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) and CBP's representative in Jordan.
- OI's is augmenting its Watch staffing, which includes moving to a 24/7 schedule to monitor Iran-related threats until further notice.
- OI supports (b)(7)(E) that DHS/I&A led with Key Intelligence Officers of DHS components to share threat updates and operational responses.
- To apprise CBP personnel in the field, OI prepared UNCLASSIFIED talking points for a 3 January teleconference with INA to inform our CBP teammates overseas on Iran-related threats.
- OI is planning multiple UNCLASSIFIED intelligence products for customers, including a formal bulletin and a (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) ”.

Air and Marine

- HQ Ops: In light of increasing tensions between the U.S. and Iran, Air and Marine Operations field leadership is proactively leveraging its strategic partnerships with local, state, and federal counter-terrorism partners in order to enhance the Nation's security preparedness and response posture.
- AMOC: The Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) is on heightened alert and is shifting resources (equipment and personnel) as necessary in order to support interagency partners such as the (b)(7)(E). AMOC's intelligence cell is actively monitoring relevant message traffic to immediately identify and process additional threat streams. The Joint PED Operations Center West (JPOC-W) is prepared to support emergent contingency operations that may require full motion video (i.e. Humanitarian Aid Disaster Relief (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)) and analytical processing.

Office of International Affairs

- Maintaining global accountability of personnel stationed overseas, including those with dependents at foreign locations, and teaming with OI to provide immediate intelligence updates
- Attaches and deployed personnel are maintaining access to classified systems to report and receive sensitive information.
- INA/HQ is working to provide requisite personal protective gear to personnel stationed overseas.
- Monitoring information to integrate updates t (b) (7)(E)
- Teaming with “Five Eyes” partners to ensure shared awareness of threat activity, including (b) (7)(E)

From: Office of the Secretar [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 9:54 PM
Subject: Message from Acting Secretary Chad F. Wolf on Recent Airstrike in Iraq

January 3, 2020

Message from Acting Secretary Chad F. Wolf on Recent Airstrike in Iraq

Thank you for all you do to secure the homeland.

Yesterday, the U.S. successfully led an airstrike in Iraq that eliminated Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization.

I commend the President's decisive action to protect American lives both abroad and at home. As many of you in the DHS family are intimately aware, Soleimani was responsible for countless attacks in the region, which resulted in the death and wounding of thousands of Americans and coalition service members, including the recent attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

We have been in constant communication with our interagency partners throughout the events and I also convened senior DHS leadership last night and earlier this morning to assess potential new threats and component actions to respond to the constantly evolving threat landscape. We continue to meet regularly.

As I have said today, there are currently no specific, credible threats against our homeland.

Our Department was formed for moments like this. I am confident in you and in our ability to confront and combat any and all threats. I appreciate all you do to carry out our mission as we all monitor the situation and work with our Federal, State and local partners to ensure the safety of every American.

I stand with you as we remain vigilant and ready, as always, to defend our Homeland.

Thank you,

Chad F. Wolf
Acting Secretary

With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values.

From: LAMM, CLINT
Sent: Saturday, January 4, 2020 12:49 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY J
Subject: Fwd: SA- Refusal of IRGC Member (Vancouver)
Attachments: image001.jpg (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).docx

FYI

Clint Lamm
Director, Preclearance Field Office
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (mobile)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Saturday, January 4, 2020 12:32:43 AM
To: LAMM, CLINT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Fwd: SA- Refusal of IRGC Member (Vancouver)

Please see below and attached refusal in Vancouver. Upon your concurrence Vancouver will initiate the SITROOM.

Thank you

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Branch Chief
Preclearance Field Office
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (desk)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

Begin forwarded message:

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date: January 4, 2020 at 00:28:02 EST
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: SA- Refusal of IRGC Member (Vancouver)

Vancouver, Canada: Refusal of IRGC Member (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

SI (b) (7)(E)

Summary:

On January 3, 2020, at approximately 1743 hours PST, Canadian citizen (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), applied for admission at Vancouver Preclearance as a visitor for pleasure. He presented a

boarding pass for Air Canada Jazz (QK) 8670 to San Diego, California. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) claimed that he and his wife were traveling to San Diego for one day to attend his uncle's funeral.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was referred from Primary and escorted to Secondary for being a match to (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was traveling with his wife (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

(b) (7)(E) exam, including a baggage and a phone inspection, were conducted with the positive results. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) phone contained a photo of an identification card indicating that he was a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). When asked, he admitted to being a member of the IRGC.

(b) (7)(E) . (b) (7)(E)

Based on his previous membership in a terrorist organization (IRGC) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was found inadmissible under 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and allowed to withdraw his application for admission. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was turned over to Canada Border Services Agency and escorted out of the CBP area.

Details:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is a Canadian citizen residing in North Vancouver, British Columbia with his wife and child. He is a Structural Engineer at BBA Engineering in Vancouver. He stated that he was traveling to San Diego for to attend his uncle's funeral for one day.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and his wife were traveling with two carry-on bags. (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) cell phone contained a photo of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) IRGC Identification Card. During questioning he stated that he had served in the IRGC from 1990 to 1992 as an Engineer.

Upon completion of the interview (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was found inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). He was allowed to withdraw his application for admission and return to Canada. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wife was found to be admissible at this time, but declined to travel due to the flight having already departed.

(b) (7)(E)

At approximately 2035 hours (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was turned over to CBSA and escorted out of the CBP area.

Subject of Interest



~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~

U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Office of Field Operations
Vancouver Preclearance

Vancouver, Canada: Refusal of IRGC Member (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) .

SIR (b) (7)(E)

Summary:

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
(b) (7)(E)

At approximately 2035 hour (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was turned over to CBSA and escorted out of the CBP area.

(b) (7)(E), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Travel History (Last 5 years):

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



Timeline:

All times listed are approximate and in Pacific Standard Time (PST) Zone.

- 1743 hrs. Referred to Secondary
- 1755 hrs. (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) made contact with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- 1813 hrs. (b) (7)(E) Office (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised Vancouver management of inspection results.
- 1847 hrs. (b) (7)(E) contacted and advised of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) membership in the IRGC.
- 1859 hrs. (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) with concurrence of (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- 1910 hrs. (b) (7)(E) Office (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) place (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) under oath for a sworn statement.
- 1940 hrs. Sworn statement complete
- 1945 hrs. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Cell phone was examined by (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- 2002 hrs. Cell phone exam completed.
- 2005 hrs. HSI contacted via Sector.
- 2010 hrs. HSI S/ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) declined to respond.
- 2035 hrs. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed the FIS area under CBSA control.

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Sent: Saturday, January 4, 2020 6:13 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
Cc: OFO-FIELD LIAISON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[Redacted]
Subject: RE: Request- Operational Actions/Significant Encounters- Reporting
Attachments: 20200104 - U.S. Airstrike on Iranian Military Leader (with OFO Input).docx

ALCON:


Good morning...I created a section for the **OFO responses** on the attached template, as none existed since this was the 1st report. Please see the area in **Blue** entitled **Office of Field Operations**; it appears after the NTC inputs.

As of 0530 hrs., we have only received input from one Field Office SAN FRANCISCO. We will send out another reminder to the Field Offices at 0700 hours.

We should anticipate a positive response from the PRECLEARANCE FIELD OFFICE, as Vancouver Preclearance had a refusal of a subject after CBP officers discovered he was a member of the IRGC (the SIR was called in last night and the incident will appear on this morning 20200104 EAC Daily Ops Report). Also, Detroit had a refusal of a Canadian citizen, born in Iran (b) (7)(E), no apparent ties to IRGC.

Additionally, in anticipation of the influx of emails related to this TASKER, ie. daily responses from the Field Offices, report submissions, etc, I created a new email folder entitled:
US-Iran Airstrike –IRGC TASKER

It will appear under the OFO-FLD INBOX as follows:



Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
CBP Officer/ Program Mgr
Field Liaison Division/ Commissioner's Situation Room
US Customs & Border Protection
Unclass (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Office (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 9:46 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc: OFO-FIELD LIAISON

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: FW: Request- Operational Actions/Significant Encounters- Reporting

All,

The below tasking has been sent out to all the DFOs and requires submission by noon daily. Each Field Office must provide a response to FLD and we will incorporate all the responses in the attached working document. We will not include negative responses in the document with our submission but we need to ensure we receive a response from each Field Office for tracking purposes.

Please ensure you include the date and the submission right below it so it is clear..

The document should go to the SITROOM inbox by 12 pm (EST) and ensure you copy ops management. If you have any questions please ask.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Supervisory CBP Officer
Field Liaison Division
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Room 2.3A-17
Washington, DC 20229
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
E-Mail: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) **On Behalf Of** OFO-FIELD LIAISON

Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 9:33 PM

To: BROPHY, ROSE M (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

DRAGANAC, JOSEP (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DURST, CASEY OWE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

FASANO, ADEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) FLORES, PETE ROMER (b) (6), (b) (7)(C);

FORET, VERNON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

HARRIGER, KEVIN C (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

HOFFMAN, TODD A (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ; HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HUMPHREY, BRIAN J
(DFO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) LAMM, CLINT
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ; MANCHA, HECTO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
MARTEL, CARLOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ; MILLER, TROY A
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) MURDOCK, JUDSON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ; OVERACKER,
THOMAS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
RAMIREZ, GUADALUPE H
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ; ROBLES, ALFONS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ; SABATINO, DIANE J
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
SUTTON-BURKE, LAFONDA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; WHITE, ROBERT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ;
YANDO, DONALD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
OFO-FIELD LIAISON
(b) (7)(E)

Subject: Request- Operational Actions/Significant Encounters- Reporting

Good Evening DFOs,

Operations Support is required to provide C1's office with updates to the operational posture and/or actions taken by your AOR and significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader. Please provide significant action(s) or encounter(s) by 10:00 am (EST) **daily** to Field Liaison Division. Although negative responses are not required to Operations Support, FLD requires a response from each Field Office. The attached document is the running template that will be used for consolidation and submission to Operations Support.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Supervisory CBP Officer
Field Liaison Division
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Room 2.3A-17
Washington, DC 20229
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
E-Mail: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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From: HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 9:19 PM

To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); SITROO (b) (7)(E); OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E)

Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Fwd: Operational Actions/Significant Encounters- Reporting

Action please. Please advise the Field of this reporting requirement. Field Liaison will consolidate for OFO.

Randy J. Howe

Executive Director, Operations

Office of Field Operations

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date: January 3, 2020 at 21:05:52 EST

To: "HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO)"

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), "FORET, VERNON T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Fwd: Operational Actions/Significant Encounters- Reporting

Randy, pls have Ops take for action.

Thank you.

Todd C. Owen

Executive Assistant Commissioner


Office of Field Operations

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

U.S. Customs and Border Protection
National Targeting Center
January 3, 2020

Issue: Information Regarding Iran and Actions Taken Prior to U.S. Airstrike on Iranian Military Leader

On January 2, 2020, the United States successfully targeted General Qassem Soleimani, the head of Iran's elite Quds Force via an airstrike in Baghdad. Prior to this event the National Targeting Center (NTC) had implemented a number of actions in response to the Department of State's designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Tier I Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).



(b) (7) (E)

- There are currently no direct flights between Iran and the U.S.

Counter Network Division

- NTC supports and enforces the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) licensing and sanctions programs by targeting, detaining, and when necessary seizing shipments of restricted commodities and shipments destined to sanctioned countries or entities.
- NTC assists th (b) (7)(E) [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
- NTC continues t (b) (7)(E) [redacted], as well as the laundering of funds generated from these sales.

Conclusion

The NTC has taken various actions in response to the IRGC’s designation as a Tier 1 FTO and will continue to coordinate with the Intelligence Community (IC) to modify operations based on additional information obtained through the IC, CBP inspections, or in working with our international, federal, and state/local partners (b) (7)(E) [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

Historical Data (through June 2019)

(b) (7) (E)

Land Border



Office of Field Operations

OFO continues to remain vigilant and has increased its enforcement posture at CBP land, air, and sea ports of entry (POEs), both domestically and OCONUS. All POEs are working cohesively with NTC, as well as our Federal and State/Local partners, to intercept and thoroughly examine and interview travelers with ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Beginning January 4, 2020, all Field Offices were instructed to provide daily updates on significant encounters/ incidents from ports in their AOR related to the U.S. airstrike on the Iranian Military Leader Qasem Soleimani / encounters with IRGC members.

- **Atlanta:**
- **Baltimore:**
- **Boston:**
- **Buffalo:**
- **Chicago:**
- **Detroit:**
- **El Paso:**
- **Houston:**
- **Laredo:**
- **Los Angeles:**
- **Miami:**
- **New Orleans:**
- **New York:**

- **Preclearance:**
- **San Diego:**
- **San Francisco:**
 - DFO and ADBS cascaded briefing information to all Area Port Directors. All ports coordinating with local LE partners.
 - SFO Chief Operating Officer briefed and updated on CBP heightened vigilance.
 - SFO TSA FSD contacted to coordinate activities.
 - Increased CBP uniform presence in airports which is supported by airport authorities.
 - (b) (7)(E)
 - (b) (7)(E)
 - No enforcement events to report.
- **San Juan:**
- **Seattle:**
- **Tucson:**

Office of Intelligence

- To facilitate rapid update exchanges, OI made positive contact with partners in the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (I&A, TSA ICE, and USCIS) and US Intelligence Community (CIA, (b) (7)(E), DCTC, and NSA) and CBP's representative in Jordan.
- OI's is augmenting its Watch staffing, which includes moving to a 24/7 schedule to monitor Iran-related threats until further notice.
- OI supports (b) (7)(E) that DHS/I&A led with Key Intelligence Officers of DHS components to share threat updates and operational responses.
- To apprise CBP personnel in the field, OI prepared UNCLASSIFIED talking points for a 3 January teleconference with INA to inform our CBP teammates overseas on Iran-related threats.
- OI is planning multiple UNCLASSIFIED intelligence products for customers, including a formal bulletin and a (b) (7)(E)

Air and Marine

- HQ Ops: In light of increasing tensions between the U.S. and Iran, Air and Marine Operations field leadership is proactively leveraging its strategic partnerships with local, state, and federal counter-terrorism partners in order to enhance the Nation's security preparedness and response posture.
- AMOC: The Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) is on heightened alert and is shifting resources (equipment and personnel) as necessary in order to support interagency partners such as the FAA, Dept. of Defense, and the FBI. AMOC's intelligence cell is actively monitoring relevant message traffic to immediately identify and process additional threat streams. The Joint PED Operations Center West (JPOC-W) is prepared to support emergent contingency operations that may require full motion video (i.e. Humanitarian Aid Disaster Relief (b) (7)(E)) and analytical processing.

Office of International Affairs

- Maintaining global accountability of personnel stationed overseas, including those with dependents at foreign locations, and teaming with OI to provide immediate intelligence updates
- Attaches and deployed personnel are maintaining access to classified systems to report and receive sensitive information.
- INA/HQ is working to provide requisite personal protective gear to personnel stationed overseas.
- Monitoring information to integrate updates t (b) (7)(E)
- Teaming with "Five Eyes" partners to ensure shared awareness of threat activity, including (b) (7)(E)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Sent: Saturday, January 4, 2020 7:00 AM
To: BROPHY, ROSE M (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DURST, CASEY OWEN; FASANO, ADELE; FLORES, PETE ROMERO;
FORET, VERNON T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HARRIGER, KEVIN C;
HOFFMAN, TODD A (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOWE, RANDY J; HUMPHREY, BRIAN J
(DFO); HUNOLT, KIRBY; LAMM, CLINT; MANCHA, HECTOR (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
MARTEL, CARLOS C; MILLER, TROY A; MURDOCK, JUDSON W; OVERACKER, THOMAS F;
Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO); PERRY, CHRISTOPHER M; RAMIREZ, GUADALUPE H; ROBLES,
ALFONSO; SABATINO, DIANE J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SUTTON-BURKE, LAFONDA D; WAGNER, JOHN P
(DEAC OFO); WHITE, ROBERT E; YANDO, DONALD F
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Subject: Reminder - Operational Actions/Significant Encounters - Reporting
Attachments: 20200103 Iran (with AMO and INA).docx

Good Morning DFOs,

Operations Support is required to provide C1's office with updates to the operational posture and/or actions taken by your AOR and significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader. Please provide significant action(s) or encounter(s) by 10:00 am (EST) daily to Field Liaison Division. Although negative responses are not required to Operations Support, FLD requires a response from each Field Office. The attached document is the running template that will be used for consolidation and submission to Operations Support.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Program Manager
Commissioner's Situation Room
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



Duplicative

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of LAREDO OPS CENTER
Sent: Saturday, January 4, 2020 8:56 AM
To: OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY J; BROPHY, ROSE M (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
Subject: Heightened Vigilance - Laredo Field Office Daily Reporting Saturday, January 4, 2020

Good morning,

Please see the below response for the Laredo Field Office (LFO) as it relates to proactive measures being taken in response to the current threat and heightened vigilance.

Laredo Field Office Operational Actions:

- Messaging to LFO management on heightened level of vigilance due to the recent airstrike on Iranian assets with verbal mustering to all frontline CBPOs.
- Recurring musters to frontline employees on threat awareness.
- Reminder to LFO employees of the potential of Cyberattack and how to mitigate risk, highlighting the recent OIT messaging on Phishing sent out on Friday, January 3rd.
- Coordination with all Task Force Officers, JTTF, Law Enforcement and Intel community partners to ensure open lines of communication and identify if any local concerns exist.
- Immediate coordination with USBP Del Rio, Laredo and Rio Grande Valley Sectors within the LFO AOR to ensure coordinated efforts and outbound assistance support if required.
- Prepared for immediate deployment of outbound operations if required.
- Ensured employee safety/accountability procedures are updated and ready for implementation if required.
- Increased review of port security measures and enhanced security sweeps.

Significant Encounters:

- **No Encounters**

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) .
Supervisory CBP Officer
Laredo Operations Center
Email (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Laredo Field Office | Laredo, Texas (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



Report Smuggling Activities at ReportSmuggling@cbp.dhs.gov

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From: HOWE, RANDY J
Sent: Saturday, January 4, 2020 10:54 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Fwd: Daily report on refusals

Action please. Please use the reminder message from this morning to advise the field of the requirement noted below by EAC Owen. Please call me.

Randy J. Howe
Executive Director, Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)"
Date: January 4, 2020 at 10:46:27 EST
To: "FORET, VERNON T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)" "HOWE, RANDY J"
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO)"
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Daily report on refusals

Vernon, Randy,

C1 would like a daily report on all refusals with linkages to Iran, and also wants to ensure that the port contact (b) (7)(E) on each of these, notating whether or not they chose to respond.

Can NTC take the lead on developing such a report, and Randy, can we make sure the ports know about the expectation that th (b) (7)(E) is called on each refusal with linkages to Iran?

Todd C. Owen
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

From: OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Sent: Saturday, January 4, 2020 11:15 AM
To: MURDOCK, JUDSON W
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) FORET, VERNON T; HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
CONROY, DONALD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Re: Situational Awareness - DFW (b) (7)(E) Positive Inspection / LPR - COC: Iran / Port
(b) (7)(E)

DFO Murdock,

Message received, we will have the Sitroom draft EAC bullets for visibility.

Thank you

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Director, Field Liaison Division
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Washington, DC
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (O)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: MURDOCK, JUDSON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Saturday, January 4, 2020 11:11:13 AM
To: OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E)
C (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) FORET, VERNON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CONROY,
DONALD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Fwd: Situational Awareness - DFW (b) (7)(E) Positive Inspection / LPR - COC: Iran / Por (b) (7)(E)

Liaison

Please see below. I thought I sent last night, but it looks like it was hung up in drafts.

Jud Murdock
Director, Field Operations
Houston Field Office
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) office
cell

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Begin forwarded message:

From: [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date: January 3, 2020 at 10:47:31 PM CST
To: DFW AIRPORT MORNING REPORT [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
Subject: Situational Awareness - DFW [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) Positive Inspection / LPR - COC: Iran / Por [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED]

Houston Field Office – Area Port of DFW – DFW International Airport
(b) (7)(E) Positive Inspection / LPR - COC: Iran / Por [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
Friday, January 3, 2020

Summary:

On Friday, January 3, 2020, the Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airport (DFW) [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) and inspected a citizen of Iran, with status as a Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) of the United States, returning from a pilgrimage in Baghdad, Iraq. A basic phone search revealed [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) from her boyfriend, a former [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) calling the death of Iranian General SOLEIMANI one of martyrdom. The subsequent advanced search was successful and the information was uploaded into the appropriate CBP systems. The [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] DFW Airport Group, and the CB [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) Liaison were notified of the positive results [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E). The traveler was admitted as a returning LPR and released from the FIS without incident.

Details:

On Friday, January 3, 2020, subject [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at DFW onboard Qatar Airways flight QR729 from Baghdad, Iraq via Doha, Qatar [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was th [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E), with regards to national security, and due to the recent airstrikes by U.S. military forces in the region. To record this encounter [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]. At approximately 1640 hours [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was referred to Passport Control Secondary to be interviewed b [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) officers.

In secondary [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) officers proceeded to conduct a standard interview and basic search of her electronic media devices. During the interview [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) advised she had gone to Baghdad, Iraq to attend a religious pilgrimage. She was traveling with a tour group and her boyfriend [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); COC [REDACTED] (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E); POB [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) was the tour group leader. Research found th [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was previously [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was removed from th [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E). The basic search of her cell phone revealed a WhatsApp group calle [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that contained all of the members of the religious tour group. A review of the messages in this group found a message from [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stating that “Soleymani” became a martyr and “severe revenge awaits those criminals who have tainted their filthy hands with his blood and the blood of the other martyrs of last night’s incident.” During the interview, it was confirmed that [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she saw the message, but she did not know much about it.


(b) (7)(E) officers informed th (b) (7)(E) Supervisor of the inspection findings at approximately 1815 hours. NTC was notified at approximately 1841 hours. The advanced search was approved at 1902 hours by th (b) (7)(E) Watch Commander. The advanced search was successfu (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was admitted as a returning LPR with concurrence of th (b) (7)(E) Chief (b) (7)(E) Watch Commander, and Duty Watch Commander. Post-analysis will be conducted to determine i (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has additional ties to subjects of interest with a national security nexus (b) (7)(E) o (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)


Timeline:

- 1640 hours Subject intercepted b (b) (7)(E) and escorted to secondary for inspection
- 1645 hours (b) (7)(E) interview began
- 1725 hours Basic search began
- 1758 hours (b) (7)(E)
- 1758 hours (b) (7)(E)
- 1810 hours (b) (7)(E)
- 1815 hours (b) (7)(E) Supervisor notified
- 1818 hours (b) (7)(E)
- 1821 hours (b) (7)(E) Chief and Watch Commander notified
- 1841 hours (b) (7)(E)
- 1843 hours DFW (b) (7)(E) Airport Group (b) (7)(E) notified of findings
- 1902 hours Advanced search approved
- 1908 hours Advance search began
- 2028 hours Advance search ended
- 2035 hours Admitted LPR with concurrence o (b) (7)(E) Chief (b) (7)(E) Watch Commander, and Duty Watch Commander

(b) (7)(E), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



(b) (7)(E), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



Conclusion:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was admitted as a returning LPR. All information obtained was forwarded to th (b) (7)(E) Liaison for exploitation (b) (7)(E).

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

*Watch Commander
Customs & Border Protection
Area Port of Dallas/Ft. Worth
2333 S. International Pkwy
DFW Airport, 75261*

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) *Office*

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) *Cell*

When you find yourself in deep water, it's best to keep your mouth shut.

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7) (E)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Saturday, January 4, 2020 12:14 PM
To: HOWE, RANDY J
Subject: Re: **UPDATED REQUIREMENT** Operational Actions/Significant Encounters - Reporting

Thank you.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Director, Business Operations and Communications
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On Jan 4, 2020, at 12:12 PM, HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

Excellent message. Thank you

Randy J. Howe
Executive Director, Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)

On Jan 4, 2020, at 11:30 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
wrote:

Good morning DFOs,

As previously relayed, Operations Support is required to provide C1's office with updates to the operational posture and/or actions taken by your AOR and significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on the Iranian Military Leader.

Additionally, C1 has requested a daily report on all refusals with linkages to Iran and asked to **ensure the ports are contactin (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) on each of these such encounters; annotating whether or n (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) chooses to respond.** The information on refusals with linkages to Iran will be handled by the NTC; however, it is imperative the ports relay the information regarding the encounter, responses, and particulars to the NTC for awareness and completeness in their reporting.

Please continue to provide significant action(s) or encounter(s) by 10:00 am (EST) ***daily*** to Field Liaison Division. Although negative responses are not required to Operations Support, FLD requires a response from each Field Office. The attached document is the running template that will be used for consolidation and submission to Operations Support.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Director, Business Operations and Communications
Operations Directorate
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, 3.4D-15
Washington D.C. 20229

Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Email: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

<20200103 Iran (with AMO and INA).docx>

From: FORET, VERNON T
Sent: Saturday, January 4, 2020 1:05 PM
To: HOWE, RANDY J
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Daily report on refusals

Randy,

NTC will incorporate the information into the report we submit to FLD at 1000 each day. Also (b) (7)(E) will inform our TFOs that the ports have been directed to contact them during these encounters and if unable to respond, to provide a reason for not responding. Thanks.

Vernon Foret
Executive Director
National Targeting Center
Customs and Border Protection

-----Original Message-----

From: Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C))
Sent: Saturday, January 4, 2020 10:46 AM
To: FORET, VERNON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ;
WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)) >
Subject: Daily report on refusals

Vernon, Randy,

C1 would like a daily report on all refusals with linkages to Iran, and also wants to ensure that the port contact (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) on each of these, notating whether or not they chose to respond.

Can NTC take the lead on developing such a report, and Randy, can we make sure the ports know about the expectation that th (b) (7)(E) is called on each refusal with linkages to Iran?

Todd C. Owen
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of LAREDO OPS CENTER
Sent: Saturday, January 4, 2020 2:42 PM
To: BROPHY, ROSE M; HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

Subject: Message to PDs: Heightened Vigilance and New Reporting Requirement

Port Directors,

We have provided an initial report for the Laredo Field Office detailing our port security posture, employee engagement, coordination with external agencies, etc. due to the Iran based threat.

Moving forward we are still required to provide C1's office with daily reporting regarding updates to the operational posture and/or actions taken within our AOR along with any significant encounters/incidents related to this threat. Note: The highlight of this reporting is the encounters or incidents related to the threat.

Effective immediately, a daily report on all refusals with linkages to Iran is required, and must include information about the ports contactin (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) on each of the encounters; annotating whether or not (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) chooses to respond.

The information on refusals with linkages to Iran will be handled by the NTC; however, it is imperative the ports relay the information regarding the encounter, responses, and particulars to the NTC for awareness and completeness in their reporting.

We do not anticipate any major changes to our already heightened posture and as noted yesterday, we are fully aware that we may also have few, if any, encounters or incidents, thereby it is OK to submit negative reports.

LOC will coordinate daily reporting for the LFO with responses due by 0600 daily starting this **Sunday, January 5th**.

To ensure that all of our locations remain engaged, please ensure that you provide your information or a negative response, to the LOC prior to 0600.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
ADFO Border Security
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Laredo Field Office
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
email: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

HSDN: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: HOWE, RANDY J
Sent: Saturday, January 4, 2020 3:30 PM
To: OFO-FIELD LIAISON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Fwd: 20200104 EAC Daily Operations Report

Please add EAC Ferrara do this email distribution. Thanks

Randy J. Howe
Executive Director, Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)

Begin forwarded message:


From: OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E)
Date: January 4, 2020 at 07:40:47 EST
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "CONROY, DONALD E"
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), DIRECTORS FIELD OP (b) (7)(E)
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS H (b) (7)(E) > (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), "MORGAN, MARK A"
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E) Operations
Director (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
"PEREZ, ROBERT E (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
"SULIVERAS, ROLAND (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORDER SECURITY ASST DIRECTORS
(b) (7)(E) >, SBT (b) (7)(E) >, SITROO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
TRADE OPERATIONS ASST DIRECTOR (b) (7)(E) > (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: 20200104 EAC Daily Operations Report

Significant Non-Threshold Items of Interest

None

Non-Threshold Items on Situation Room Commissioner's Report

(b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6)



Date of Incident: January 3, 2020

Location of Incident: (b) (7)(E)

SIR #:

CBP Officers Refused Admission to Canadian Citizen, Born in Iran (b) (7)(E)

Summary:

On January 3, 2020, CBP officers assigned to the Detroit Windsor Tunnel in Detroit, MI encountered a 32-year old male Canadian citizen, born in Iran, who was (b) (7)(E). The Detroit (b) (7)(E) was notified and examination of the subject was initiated. Th (b) (7)(E) and HSI were notified and declined interest. (b) (7)(E) was created and th (b) (7)(E) was notified (b) (7)(E). As a result, CBP officers determined the subject was inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA (b) (7)(E).

Date of Incident: January 3, 2020

Location of Incident: Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada

SIR #: (b) (7)(E)

CBP Officers Refused Admission to Canadian Citizen, Born in Iran (b) (7)(E)

Summary:

On January 3, 2020, CBP officers assigned to the Vancouver, Canada Preclearance facility encountered a 53-year old male Canadian citizen, born in Iran, who applied for admission before boarding Air Canada Jazz flight 8670 to San Diego, CA. The subject claimed that he and his wife were traveling to San Diego for one day to attend his uncle's funeral. The subject was a match to (b) (7)(E). (b) (7)(E) exam, including a baggage and a phone inspection, were conducted with th (b) (7)(E), as officers discovered a photo of an identification card indicating that indicated the subject was a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). When asked, the subject admitted to being a member of the IRGC and stated he served in the IRGC from 1990 to 1992 as an engineer. (b) (7)(E). the subject was found inadmissible under 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and allowed to withdraw his application for admission. The subject was turned over to Canada Border Services Agency and escorted out of the CBP area.

Significant Visits

None

End of Report

CBP0000006

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) A on behalf of OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 6:22 AM
To: BROPHY, ROSE M (b) (6), (b) (7)(C);
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DURST, CASEY OWEN; FASANO, ADELE; FLORES, PETE ROMERO;
FORET, VERNON T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HARRIGER, KEVIN C;
HOFFMAN, TODD A (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) R; HOWE, RANDY J; HUMPHREY, BRIAN J
(DFO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) LAMM, CLINT; MANCHA, HECTOR (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
MARTEL, CARLOS C; MILLER, TROY A; MURDOCK, JUDSON W; OVERACKER, THOMAS F;
Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO); PERRY, CHRISTOPHER M; RAMIREZ, GUADALUPE H; ROBLES,
ALFONSO; SABATINO, DIANE J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); SUTTON-BURKE, LAFONDA D; WAGNER, JOHN P
(DEAC OFO); WHITE, ROBERT E; YANDO, DONALD F; FORET, VERNON T; CONROY,
DONALD E (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Subject: RE: REMINDER: Operational Actions/Significant Encounters - Reporting

Reminder.....Please include NEGATIVE responses.

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
CBP Officer/ Program Mgr
Field Liaison Division/ Commissioner's Situation Room
US Customs & Border Protection
Unclass (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Office (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



From: CAMPBELL, LORNE A (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) **On Behalf Of** OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 6:18 AM
To: OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E); BROPHY, ROSE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DURST, CASEY OWEN (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); FASANO, ADELE
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) FLORES, PETE ROMER (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); FORET, VERNON T
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HARRIGER, KEVIN (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOFFMAN, TODD A

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE,
RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HUMPHREY, BRIAN J (DFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) LAMM, CLIN (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) MANCHA, HECTOR
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) MARTEL, CARLOS C
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); MILLER, TROY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); MURDOCK, JUDSON W
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); OVERACKER, THOMAS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Owen, Todd
C (EAC OF (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PERRY, CHRISTOPHER (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
RAMIREZ, GUADALUPE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ROBLES, ALFONS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
SABATINO, DIANE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SUTTON-BURKE, LAFONDA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); WHITE, ROBERT E
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) YANDO, DONALD F <DONALD.F.YANDO@cbp.dhs.gov>; FORET, VERNON T
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); CONROY, DONALD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) NTC HEART (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: REMINDER: Operational Actions/Significant Encounters - Reporting
Importance: High

Good Morning DFOs,

Just a gentle reminder....Operations Support is required to provide C1's office with updates to the operational posture and/or actions taken by your AOR and significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader. **Please provide significant action(s) or encounter(s) by 10:00 am (EST) daily to Field Liaison Division.** Although negative responses are not required to Operations Support, FLD requires a response from each Field Office. The attached document is the running template that will be used for consolidation and submission to Operations Support.

Attached is a copy of yesterday's report for reference (the OFO portion begins on the 3rd page).

Thank you,

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
CBP Officer/ Program Mgr
Field Liaison Division/ Commissioner's Situation Room
US Customs & Border Protection
Unclass (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Office (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



From [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) On Behalf Of OFO-FIELD LIAISON

Sent: Saturday, January 4, 2020 7:00 AM

To: BROPHY, ROSE M [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED] DURST, CASEY OWE [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
FASANO, ADEL [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); FLORES, PETE ROMER [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
FORET, VERNON [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) FOWLKES, BRITTAN [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C);
FRASER, CATHERINE [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HARRIGER, KEVIN [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C);
HOFFMAN, TODD [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOLTZER, CHRISTOPHER R
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HUMPHREY, BRIAN J
(DFO [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) LAMM, CLINT
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); MANCHA, HECTO [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED] MARTEL, CARLOS [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); MILLER, TROY A
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) MURDOCK, JUDSON [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OVERACKER,
THOMAS [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); PERRY,
CHRISTOPHER [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) RAMIREZ, GUADALUPE H
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); ROBLES, ALFONS [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); SABATINO, DIANE J
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED] SUTTON-BURKE, LAFONDA [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) WHITE, ROBERT [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
YANDO, DONALD [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
HOWE, RANDY [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED] OFO-FIELD LIAISO [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

Subject: Reminder - Operational Actions/Significant Encounters - Reporting

Good Morning DFOs,

Operations Support is required to provide C1's office with updates to the operational posture and/or actions taken by your AOR and significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader. Please provide significant action(s) or encounter(s) by 10:00 am (EST) **daily** to Field Liaison Division. Although negative responses are not required to Operations Support, FLD requires a response from each Field Office. The attached document is the running template that will be used for consolidation and submission to Operations Support.

Thank you,

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Program Manager
Commissioner's Situation Room

Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



From: HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 9:19 PM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SITROO (b) (7)(E); OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E)

Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Fwd: Operational Actions/Significant Encounters- Reporting

Action please. Please advise the Field of this reporting requirement. Field Liaison will consolidate for OFO.

Randy J. Howe
Executive Director, Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date: January 3, 2020 at 21:05:52 EST

To: "HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >, "WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO)"

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >, "FORET, VERNON T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Fwd: Operational Actions/Significant Encounters- Reporting

Randy, pls have Ops take for action.

Thank you.

Todd C. Owen
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 7:51 AM
To: OFO-FIELD LIAISON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); CONROY, DONALD E; DIRECTORS FIELD OPS; EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS HQ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); MORGAN, MARK A; Operations Directors (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); PEREZ, ROBERT E (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); SULIVERAS, ROLAND (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); BORDER SECURITY ASST DIRECTORS; SBTU; SITROOM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); TRADE OPERATIONS ASST DIRECTORS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); CETD-Watch
Subject: 20200105 EAC Daily Operations Report
Attachments: 20200105 - EAC Daily Operations Report.docx



Executive Assistant
Commissioner's
Daily Operations Report
Operations - Field Liaison
Division
January 05, 2020



Significant Items of Interest

None

Significant Non-Threshold Items of Interest

None

Non-Threshold Items on Situation Room Commissioner's Report

Date of Incident: January 4, 2020
Location of Incident: Port Huron, MI
SIR #: (b) (7)(E)

CBP Officers Refuse Admission to Canadian Citizen Born in Iran

Summary:

On January 4, 2020, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers assigned to the Port Huron, MI Port of Entry (POE) encountered two male Canadian citizens, born in Iran, who arrived in a Quebec plated commercial vehicle. The vehicle was referred to secondary (b) (7)(E). In secondary, CBP officers conducted an interview and revealed both subjects served in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). One subject served in the IRGC/Sepah from 2004 to 2006, and was a 2nd lieutenant and served as the personal assistant to Imam Hasan Nasab. The other subject stated he served in the IRGC Air Force from 1984 to 1986, was stationed on the front lines of the Iran/Iraq war as an anti-aircraft gunner, and was kidnapped and tortured by his government for refusing to create fraud to benefit the state. Th (b) (7)(E) and conducted a basic electronic media search with negative results. Th (b) (7)(E) was contacted and declined to respond to the port and had no interest at this time. Due to being a member of the IRGC and the (b) (7)(E) the first subject was found inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended, and was returned to Canada via the commercial conveyance. The second subject was found to be admissible as a B-1 nonimmigrant visitor for business, but chose to return to Canada with his friend.

Date of Incident: January 4, 2020

Location of Incident: Blaine, WA

SIR #: (b) (7)(E)

CBP Officers Refuse Admission to Canadian/Iranian Citizen (b) (7)(E)

Summary:

On January 4, 2020, CBP officers assigned to the Pacific Highway Crossing at the Blaine, Washington POE intercepted a 38-year old male citizen of Iran and Canada, who was (b) (7)(E). The subject stated he was destined to SEATAC Airport to pickup his girlfriend, and return to Canada. (b) (7)(E) inspection was initiated in coordination th (b) (7)(E). (b) (7)(E) and Homeland Security Investigations were contacted and declined to interview the subject. (b) (7)(E). The subject was refused entry pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(II) of the INA (b) (7)(E) and was returned to Canada.

Significant Visits

None

End of Report

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 1:19 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Subject: Re: Time sensitive OPA inquiry

Thank you; let make sure that we continue to take necessary precautions.

Just spoke with Mike as well, OPA will sanitize the first three bullets so there is no LES info and get back to DHS.

Thank you all!

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(A) Chief of Staff, CBP
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 1:04:51 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); OFO-FIELD LIAISON (b) (7)(E)
Subject: Re: Time sensitive OPA inquiry

All,

Write-up below...

Per a phone conversation with AD Border Security Freeman, the following was stated:

(b) (7) (E)

- He further stated that for subsequent Iranian-American encounters, if there are no derogatory issues, (b) (7)(E) interviews will no longer be mandatory in order to facilitate processing times.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Director, Business Operations and Communications
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On Jan 5, 2020, at 12:53 PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) > wrote:

10-4. Looking forward to the write up. Thank you for the quick turn!

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(A) Chief of Staff, CBP

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: MATTINA, DANIEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 12:50:09 PM

To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc: HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Re: Time sensitive OPA inquiry

All,

Touched base with the FO and there is a kernel of truth to this but the below appears exaggerated. Large family unit returned last night, resulting in long wait times at the port due to minimal staffing present. Also, when contacting NTC, there was a delay in vetting responses due to increased vigilance nationwide. All pax were eventually released.

Write-up being drafted now and will be sent shortly.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Director, Business Operations and Communications

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On Jan 5, 2020, at 12:18 PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

wrote:

Thanks team. Important to note that the reporters deadline is 2 and we'll need time to clear any response so sooner is better if possible. Thanks so much. Best,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 5, 2020, at 12:10 PM, HOWE, RANDY J

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) gov> wrote:

Action please. Please respond to this email distribution. Thanks

Randy J. Howe
Executive Director, Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)

On Jan 5, 2020, at 12:0 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
> wrote:

XD HOWE,

Please see below inquiry from DHS OPA
(originated from a reporter). Can you please
confirm whether this is accurate? Haven't seen any
reports matching the below.

Reporter's deadline is 2pm today. Thank you.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(A) Chief of Staff, CBP
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 11:34 AM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: ?

Subject: CBC NEWS REQUEST

Hello:

We have been told by a lawyer that some 40 Iranian
Americans were detained at the Washington
State/British Columbia border last night when they
attempted to cross back into the US. Was there an
order by Homeland Security to detain and question
US Iranian citizens at the border?

(b) (6)

Thanks,
(b) (6)

From: Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 2:14 PM
To: HOWE, RANDY J
Cc: PEREZ, ROBERT E
Subject: Re: Tweet On Report CBP to Detain All Iranians Entering the Country

Randy, please join the C1 call at 2:45 to hare what you have. I'll forward you the call in info.

Todd C. Owen
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

On Jan 5, 2020, at 2:12 PM, HOWE, RANDY [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

Deputy. I'm jumping on a call with SEATTLE and OPA shortly and I will get that information.

Randy J. Howe
Executive Director, Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)

On Jan 5, 2020, at 14:08, PEREZ, ROBERT E
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

EAC - please see AS2 question below - thanks.

REP

Robert E. Perez
Deputy Commissioner
U.S. Customs & Border Protection

Begin forwarded message:

From: AS2KT [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
Date: January 5, 2020 at 2:02:08 PM EST
To: "MORGAN, MARK A [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
AS1CFW [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
Cc: "PEREZ, ROBERT E [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

"SEGUIN, DEBBIE W [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Re: Tweet On Report CBP to Detain All Iranians Entering the Country

Helpful update.
Thx

Was that an unusual number at that location?

From: MORGAN, MARK [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 1:50:00 PM
To: AS1CF [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) AS2KT [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
Cc: PEREZ, ROBERT [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]
Subject: Fwd: Tweet On Report CBP to Detain All Iranians Entering the Country

We're on this. He is the truth:

[REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: Media Inquiry
[REDACTED] (b) (6)
Date: January 5, 2020 at 1:38:32 PM EST
Subject: Tweet On Report CBP to Detain All Iranians Entering the Country

Tweet On Report CBP to Detain All Iranians Entering the Country

[<image002.jpg>](#)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 4:21 PM
To: MORGAN, MARK A
Cc: PEREZ, ROBERT E (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO); HOWE, RANDY J
Subject: RE: Draft Statement

Good here. Media are asking about whether DHS/CBP issued a directive.... So I added another line. Highlights reflect updates to the statement.

Good?

(b) (6), (b) (7)

Based on the current threat environment, CBP is operating with an enhanced posture at its ports of entry to safeguard our national security and protect the America people while simultaneously protecting the civil rights and liberties of everyone.

Reports that CBP officers are detaining Iranian-Americans and refusing their entry into the U.S. solely because of their country of origin are false. Reports that DHS/CBP has issued a related directive are also false. CBP routinely adjusts staffing and operations to maintain the dual missions of border security and facilitation of lawful trade and travel. Processing times are the result of the current circumstances, including staffing levels, volume of traffic, and threat levels.

At Blaine POE, wait times increased to an average of two hours on Saturday evening, although some travelers experienced wait times of up to four hours due to increased volume and reduced staff during the holiday season. Current wait times Sunday morning were about 40 minutes for passenger vehicles.

CBP does not discriminate based on religion, race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.

From: MORGAN, MARK (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 4:14 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: PEREZ, ROBERT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Re: Draft Statement

I don't like the opening line. How about something like this.

Based on the current threat environment, CBP is operating with an enhanced posture at its ports of entry to safeguard our national security and protect the America people while simultaneously protecting the civil rights and liberties of everyone.

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 5, 2020, at 3:51 PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

Draft Statement for your review. All included due to quick turn...

Based on the current threat, CBP is operating with an enhanced posture. As a result wait times may be impacted for international travelers arriving at ports of entry.

Reports that CBP officers are detaining Iranian Americans and refusing their entry into the U.S. solely because of their country of origin are false. CBP routinely adjusts staffing and operations to maintain the dual missions of border security and facilitation of lawful trade and travel. Processing times are the result of the current circumstances, including staffing levels, volume of traffic, and threat levels.

At Blaine POE, wait times increased to an average of two hours on Saturday evening, although some travelers experienced wait times of up to four hours due to increased volume and reduced staff during the holiday season. Current wait times Sunday morning were about 40 minutes for passenger vehicles.

CBP does not discriminate based on religion, race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 9:08 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); OFO-FIELD LIAISON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C);
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOWE, RANDY J
Subject: RE: **UPDATED REQUIREMENT** Operational Actions/Significant Encounters - Reporting
Attachments: CBP RESPONSE (b) (7)(E) .docx

Good Evening,

See attached and below OFO content for submission to NOC. In an effort to get ahead of the reporting requirement OFO Sitroom personnel worked with SWOs on the attached. Upon receiving Field Office information tomorrow morning, if nothing has changed then these high level bullets will be used if Ops leadership approves.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Supervisory CBP Officer
Field Liaison Division
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Room 2.3A-17
Washington, DC 20229
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
E-Mail: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 7:18 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Re: **UPDATED REQUIREMENT** Operational Actions/Significant Encounters - Reporting

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C),

Please begin to consolidate this report and have a draft of what we've received prepared for the 0730.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Director, Field Liaison Division
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Washington, DC

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (O)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 7:12:39 PM

To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted]

Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted] >; OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted] >

Subject: FW: **UPDATED REQUIREMENT** Operational Actions/Significant Encounters - Reporting

Good Evening,

DHS NOC is requesting this tasking by 0900 hours tomorrow. I have sent a message to the DFOs requesting it by 0800 hours for consolidation and submission.

Please ensure that all of Ops management is included in the tasking email to the SITROOM.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Supervisory CBP Officer
Field Liaison Division
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Room 2.3A-17
Washington, DC 20229
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
E-Mail: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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From [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) On Behalf Of OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 7:08 PM
To: BROPHY, ROSE M [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] DURST, CASEY OWE [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C);
FASANO, ADEL [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); FLORES, PETE ROMER [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C);
FORET, VERNON [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C);
HARRIGER, KEVIN [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOFFMAN, TODD [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED] HOWE, RANDY J
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HUMPHREY, BRIAN J (DFO) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED] LAMM, CLIN [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) MANCHA, HECTOR
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) MARTEL, CARLOS C
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); MILLER, TROY [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); MURDOCK, JUDSON W
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); OVERACKER, THOMAS [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; Owen, Todd
C (EAC OFO [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; PERRY, CHRISTOPHER [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C);
RAMIREZ, GUADALUPE [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; ROBLES, ALFONS [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C);
SABATINO, DIANE [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] SUTTON-BURKE, LAFONDA [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED] WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) WHITE, ROBERT E
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) YANDO, DONALD [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]; OFO-FIELD LIAISO [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) >
Cc: Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) FORET, VERNON T
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OFO-FIELD LIAISO [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
Subject: FW: **UPDATED REQUIREMENT** Operational Actions/Significant Encounters - Reporting

Good Evening DFOs,

The Department of Homeland Security National Operations Center has just set a suspense time of **0900 hours (EST) on Monday, January 6, 2010** for this tasking. Please ensure you provide your AOR's operational posture, actions taken and significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader by **0800 hours (EST) tomorrow** to FLD for consolidation and submission to Ops Support.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Supervisory CBP Officer
Field Liaison Division
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Room 2.3A-17
Washington, DC 20229
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
E-Mail: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Saturday, January 4, 2020 11:30:30 AM
To: BROPHY, ROSE M (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DURST, CASEY OWE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
FASANO, ADEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); FLORES, PETE ROMER (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
FORET, VERNON T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
HARRIGER, KEVIN (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOFFMAN, TODD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY J
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HUMPHREY, BRIAN J (DFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) LAMM, CLIN (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); MANCHA, HECTOR
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) MARTEL, CARLOS C
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); MILLER, TROY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) MURDOCK, JUDSON W
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OVERACKER, THOMAS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); Owen, Todd
C (EAC OFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); PERRY, CHRISTOPHER (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
RAMIREZ, GUADALUPE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ROBLES, ALFONS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
SABATINO, DIANE J <(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)>
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SUTTON-BURKE, LAFONDA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) WHITE, ROBERT E
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) YANDO, DONALD F (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) FORET, VERNON T

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: **UPDATED REQUIREMENT Operational Actions/Significant Encounters - Reporting**

Good morning DFOs,

As previously relayed, Operations Support is required to provide C1's office with updates to the operational posture and/or actions taken by your AOR and significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on the Iranian Military Leader.

Additionally, C1 has requested a daily report on all refusals with linkages to Iran and asked to **ensure the ports are contactin (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) on each of these such encounters; annotating whether or no (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) chooses to respond.** The information on refusals with linkages to Iran will be handled by the NTC; however, it is imperative the ports relay the information regarding the encounter, responses, and particulars to the NTC for awareness and completeness in their reporting.

Please continue to provide significant action(s) or encounter(s) by 10:00 am (EST) **daily** to Field Liaison Division. Although negative responses are not required to Operations Support, FLD requires a response from each Field Office. The attached document is the running template that will be used for consolidation and submission to Operations Support.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Director, Business Operations and Communications
Operations Directorate
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, 3.4D-15
Washington D.C. 20229
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Email: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Washington D.C.
January 6, 2020

Issue: Information Regarding Iran and Actions Taken Prior to U.S. Airstrike on Iranian Military Leader (b) (7)(E)

On January 2, 2020, the United States successfully targeted General Qassem Soleimani, the head of Iran's elite Quds Force via an airstrike in Baghdad. Prior to this event, CBP, predominantly through the National Targeting Center (NTC), had implemented a number of actions in response to the Department of State's designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Tier I Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The other components of CBP are also making adjustments in focus in the event a response from Iran's government or proxy groups begin to target U.S. persons and or government assets in the region. Furthermore, CBP has requested increased reporting from ports with regard to subjects requesting entry, who may have a nexus to the region.

- Increased enforcement posture at Ports of Entry (POE) both domestic and OCONUS. All POEs are working cohesively with the NTC, as well as our Federal and State/Local partners, to intercept and thoroughly examine and interview travelers with ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
- (b) (7)(E)
- Maintaining global accountability of personnel stationed overseas, including those with dependents at foreign locations, and teaming with CBP Office of Intelligence (OI) to provide immediate intelligence updates along with mustering of employees deployed outside of the United States in coordination with the U.S. Department of State. OI is augmenting its Watch staffing, which includes moving to a 24/7 schedule to monitor Iran-related threats until further notice.
- (b) (7)(E)
- (b) (7)(E)
- (b) (7)(E)

From: [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . on behalf of SITROOM
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 9:21 PM
To: CBP SITROOM CBP LEADERSHIP; CBP SITROOM- REPORTS - CBP MORNING REPORT
Cc: SITROOM
Subject: Commissioner's Significant Incident Report for January 6, 2020

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**U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
COMMISSIONER'S SITUATION ROOM DAILY REPORT**

This is the report for 1/6/2020

Blaine


Date of Incident: 1/4/2020 [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

Location: Blaine, WA

Type of Incident: [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

On January 4, 2020, CBP officers assigned to the Blaine, Washington POE encountered a citizen of both Iran and Canada, who is [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E). A full [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] inspection was initiated in coordination with NTC. [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) and HSI were notified. [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]. The subject was allowed to withdraw his admission and was returned to Canada. CBSA and the U.S. Border Patrol were notified.



(b) (7) (E)

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From: FASANO, ADELE
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 1:24 AM
To: HOWE, RANDY J
Subject: Re: DHS Directive?

In case someone needs the data from Friday and Saturday on numbers of Iranian nationals by immigration status, referred to secondary for SFO, see below:

Friday 1/3
USCs 19
LPRs 12
Canadian 38
Iran 4
Total 73

Saturday 1/4
USCs 63
LPRs 33
Canadian 76
Iranian 4
Total 180

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 5, 2020, at 5:13 PM, HOWE, RANDY [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

OCA is meeting with the commissioner tomorrow morning on this.

Randy J. Howe
Executive Director, Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
[REDACTED] (Office)
[REDACTED] (Cell)

On Jan 5, 2020, at 20:11, FASANO, ADEL [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

Ok

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 5, 2020, at 3:19 PM, HOWE, RANDY J

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

Info. Let's see if we need more information

Randy J. Howe
Executive Director, Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)

Begin forwarded message:

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date: January 5, 2020 at 18:17:27 EST
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
"Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO)"
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "HOWE,
RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Re: DHS Directive?

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

We just issued the below, which I think mike provided OCA a copy of. Are you looking for information beyond?

STATEMENT

Social media posts that CBP is detaining Iranian-Americans and refusing their entry into the U.S. because of their country of origin are false. Reports that DHS/CBP has issued a related directive are also false.

ON BACKGROUND

Based on the current threat environment, CBP is operating with an enhanced posture at its ports of entry to safeguard our national security and protect the America people while simultaneously protecting the civil rights and liberties of everyone. CBP routinely adjusts staffing and operations to maintain the dual missions of border security and facilitation of lawful trade and travel. Processing times are the result of the current circumstances, including staffing levels, volume of traffic, and threat posture.

At the Blaine POE, wait times increased to an average of two hours on Saturday evening, although some travelers experienced wait times of up to four hours due to increased volume and reduced staff during the holiday season. Current wait times Sunday morning were about 40 minutes for passenger vehicles.

CBP does not discriminate based on religion, race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(A) Chief of Staff, CBP

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 6:14:33 PM

To: Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOWE, RANDY J

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: DHS Directive?

EAC, XD,

I'm receiving a lot of questions from the Hill regarding the Iranians at Blaine. They are claiming that they are hearing that DHS has issued a directive to CBP to stop and inspect all Iranians, whether or not they are now USCs and/or LPRs. Is this factual? How should we respond?

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of LAREDO OPS CENTER
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 6:52 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOWE, RANDY J; BROPHY, ROSE M; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
Cc: LAREDO OPS CENTER
Subject: Heightened Vigilance - Laredo Field Office Daily Reporting Monday, January 6, 2020

Good morning,

Please see the below response for the Laredo Field Office (LFO) as it relates to proactive measures being taken in response to the current threat and heightened vigilance.

Laredo Field Office Operational Actions:

- Messaging to LFO management on heightened level of vigilance due to the recent airstrike on Iranian assets with verbal mustering to all frontline CBPOs.
- Recurring musters to frontline employees on threat awareness.
- Reminder to LFO employees of the potential of Cyberattack and how to mitigate risk, highlighting the recent OIT messaging on Phishing sent out on Friday, January 3rd.
- Coordination with all Task Force Officers, JTTF, Law Enforcement and Intel community partners to ensure open lines of communication and identify if any local concerns exist.
- Immediate coordination with USBP Del Rio, Laredo and Rio Grande Valley Sectors within the LFO AOR to ensure coordinated efforts and outbound assistance support if required.
- Prepared for immediate deployment of outbound operations if required.
- Ensured employee safety/accountability procedures are updated and ready for implementation if required.
- Increased review of port security measures and enhanced security sweeps.

Significant Encounters:

- **No Encounters**

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) .
Supervisory CBP Officer
Laredo Operations Center
Emai (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Laredo Field Office | Laredo, Texas (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



Report Smuggling Activities at ReportSmuggling@cbp.dhs.gov

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From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 9:27 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: HOWE, RANDY J; HOFFMAN, TODD A; WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO)
Subject: RE: CSO Council SVTC-Teleconference Follow-Up 1:00pm Today

Thank yo (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Assistant Commissioner
Office of Professional Responsibility
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 9:02 AM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOFFMAN, TODD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: CSO Council SVTC-Teleconference Follow-Up 1:00pm Today

DA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

OFO is operating under a heightened awareness/vigilance but has not implemented any specific special operations. Abu Dhabi preclearance has increased security measures as per the following:

In response to the heightened tension with Iran and fluid situation in the middle-east region, (b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 8:51 AM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: CSO Council SVTC-Teleconference Follow-Up 1:00pm Today

Please excuse my informal request - We have a 1300 telcon with the DHS Chief Security Officer (CSO) regarding any increased security measures implemented within CBP. I have been receiving the Sitroom's updates, which primarily focus on foreign personnel and ops in the middle east. If there are any key increased security measures/ops (other than heightened awareness/increased vigilance) which have been implemented within USBP, OFO or OAM, could you or your staff please send me a couple bullets for AC Klein to brief out on?

Thanks in advance,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Deputy Assistant Commissioner
Office of Professional Responsibility
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)

From: KLEIN, MATTHEW (OPR (b) (6), (b) (7)(C))
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 8:15 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Fwd: CSO Council SVTC-Teleconference Follow-Up 1:00pm Today

Good morning - please let me know if we have SVTC capability in the building. Thanks.

Matthew Klein
Assistant Commissioner
Office of Professional Responsibility
CBP | DHS
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent from my iPad

Begin forwarded message:

From: (b) (6)
Date: January 6, 2020 at 8:07:33 AM EST
To: CSO Council (b) (7)(E)
Cc: (b) (6)
Subject: CSO Council SVTC-Teleconference Follow-Up 1:00pm Today
Reply-To: (b) (6)

Good Morning Council Members,

I hope this email finds you well. C (b) (6) wishes to hold a SVTC this afternoon at 1:00pm as a follow up to Fridays Teleconference. We kindly request you to indicate if your Component does not have access to a SVTC. Dial in information for the SVTC will be provided later this morning.

Thank you Kindly,

(b) (6)
Management and Program Analyst
Strategic Operations Division
Office of the Chief Security Officer
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Ofc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cell (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
email (b) (6)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 9:30 AM
To: DRAGANAC, JOSEPH
Cc: HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Subject: FW: OFO Input-01062020 U.S. Airstrike on Iranian Military Leader Report
Attachments: Draft 20200106 - U.S. Airstrike on Iranian Military Leader (with OFO Input).docx

DXD,

Attached is the updated OFO report sent to SITROOM for dissemination in the event you want to forward to OFO leadership.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Supervisory CBP Officer
Field Liaison Division
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Room 2.3A-17
Washington, DC 20229
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
E-Mail: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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No big changes to report.

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 8:58 AM
To: SITROO (b) (7)(E) >; CBP SITROOM- SWO (b) (7)(E) >
Cc: OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

HOWE, RANDY J

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: OFO Input-01062020 U.S. Airstrike on Iranian Military Leader Report

Good Morning,

See attached report with OFO input in red.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Supervisory CBP Officer
Field Liaison Division
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Room 2.3A-17
Washington, DC 20229
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
E-Mail: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)




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U.S. Customs and Border Protection
National Targeting Center
January 6, 2020

Issue: Information Regarding Iran and Actions Taken Prior to U.S. Airstrike on Iranian Military Leader

On January 2, 2020, the United States successfully targeted General Qassem Soleimani, the head of Iran's elite Quds Force via an airstrike in Baghdad. Prior to this event th (b) (7)(E) Center (NTC) had implemented a number of actions in response to the Department of State's designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Tier I Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).



(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7) (E)

Counter Network Division

- NTC supports and enforces the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) licensing and sanctions programs by targeting, detaining, and when necessary seizing shipments of restricted commodities and shipments destined to sanctioned countries or entities.
- NTC assists th (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- NTC continues to suppo (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED], as well as the laundering of funds generated from these sales.

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7)(E)

Conclusion

The NTC has taken various actions in response to the IRGC's designation as a Tier 1 FTO and will continue to coordinate with the Intelligence Community (IC) to modify operations based on additional information obtained through the IC, CBP inspections, or in working with our international, federal, and state/local partners (b) (7)(E)

Historical Data (through January 3 2020)

(b) (7)(E)

Land Border

(b) (7)(E)

Office of Field Operations

OFO continues to remain vigilant and has increased its enforcement posture at CBP land, air, and sea ports of entry (POEs), both domestically and OCONUS. All POEs are working cohesively with NTC, as well as our Federal and State/Local partners, to intercept and thoroughly examine and interview travelers with ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Beginning January 4, 2020, all Field Offices were instructed to provide daily updates on significant encounters/ incidents from ports in their AOR related to the U.S. airstrike on the Iranian Military Leader Qasem Soleimani / encounters with IRGC members.

Atlanta:

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.
- **There have been no refusals for contact/linkage to Iran.**

Baltimore

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- (b) (7)(E)
- Local CBP JTTF Liaisons and FBI providing threat briefings to port personnel.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time

Boston

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time

Buffalo

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
 - Irania (b) (7)(E) Encounters Buffalo 0, Champlain 0, Alexandria Bay 0

- Operation ED Encounters Buffalo 7, Champlain 1, Alexandria Bay 0
- Significant Encounters-Iranian Nexus-Adverse Actions: Buffalo 0, Champlain 0, Alexandria Bay 0
- Significant Encounters-Iranian Nexus- Admissions: Buffalo 0, Champlain 0, Alexandria Bay 0

Chicago

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- The Area Port of Chicago has inspected 16 citizens of Iran, 19 inbound and 9 outbound.
- The Area Port of Minneapolis has inspected 3 citizen of Iran, 1 inbound and 2 outbound.
- TTRT conducted 2 inbound interviews with negative derogatory findings.

Detroit

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- (b) (7)(E)
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

El Paso

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Houston

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.

- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Laredo

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Los Angeles

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- (b) (7)(E)
 -
 -
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Miami

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.
- (b) (7)(E)

New Orleans

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information

- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- [REDACTED]
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.
- **CBP is engaged with all 5 State Fusion Centers and sharing information as it becomes available.**
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

New York

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- [REDACTED]
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Preclearance:

- **Abu Dhabi:** Due to the expected retaliation towards U.S. assets in the region in response to the killing, the Department of State (DOS) will increase force protection at the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi. Additionally, DOS will review the overall security posture and has messaged the need for increased vigilance throughout the U.S. government community in country. There are currently no known threats specific to the UAE and preclearance operations in Abu Dhabi, however a heightened state of awareness is in effect resulting in the below actions by Abu Dhabi management:
 1. Phone tree executed with all employees (44) and dependents (62) accounted for without issue.
 2. Consistent communication with the DOS and local police established.
 3. Security awareness muster for all staff assigned to Abu Dhabi.
 4. Emergency contact information for staff and dependents updated and validated.
 5. Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) reviewed with all staff.
 6. (b) (7)(E)
 7. [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
 8. Additional local police presence in and outside the Preclearance Facility (PCF).
 9. All Government travel cards validated should the need for evacuation arise.

HRM inquiry:

10. Do we plan to evacuate any employees/dependents?
 - a. Preclearance personnel fall under Department of State Chief of Mission authority and DoS has the lead for evacuation. At this time there are no evacuation orders
11. Do you need further HR guidance from the Department?
 - a. Not at this time
12. Do you believe at this time all bases are covered regarding personnel?
 - a. Yes, Preclearance Field Office Mission Support Division has been engaged and ready to act if required.

In response to the heightened tension with Iran and fluid situation in the middle-east regio (b) (7)(E)

- **Aruba:** Due to proximity and connection flights to South America, which have flights from Iran, along with constant Iranian/Canadian travelers, Aruba preclearance has increased daily assignments to PAU and Rovers through shift reassignments or overtime to provide for more detailed targeting.
- **Canada, Embassy Ottawa:** No specific information to indicate U.S. personnel in Canada are subject to an increased security threat. As a matter of due diligence personnel are reminded of the standing status quo on security, which generally entails maintaining a low profile and exercising regular vigilance.
- **Embassy Nassau:** No specific threat information related to the embassy or U.S. interests in The Bahama (b) (7)(E) Washington is continuously updating the threat analysis for posts across the globe, not just NEA (Middle East). The Surveillance Detection Teams are on high alert and will expand coverage to high profile residential and school zones.
- **Vancouver:** RCMP assigned to CBP preclearanc (b) (7)(E), and continue coordination with RCMP headquarters for awareness and determine needs and ability for increased presence.

Container Security Initiative

- Management does not plan for evacuations for employees/dependents.
- No Human Resources from the Department is requested at this time.
- All CBP Personnel has been accounted for.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Immigration Advisory Program:

- 1) Do we plan to evacuate any employees/dependents?
Not at this time.
- 2) Do you need further HR guidance from the Department?
Not at this time.

3) **Do you believe at this time all bases are covered regarding personnel?**

Yes.

San Diego

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

San Francisco

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.
- **CBP Foreign Liaison Units in Mexico: For both the CBP International Liaison Unit and Border Patrol's Foreign Operations Branch will provide information, which will assist in building general domain awareness of key demographics for potential future outreach opportunities.**

San Juan

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Seattle

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- Significant encounters:
 - One Visa Waiver Program refusal based on discovery of prior travel to Iran.
 - (b) (7)(E)

Tucson

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Office of Intelligence

- To facilitate rapid update exchanges, OI made positive contact with partners in the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (I&A, TSA ICE, and USCIS) and US Intelligence Community [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E), [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) and CBP's representative in Jordan.
- OI's is augmenting its Watch staffing, which includes moving to a 24/7 schedule to monitor Iran-related threats until further notice.
- OI supports [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) that DHS/I&A led with Key Intelligence Officers of DHS components to share threat updates and operational responses.
- To apprise CBP personnel in the field, OI prepared UNCLASSIFIED talking points for a 3 January teleconference with INA to inform our CBP teammates overseas on Iran-related threats.
- OI is planning multiple UNCLASSIFIED intelligence products for customers, including a formal bulletin on [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].

Air and Marine

- HQ Ops: In light of increasing tensions between the U.S. and Iran, Air and Marine Operations field leadership is proactively leveraging its strategic partnerships with local, state, and federal counter-terrorism partners in order to enhance the Nation's security preparedness and response posture.
- AMOC: The Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) is on heightened alert and is shifting resources (equipment and personnel) as necessary in order to support interagency partners such as the [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E). AMOC's intelligence cell is actively monitoring relevant message traffic to immediately identify and process additional threat streams. The Joint PED Operations Center West (JPOC-W) is prepared to support emergent contingency operations that may require full motion video (i.e. Humanitarian Aid Disaster Relief [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]) and analytical processing.

Office of International Affairs

- Maintaining global accountability of personnel stationed overseas, including those with dependents at foreign locations, and teaming with OI to provide immediate intelligence updates
- Attaches and deployed personnel are maintaining access to classified systems to report and receive sensitive information.
- INA/HQ is working to provide requisite personal protective gear to personnel stationed overseas.
- Monitoring information to integrate updates t (b) (7)(E)
- Teaming with “Five Eyes” partners to ensure shared awareness of threat activit (b) (7)(E)

CBP000007

CBP0000008

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 1:40 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOWE, RANDY J
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: EAC Ferrara Request

Thanks (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), PMP
Chief Analyst
Planning, Program Analysis and Evaluation
Entry / Exit Transformation
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (RRB)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (mobile)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 1:35 PM
To: PPA (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY J
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: EAC Ferrara Request

Much appreciated, once again!

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) On Behalf Of PPAE
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 1:35 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) PPA (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: EAC Ferrara Request

See below for breakdown.

Calendar Date	Field Office Name	Citizenship Country Name	Inadmissibles Subject Count
01/02/20	BUFFALO	IRAN	11
01/02/20	SEATTLE	IRAN	2
01/03/20	SEATTLE	IRAN	4
01/04/20	BUFFALO	IRAN	6
01/04/20	SEATTLE	IRAN	2
01/05/20	SEATTLE	IRAN	4
01/06/20	BUFFALO	IRAN	2
Total:			31

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Custom and Border Protection Officer (Program Manager)
 Planning, Program Analysis and Evaluation Mission Systems Management Branch

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 1:29 PM
To: PPA (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY J
 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: EAC Ferrara Request

Good Afternoon and thank you for this information,

Do you have any breakdown available?

Many thanks for the quick assistance.

V/r,
 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Special Advisor
 IMMEDIATE OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
 Operations Support, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)(c)
 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (a)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) > On Behalf Of PPAAE
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 1:27 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; PPAAE
 (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: RE: EAC Ferrara Request

H (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

A total of 31 Iranian citizens were found inadmissible since 1/2/2020. This is for OFO only.

Let me us know if you need this number broken down by disposition or any other category.

Regards.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Custom and Border Protection Officer (Program Manager)
Planning, Program Analysis and Evaluation Mission Systems Management Branch
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >

Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 1:17 PM

To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; PPA (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY J
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: RE: EAC Ferrara Request

Importance: High

H (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Please see request below that initiated with Ops Support EAC Ferrara. Can we provide those numbers ASAP?

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), PMP
Chief Analyst
Planning, Program Analysis and Evaluation
Entry / Exit Transformation
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (RRB)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (mobile)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >

Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 1:08 PM

To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >

Subject: RE: EAC Ferrara Request

Perfect, thank you very much sir!

V/r,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Special Advisor

IMMEDIATE OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER

Operations Support, U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (c)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (o)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 1:07 PM

To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: RE: EAC Ferrara Request

Looping in OFO PPAAE to provide those statistics.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Deputy Executive Director Operations

Office of Field Operations

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 1:04 PM

To: HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: EAC Ferrara Request

Good Afternoon Sirs,

I just spoke to Mr. Ferrara, and he's asked me to get the latest numbers on Iranian refusals since 1/2/20. Could I trouble you to help me get those numbers before 1400?

Many thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Special Advisor

IMMEDIATE OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER

Operations Support, U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (c)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (o)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 1:54 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
OFO-Incident-Management (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OFO-FIELD LIAISON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS DIVISION; Tyl (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOFFMAN, TODD A; HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); OFO
BUDGET FORMULATION
Subject: RE: Hill Questions re: Iranians Stopped at U.S. Border

Thank you, Sir.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Budget Analyst, Budget Formulation
Budget Division
Office of Mission Support
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
RRB 3.4B-12
P: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
E (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[Click here to let us know how we're doing!](#)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 1:53 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >;
OFO-Incident-Management (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E) > (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS DIVISION
(b) (7)(E) > (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; HOFFMAN, TODD A (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OFO BUDGET
FORMULATIO (b) (7)(E) >
Subject: RE: Hill Questions re: Iranians Stopped at U.S. Border

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

OCA is working on a statement from C1 to the hill. Recommend coordinating with them once the final statement is approved to maintain consistency.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 1:51 PM
To [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED] > [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E); OFO-Incident-Management [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED] > [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OFO-FIELD LIAISO [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) > ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS DIVISION
[REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOFFMAN, TODD A [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
HOWE, RANDY J [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED] OFO BUDGET FORMULATIO [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) >
Subject: RE: Hill Questions re: Iranians Stopped at U.S. Border

Good Afternoon OPS and APP,

We received the following technical assistance questions from the hill regarding the U.S. Iranians who were turned away at the border over the weekend. The hill referenced [this report](#) regarding this issue. Is there someone in OPS or APP who can provide responses to the following questions or let us know if the questions need to be redirected:

1. Were all travelers of Iranian descent detained and/or stopped for secondary questioning?
2. Were the dozens detained for the reason that they are Iranians or of Iranian descent?
3. Is detaining Iranians or Iranian Americans occurring at multiple ports of entry? Has CBP issued a memorandum to implement such actions?

Thank you.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Budget Analyst, Budget Formulation
Budget Division
Office of Mission Support
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
RRB 3.4B-12

P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Click here to let us know how we're doing!](#)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 5:30 PM
To: (b) (7)(E) SITROOM
Subject: (b) (7)(E)

01/06/2020 – 1715 hours
Lewiston Bridge
Port of Buffalo, NY

A 51 year old male citizen of Canada arrived in by car from Canada at the Lewiston Bridge, Lane 6, on 01/06/2020 seeking readmission as class TN. Subject was referred for further inspectio (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Subject will allowed to withdraw per Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA – no immigrant visa - and return to Canada. A Significant Incident Report was completed.

(b) (7)(E)

Primary Officer: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Secondary Officer: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On January 6, 2020 a 51 year-old male arrived from Canada at the Lewiston Bridge, Lane 6 in Lewiston, NY in a vehicle plated Ontari (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at 1026 hours. He presented his Canadian passpor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in the name o (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) COB (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); COC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that he was destined to back to the Rensselaer, NY area to his employer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). He presented his Canadian passpor (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) showing birth i (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and containing six CBP admission stamps that were marked class TN, the latest being 08/26/2019 at CBP Toronto (b) (7)(E)

Subject was referred for further inspection. He remained in CBP secure areas throughout the inspection.

Subject has had military training (IRGC) and has worked at th (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E) was called at 1330 hours and S/ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at 1420 hours to conduct an interview. (b) (7)(E). At

1500 hours th [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED] HS [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was called at 1542 hours and declined an on-site interview.

An advanced search of his cellular phone was authorized by CBP Watch Commande [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Prior to the search, the subject's cellular and data connections were turned off by placing the phones in airplane mode. The searches were conducted in accordance with CBP policy and procedure. The search was conducted from 1500 hours to 1530 hours and concluded successfully with negative results [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) will be allowed to withdraw his application for admission under Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA immigrant without an immigrant visa. He returned to Canada at 1710 hours [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] His TN e-I94 will be closed upon his return to Canada now.

The Commissioner's Situation Room was contacted telephonically and issue [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) at 1715 hours.

[REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

CBP Watch Commander [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) an [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7) managed the incident and authorized all actions taken by CBP.

TIMELINE:

- 1026 hours: Subject arrived at the Lewiston Bridge
- 1330 hours [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) contacted and stated will respond on -site
- 1344 hours: [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) .
- 1400 hours: [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) arrived on-site.
- 1500 hours: [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- 1500 hours: Advanced search of subject's phone began.
- 1530 hours: Advanced search of phone ends
- 1710 hours: Subject returned to Canada.
- 1715 hours: Commissioner's Situation Room called and issue [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Thank You,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Supervisory CBP Officer
Port of Buffalo, NY
Office (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of LAREDO OPS CENTER
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 6:33 AM
To: OFO-FIELD LIAISON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOWE, RANDY J; BROPHY, ROSE M (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]
Cc: LAREDO OPS CENTER
Subject: Heightened Vigilance - Laredo Field Office Daily Reporting Tuesday, January 7, 2020

Good morning,

Please see the below response for the Laredo Field Office (LFO) as it relates to proactive measures being taken in response to the current threat and heightened vigilance.

Laredo Field Office Operational Actions:

- Messaging to LFO management on heightened level of vigilance due to the recent airstrike on Iranian assets with verbal mustering to all frontline CBPOs.
- Recurring musters to frontline employees on threat awareness.
- Reminder to LFO employees of the potential of Cyberattack and how to mitigate risk, highlighting the recent OIT messaging on Phishing sent out on Friday, January 3rd.
- Coordination with all Task Force Officers, JTTF, Law Enforcement and Intel community partners to ensure open lines of communication and identify if any local concerns exist.
- Immediate coordination with USBP Del Rio, Laredo and Rio Grande Valley Sectors within the LFO AOR to ensure coordinated efforts and outbound assistance support if required.
- Prepared for immediate deployment of outbound operations if required.
- Ensured employee safety/accountability procedures are updated and ready for implementation if required.
- Increased review of port security measures and enhanced security sweeps.

Significant Encounters:

- **No Encounters**

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Supervisory CBP Officer
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Laredo Field Office - Laredo Operations Center

Desk (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



Report Smuggling Activities at ReportSmuggling@cbp.dhs.gov

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 7:29 AM
To: WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO)
Cc: FORET, VERNON T; HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOFFMAN, TODD A
Subject: RE: Iranians detained at Blaine POE
Attachments: Copy of LOG SPREADSHEET Operation Support .xlsx

We just received the attached detailed analysis by the field office. Looks like (b) (6) was in secondary for 4.5 hours. Four to five hours looks to be typical for those arriving around 2300-2400 hours.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From: DRAGANAC, JOSEPH
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 7:17 AM
To: JOHN P WAGNER (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: FORET, VERNON T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) RANDY J HOWE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); TODD A HOFFMAN (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Iranians detained at Blaine POE

DEAC,

We have been doing a little more digging. What looks like batch closeouts in CSIS is making it difficult to corroborate stories we are seeing in the media. For example, Rep. Pramila Jayapal held a press conference with one of those secondaried that night (b) (6) who stated she was held for 5 hours. Review of her CSIS records shows she was a NEXUS card holder referred at 0206 EST and the CSIS record was closed at 0856. That means she would have been there almost 7 hours. We are seeing many records closed out between 0830-0900 which looks like they may have been closed out with the new shift but are unsure. We are reaching out to the Field Office to obtain further information on this encounter and see if the CSIS records were indeed closed out together or if there was a mass release of those waiting within this time frame.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 3:51 PM
To: JOHN P WAGNER (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: FORET, VERNON T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) RANDY J HOWE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: FW: Iranians detained at Blaine POE

DEAC,

See analysis below as requested. Looks like 55 minutes was the longest wait time in secondary from our research. Most were cleared quicker than that.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 3:16 PM

To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Fw: Iranians detained at Blaine POE

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

A deeper dive into travelers with secondary examinations with an Iranian nexus revealed the following:

- Average secondary exam time of travelers in secondary, ranged from 25 to 55 minutes. A CSIS query revealed that many examinations were not closed out promptly after the completion of the examination. The search highlighted that they were all closed out at the same time (at the end of the shift).
- So, it fair to make the assumption that 25 55 minutes is an accurate secondary wait time.
- The names selected for this query were not random, they were based on enforcement referrals per the (b) (7)(E) " in Blaine.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Director, Field Liaison Division
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Office

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Cell

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E)

Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 11:18 AM

To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >

Subject: FW: Iranians detained at Blaine POE

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

After reviewing secondary inspections for the Peace Arch crossing in Washington State see results.

On January 4, 2020 at the Peace Arch crossing for a 24 hour period, there were:

- 228 admissibility referrals
- 128 agriculture referrals
- 1108 baggage referrals

It looks like there was a **(b) (7)(E)** that day. Guidance received from FO leadership to officers was to ensure enhanced targeting was conducted for possible threats stemming from Iran. Also, there was a concert in British Columbia that may have attributed to these secondary inspections.

Peace arch and pacific highway had 148 referrals from January 4, 2020 into early January 5, 2020.

On January 5, 2020, 10 random secondary inspections were selected and the secondary inspection times range from 10 minutes to 55 minutes. The 55 minute inspection was for a passenger, COC: India to verify documents. Two Iranian nationals, mother who is an LPR and daughter, B2 visa holder were referred to secondary on January 5, 2020. They were in secondary for 24 minutes to verify admissibly of the daughter (she was traveling on B2 Visa).

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Supervisory CBP Officer

Field Liaison Division

Office of Field Operations

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Room 2.3A-17

Washington, DC 20229

Office: **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**

Mobile **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**

E-Mail: **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**



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From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 9:31 AM
To: CBP SITROOM- SWOS; SITROOM
Cc: Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO); WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C);
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOWE, RANDY J; FORET, VERNON T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C);
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); OFO-FIELD LIAISON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: OFO Input-01072020 U.S. Airstrike on Iranian Military Leader Report
Attachments: 20200107 - U.S. Airstrike on Iranian Military Leader (with OFO Input) (002).docx

Good Morning,

Please see OFO Operational Actions/Significant Encounters report for today.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Supervisory CBP Officer
Field Liaison Division
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Room 2.3A-17
Washington, DC 20229
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
E-Mail: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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U.S. Customs and Border Protection
January 7, 2020

Issue: Information Regarding Iran and Actions Taken Prior to U.S. Airstrike on Iranian Military Leader

On January 2, 2020, the United States successfully targeted General Qassem Soleimani, the head of Iran's elite Quds Force via an airstrike in Baghdad. Prior to this event the National Targeting Center (NTC) had implemented a number of actions in response to the Department of State's designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Tier I Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7) (E)

Counter Network Division

- NTC supports and enforces the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) licensing and sanctions programs by targeting, detaining, and when necessary seizing shipments of restricted commodities and shipments destined to sanctioned countries or entities.
- NTC assists th (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
- NTC continues to suppo (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED], as well as the laundering of funds generated from these sales.

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7) (E)

Conclusion

The NTC has taken various actions in response to the IRGC's designation as a Tier 1 FTO and will continue to coordinate with the Intelligence Community (IC) to modify operations based on additional information obtained through the IC, CBP inspections, or in working with our international, federal, and state/local partners (b) (7)(E)

Historical Data (through January 3 2020)

(b) (7) (E)

Land Border

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7)(E)

Office of Field Operations

OFO continues to remain vigilant and has increased its enforcement posture at CBP land, air, and sea ports of entry (POEs), both domestically and OCONUS. All POEs are working cohesively with NTC, as well as our Federal and State/Local partners, to intercept and thoroughly examine and interview travelers with ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Beginning January 4, 2020, all Field Offices were instructed to provide daily updates on significant encounters/ incidents from ports in their AOR related to the U.S. airstrike on the Iranian Military Leader Qasem Soleimani / encounters with IRGC members.

Atlanta:

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.
- There have been no refusals for contact/linkage to Iran.

Baltimore

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- SRT deployed to airports to assist with outbound operations.
- Local CBP JTTF Liaisons and FBI providing threat briefings to port personnel.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time

Boston

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time

Buffalo

14, 2019

(b) (7)(E)

The subject and his girlfriend were released as USC and LPR with no further action.

El Paso

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.
- A social media post attempting to organize a protest over the death of Senior Iranian Military Official Qasem Soleimani. The protest is scheduled to take place on January 11, 2020 and is being organized by a Facebook group called ChucoPedia. The group has 3,228 members and is claimed to be a public group for bilingual news and culture for El Paso, TX, southern New Mexico, and Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua Mexico. If this protest is carried out, it would be considered a significant encounter related to the U.S. military action in Iraq. Situation will be monitored and updates will follow.

Houston


- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Laredo

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Los Angeles

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.



- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Miami

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.
- (b) (7)(E)

New Orleans

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.
- CBP is engaged with all 5 State Fusion Centers and sharing information as it becomes available.
- (b) (7)(E)
- (b) (7)(E)

New York

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.

- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Preclearance:

- **Abu Dhabi:** Due to the expected retaliation towards U.S. assets in the region in response to the killing, the Department of State (DOS) will increase force protection at the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi. Additionally, DOS will review the overall security posture and has messaged the need for increased vigilance throughout the U.S. government community in country. There are currently no known threats specific to the UAE and preclearance operations in Abu Dhabi, however a heightened state of awareness is in effect resulting in the below actions by Abu Dhabi management:
 1. Employee accountability: 47 direct hires and 71 dependents. Currently 4 direct hires with 10 dependents are confirmed out of the country.
 2. Consistent communication with the DOS and local police established.
 3. Security awareness muster for all staff assigned to Abu Dhabi.
 4. Emergency contact information for staff and dependents updated and validated.
 5. Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) reviewed with all staff.
 6. [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
 7. [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
 8. Additional local police presence in and outside the Preclearance Facility (PCF).
 9. All Government travel cards validated should the need for evacuation arise.

HRM inquiry:

1. Do we plan to evacuate any employees/dependents
 - a. Preclearance personnel fall under Department of State Chief of Mission authority and DoS has the lead for evacuation. At this time there are no evacuation orders.
2. Do you need further HR guidance from the Department?
 - a. Not at this time
3. Do you believe at this time all bases are covered regarding personnel?
 - a. Yes, Preclearance Field Office Mission Support Division has been engaged and ready to act if required.

[REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- **Aruba:** Due to proximity and connection flights to South America, which have flights from Iran, along with constant Iranian/Canadian travelers, Aruba preclearance has increased daily assignments to PAU and Rovers through shift reassignments or overtime to provide for more detailed targeting.
- **Halifax:** Possible protest scheduled for Saturday, January 11, 2020. Expected to be small in scale however, taking place close to school where officers' dependents attend. Increased patrols requested for airport during CBP processing.
- **Canada, Embassy Ottawa:** No specific information to indicate U.S. personnel in Canada are subject to an increased security threat. As a matter of due diligence personnel are reminded of the standing status quo on security, which generally entails maintaining a low profile and exercising regular vigilance.
- **Embassy Nassau:** No specific threat information related to the embassy or U.S. interests in The Bahama (b) (7)(E). Washington is continuously updating the threat analysis for posts across the globe, not just NEA (Middle East). The Surveillance Detection Teams are on high alert and will expand coverage to high profile residential and school zones.
- **Montreal:** Protest in front of U.S. Consulate General was planned for yesterday afternoon by International League of Peoples Struggle. No further information on level or impact. Airport and CBP operations unaffected. Montreal police in airport increasing patrols and presence during CBP operations.
- **Vancouver:** RCMP assigned to CBP preclearance (b) (7)(E), and continue coordination with RCMP headquarters for awareness and determine needs and ability for increased presence.

Container Security Initiative

- Management does not plan for evacuations for employees/dependents.
- No Human Resources from the Department is requested at this time.
- All CBP Personnel has been accounted for.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Immigration Advisory Program:

- 1) Do we plan to evacuate any employees/dependents?
Not at this time.
- 2) Do you need further HR guidance from the Department?
Not at this time.
- 3) Do you believe at this time all bases are covered regarding personnel?
Yes.

San Diego

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.

- TTRT encountered a U.S. citizen at the Port of San Diego with recent travel to Iran. Vetting was conducted yielding no derogatory information. The subject was admitted into the United States without incident.
- TTRT encountered an L-1 recipient who is currently pending adjustment of status to LPR. Subject is in possession of a valid I-512. Secondary inspection of the subject yielded no derogatory information. Subject was paroled (I-512) into the United States without incident.

San Francisco

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.
- (b) (7)(E)
- CBP Foreign Liaison Units in Mexico: For both the CBP International Liaison Unit and Border Patrol's Foreign Operations Branch will provide information, which will assist in building general domain awareness of key demographics for potential future outreach opportunities.

San Juan

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Seattle

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- Significant encounters:
 - PAU targeted 10 potential targets and created 7 UPAX Events for further research.

Tucson

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Office of Intelligence

- To facilitate rapid update exchanges, OI made positive contact with partners in the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (I&A, TSA ICE, and USCIS) and US Intelligence Community (b) (7)(E), (b) (7)(E) and CBP's representative in Jordan.
- OI's is augmenting its Watch staffing, which includes moving to a 24/7 schedule to monitor Iran-related threats until further notice.
- OI supports (b) (7)(E) that DHS/I&A led with Key Intelligence Officers of DHS components to share threat updates and operational responses.
- To apprise CBP personnel in the field, OI prepared UNCLASSIFIED talking points for a 3 January teleconference with INA to inform our CBP teammates overseas on Iran-related threats.
- OI is planning multiple UNCLASSIFIED intelligence products for customers, including a formal bulletin and a (b) (7)(E) ”.

Air and Marine

- HQ Ops: In light of increasing tensions between the U.S. and Iran, Air and Marine Operations field leadership is proactively leveraging its strategic partnerships with local, state, and federal counter-terrorism partners in order to enhance the Nation's security preparedness and response posture.
- AMOC: The Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) is on heightened alert and is shifting resources (equipment and personnel) as necessary in order to support interagency partners such as the (b) (7)(E). AMOC's intelligence cell is actively monitoring relevant message traffic to immediately identify and process additional threat streams. The Joint PED Operations Center West (JPOC-W) is prepared to support emergent contingency operations that may require full motion video (i.e. Humanitarian Aid Disaster Relief (b) (7)(E) and analytical processing.

Office of International Affairs

- Maintaining global accountability of personnel stationed overseas, including those with dependents at foreign locations, and teaming with OI to provide immediate intelligence updates
- Attaches and deployed personnel are maintaining access to classified systems to report and receive sensitive information.
- INA/HQ is working to provide requisite personal protective gear to personnel stationed overseas.

- Monitoring information to integrate updates (b) (7)(E)
- Teaming with “Five Eyes” partners to ensure shared awareness of threat activit (b) (7)(E)

From: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 10:29 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 CANTWELL iranians

Michael Freeman
Assistant Director, Border Security
Seattle Field Office
OFO - U.S. Customs and Border Protection Blaine, Washington
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 5:54 AM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 CANTWELL_iranians
Importance: High

Hi Mike,

Senator Cantwell's office has some follow up questions from their initial questioning regarding the Blaine POE. I know we don't usually give out port-specific staffing information, so we can probably give them FO info instead. Do you have the answers to these, or would it be better to go through OFO Field Liaison?

- 1) What is the current staff level at the Blaine Port of Entry - Peace Arch?
- 2) How has the staff level changed over the last five years?
- 3) What has the average wait time been for each month over the last year?

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Direct Line (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 8:47 AM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: OCAINQUIR (b) (7)(E)
Subject: RE: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 CANTWELL_iranians
Importance: High

Senator Cantwell has the following additional questions.

What is the current staff level at the Blaine Port of Entry - Peace Arch?

How has the staff level changed over the last five years?

What has the average wait time been for each month over the last year?

-----Original Message-----

From [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 06, 2020 10:57 AM
To [REDACTED] (b) (6)
Cc: OCAINQUIR [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
Subject: RE: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 CANTWELL_iranians

Good morning,

Please see below for an official statement from CBP.

STATEMENT

Social media posts that CBP is detaining Iranian-Americans and refusing their entry into the U.S. because of their country of origin are false. Reports that DHS/CBP has issued a related directive are also false.

ON BACKGROUND

Based on the current threat environment, CBP is operating with an enhanced posture at its ports of entry to safeguard our national security and protect the America people while simultaneously protecting the civil rights and liberties of everyone. CBP routinely adjusts staffing and operations to maintain the dual missions of border security and facilitation of lawful trade and travel. Processing times are the result of the current circumstances, including staffing levels, volume of traffic, and threat posture.

At the Blaine POE, wait times increased to an average of two hours on Saturday evening, although some travelers experienced wait times of up to four hours due to increased volume and reduced staff during the holiday season. Wait times Sunday morning were about 40 minutes for passenger vehicles.

CBP does not discriminate based on religion, race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.

Thanks,

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

-----Original Message-----

From [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 7:21 PM
To: OCAINQUIR [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
Subject: Re: Iranian detentions in WA state

The Senator would also like a briefing on this matter. Thanks

Sent from my iPhone

> On Jan 5, 2020, at 2:52 PM [REDACTED] (b) (6) > wrote:

>

> Senator Cantwell has heard reports of mass detention of people of Iranian descent at the Northern Border in Washington state. Could you please let us know, what happened, how this situation is being handled and how individuals' rights are being respected?

>

> Thank you [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

>

> Sent from my iPhone

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 10:38 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOWE, RANDY J
Subject: RE: CBP Screenings at Blaine, WA

No problem, we're happy to route through OFO Field first. I have another request on the topic that I'll forward through the proper channels as well.

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Direct Line (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 10:36 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: CBP Screenings at Blaine, WA

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C),

Any congressional requests like this need to go thorough OFO-Ops Leadership and Field Liaison and not directly to the field, especially in a hypersensitive situation like this. Mike is sending me the info and I will provide a response.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 10:29 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: CBP Screenings at Blaine, WA

Michael Freeman
Assistant Director, Border Security
Seattle Field Office
OFO - U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Blaine, Washington

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 6:28 AM

To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: FW: CBP Screenings at Blaine, WA

Good Morning,

Thank you for all of your help with the follow up questions we have been having about Blaine, WA. Are you able to assist with the below?

“Can you please provide more information on the circumstances used for secondary screening determinations at Blaine this past weekend? Have there been any change to these circumstances since January 3, 2020? Are there any specific circumstances that are more heavily weighted than others? Did the Seattle Field Office or the Blaine Port Director issue any guidance to officers after Friday’s call regarding enhancing their operation posture? “

Thank you in advance,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Office of Congressional Affairs

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Direct Line (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6) >

Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 4:19 PM

To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >

Cc (b) (6) >

Subject: Re: CBP Screenings at Blaine, WA

H (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Thank you for this update. Can you please provide more information on the circumstances used for secondary screening determinations at Blaine this past weekend? Have there been any change to these circumstances since January 3, 2020? Are there any specific circumstances that are more heavily weighted than others? Did the Seattle Field Office or the Blaine Port Director issue any guidance to officers after Friday’s call regarding enhancing their operation posture?

Best,

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date: Monday, January 6, 2020 at 3:06 PM

Subject: CBP Screenings at Blaine, WA

Good Afternoon

Regarding the events at Blaine, WA this past weekend, there is no national directive, memo, etc. from DHS or CBP leadership with instructions to detain Iranian-Americans and refusing their entry into the U.S because of their country of origin.

On Friday, CBP field leadership participated in a teleconference with Acting Commissioner Morgan and Deputy Commissioner Perez, where the field was asked to remain vigilant and increase their situational awareness given the evolving threat environment. On Saturday, January 4, 2020, Acting Secretary Wolf issued the National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin, which stated that DHS was operating under an enhanced posture due to the current threat environment. Again, there is no national directive from DHS or CBP leadership with instructions to detain Iranian-Americans and refusing their entry into the U.S because of their country of origin. Field Leadership has discretion on how to enhance operational posture based upon the totality of circumstances, including AOR specific information.

When CBP leadership was made aware of the reports at Blaine, they quickly contacted the Blaine POE for additional information and discussion to ensure that secondary screening determinations are based upon a totality of circumstances. CBP leadership will continue to engage the field with respect to operational responses to the current threat to safeguard national security and protect the American people.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Office of Congressional Affairs | U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20229

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (main line) (b) (7)(E)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 11:39 AM
To: OFO-FIELD LIAISON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Blaine POE Questions from Members
Attachments: Blaine POE Questions from Members Updated.xlsx

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /OFO,

Attached are the combined follow up questions so far from Hill staff. These are all the follow ups OCA has received so far, but if additional are received we will continue to update this spreadsheet and send, unless they are duplicates. As you are able, please send the responses back to OCA so we can respond to staff.

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Direct Line: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 11:53 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: HOWE, RANDY J; HOFFMAN, TODD A (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Re: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS REPORT: Possible Iranian Migrant Influx / Laredo, Texas (2304)

10-04. Still appreciate the heads up.

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 11:46:16 AM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOFFMAN, TODD A (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: RE: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS REPORT: Possible Iranian Migrant Influx / Laredo, Texas (2304)

Laredo is still trying to determine its validity. Trending towards hearsay.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 11:25 AM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOFFMAN, TODD A (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: RE: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS REPORT: Possible Iranian Migrant Influx / Laredo, Texas (2304)

We have not, but will pass on to LRT for visibility.

Thanks for the awareness.

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 10:39 AM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Cc: HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOFFMAN, TODD A (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS REPORT: Possible Iranian Migrant Influx / Laredo, Texas (2304)

Chief,

Not sure if you had visibility on the information below out of Laredo.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) On Behalf Of OFO-FIELD LIAISON

Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 10:29 AM

To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) > (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

>

Subject: FW: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS REPORT: Possible Iranian Migrant Influx / Laredo, Texas (2304)

FYSA,

Please see below for leadership visibility. Bullets forthcoming.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Supervisory CBP Officer
Field Liaison Division
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Room 2.3A-17
Washington, DC 20229
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
E-Mail: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) > On Behalf Of LAREDO OPS CENTER

Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 8:29 AM

To: OFO-FIELD LIAISO [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: LAREDO OPS CENTE [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E); BROPHY, ROSE M [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS REPORT: Possible Iranian Migrant Influx / Laredo, Texas (2304)

**SITUATIONAL AWARENESS REPORT
LAREDO FIELD OFFICE
LAREDO OPERATIONS CENTER**

INCIDENT: Possible Iranian Migrant Influx
DATE: January 7, 2020
TIME OF NOTIFICATION: 0138 hours (CST)
LOCATION: Laredo, Texas (2304)

Possible Iranian Nationals Influx

Synopsis:

On January 7, 2020, at approximately 0138 hours, the Laredo Command Center reported that a subject had contacted CBP Laredo to advise of a possible one hundred (100) influx of Iranian nationals attempting to illegally enter the United States through the river.

Details:

On January 06, 2020, at approximately 1530 hours [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) received a call from subject [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), stating one hundred (100) Iranian nationals possibly attempting forceful illegal entry into the United States between Piedras Negras / Eagle Pass, Texas and Nuevo Laredo / Laredo, Texas.

At approximately 1615 hours, subject [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at the Gateway to the Americas Bridge. HSI along with [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) and OBP Intel commenced the interview in which subject affirmed the aforementioned.

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he received information from co-worker [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

[REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) began interview telephonically with [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in which he claimed to have obtained the information through his brother in law [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

According to [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) subject [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attended a gathering with [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), "affiliated with [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)". The smuggler stated a group of Iranian citizens were in Piedras Negras, Coahuila intending to illegally enter the U.S. through the river in groups of ten (10).

At approximately 1800 hours, Intel SCBPO of Eagle Pass Port of Entry was notified.

Subject [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) agreed to meet with his brother in law [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas to obtain more information.

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) agreed to meet with [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) before and after his visit to Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas.

Chain of command notified.

The Laredo Operations Center will continue to monitor this situation and provide updates if necessary.

Subject Information:

(b) (7)(E), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Systems Utilized:

(b) (7)(E)

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Customs and Border Protection Officer
Laredo Field Office | Laredo Operations Center
109 Shiloh Dr., Suite 300 | Laredo, TX | 78045
of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) |
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



Report Smuggling Activities at ReportSmuggling@cbp.dhs.gov

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CBP0000028

CBP0000029


CBP0000030

CBP000048

CBP0000049

CBP000050

From: WATCH CBP INTEL
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 12:43 PM
To: OI-CETD-Leadership; CETD Dissemination
Subject: (U//FOUO) Iranian Threat Assessment
Attachments: Iranian Threat Assessment.pdf



(U) Iranian President Response
NBC



(U) Reporting Notice: This product was prepared by U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Office of Intelligence.

(U) Background

(U//FOUO) On 2 January, the U.S. military confirmed that it conducted a strike on Iranian Major General Qassim Suleimani at the Baghdad airport. In the strike, the United States also killed the head of the Iraqi state sponsored Popular Mobilization Front (PMF), Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, and several other senior pro Iran figures in Iraq. Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that a "harsh retaliation is waiting for the criminals whose filthy hands spilled his blood" while Iran's President also vowed revenge.

(U) Executive Summary

(U//FOUO) Tensions between the Government of Iran and the United States have been escalating since 2018 when the United States re imposed economic sanctions against the Government of Iran for violations of their nuclear agreement and the April 2019 designation of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard as a foreign terrorist organization. Tensions continued to increase with Iran suspected of targeting oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf, and with the 20 June 2019 Iranian shoot down of a U.S. surveillance drone.^[1] These

tensions recently escalated into violence.^[ii] Iran likely played a pivotal role in the strikes against Saudi Arabian oil fields in 2019 as well as a 27 December rocket attack in Kirkuk that killed an American contractor, despite Iranian backed proxies claiming credit.^[iii] The 2 January drone strike at Baghdad airport removed a key Iranian military leader and has been the catalyst for Iranian government threats of an immediate and intense response.

(U) Timeline of Events

(U//FOUO) On 27 December 2019, the Iranian backed militia Kataib Hizballah (KH) reportedly conducted a rocket attack near the Iraqi city of Kirkuk, killing an American contractor and wounding several American and Iraqi personnel. In response, the United States conducted air strikes on three sites in Iraq and two in Syria linked to KH, reportedly killing 25 members of the group. Following the strikes, on 31 December, Iranian backed Iraqi KH supporters stormed the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. The violence escalated with members attempting to enter the embassy, starting fires and damaging the outside and a reception area of the embassy. On 2 January, the United States responded with a strike on a convoy outside Baghdad airport, killing Major General Qassim Suleimani, Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, and several other senior pro Iran figures in Iraq.^{[iv],[v]}

(U//FOUO) Following the death of Suleimani, Iran announced that Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, who has served as Suleimani's deputy commander since 1997, was named the new overall commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC QF) Quds Force. Qaani joined the IRGC QF in 1980 and served in the 1980 88 war with Iraq. Qaani has been described by Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as one of the "most decorated commanders" of the Guards during the 1980 88 Iran Iraq war.^{[vi],[vii]}

(U//FOUO) On 5 January, Iraqi lawmakers approved a resolution asking the Iraqi government to end the agreement under which Washington sent forces more than four years ago to help fight the Islamic State of Iraq and ash Sham (ISIS). The bill is nonbinding and subject to approval by the Iraqi government; however, the resolution has the backing of the outgoing prime minister. Additionally, on 5 January, Iran said it would fully withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In a government statement, Iran noted that its nuclear program will have no limitations on its uranium enrichment, production and research..^{[viii],[ix]}

(U) Key Findings

- (U//FOUO (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
- (U//FOUO (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
- (U//LES (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]

(U) Iranian Threats to U.S. Interests

(U//FOUO) Iranian leaders have vowed revenge against the United States for the death of Suleimani, which will likely increase geopolitical escalation and conflict between the U.S. and Iran, likely further destabilizing the

region. In April 2019, IRGC QF was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) making it the first time the U.S. Department of State has labeled a state institution as a FTO. Iran has promised “harsh revenge” and threatened to respond on American soil, with an Iranian Member of Parliament stating that Iran could attack the White House directly.^[x]

(U) During an open session of parliament in Tehran, on 5 January, Iranian Parliament Member Abolfazl Abutorabi stated that the killing of Suleimani is a “declaration of war” and Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations stated that the response for a military action is military action. Potential targets for Iran would likely come from rocket attacks against U.S. bases or allies in the region or sabotaging oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, it could embark on a sustained campaign of cyber warfare or target American citizens and troops abroad near embassies and consulates.^[xi]

(U) As of 5 January, the Department of Homeland Security stated that there were no specific, credible threats against the homeland; however, Iran and its proxies, including Hizballah, have shown an intent and capability to conduct attacks in the homeland. DHS has stated that Iran has a robust cyber program and is able to execute cyber attacks against the United States, to include temporarily disrupting critical infrastructure.^{[xii],[xiii],[xiv],[xv],[xvi]}

(U) Iranian-Backed Proxies

(U//LES) The IRGC QF maintains influence throughout the Middle East by working with allied groups that allow the group that ability to present an asymmetrical threat to traditional military capabilities utilized by the U.S. and its regional allies. Those partners include Shia militias operating in the region such as the Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and the Houthi rebels in Yemen.^[xvii] Iranian military officials have suggested that Iran’s regional proxies, rather than Iran itself, will be charged with responding to the death of Suleimani.^[xviii] Iranian proxies have been responsible for targeting U.S. interests in the region to include oil infrastructure, military bases and shipping lanes. In September 2019, Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed responsibility for a major attack on Saudi oil facilities and KH have reportedly carried out a string of rocket attacks against Iraqi military bases where U.S. troops are located as well U.S. embassies in Iraq. Additionally, Iranian backed KH has warned Iraqi security forces to stay away from US bases in Iraq starting on 5 January.^{[xix],[xx],[xxi]}

(U//FOUO) LH, Iran’s most significant non state partner, has expanded its influence in Latin America, networking with organized crime and other violent groups. Iran has historically provided weapons, training, and financial support to LH for facilitating activities abroad. Iran remains intent on using and expanding its global reach by utilizing its proxy forces to potentially conduct attacks and create a destabilizing effect on Western interests. A DHS review of 63 disrupted terrorist operations or attacks from 2012 2018 across 26 countries highlights the broad reach of Iranian efforts, to include efforts within the United States.^{[xxii],[xxiii],[xxiv]}

- (U) On 9 July 2019, a New Jersey based individual who authorities believe was working on behalf of LH’s Islamic Jihad Organization was arrested on terrorism charges and is suspected of conducting surveillance of landmarks including the Statue of Liberty, the United Nations, the White House, and Boston’s Fenway Park.^[xxv]
- (U) In May 2019, a U.S. Federal Court convicted Ali Mohamad Kourani^{USPER} of covertly providing material support for Hizballah’s Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO). Kourani, a naturalized U.S. citizen, was recruited, trained, and deployed by IJO to procure weapons and gather intelligence on potential U.S. targets for future Hizballah terrorist attacks. Kourani surveilled JFK Airport and law enforcement facilities in New York City.^[xxvi]

- (U) In 2017, two men were arrested in New York and Michigan on charges related to their alleged activities on behalf of Hizballah. Their activities included receiving military style training, conducting surveillance on potential targets in America, and assessing vulnerabilities of the Panama Canal and ships in the canal.^[xxvii]



(U//FOUO) Attacks and Disrupted Operations Linked to Hizballah or Iran
CBP

(U) Iranian Proxy Encounters at POEs

(b) (7)(E)

Iran has historically provided weapons, training, and financial support to LH and the IRGC Qods Force—Iran’s primary arm for facilitating terrorist activities abroad. Since the United States designated IRGC as a terrorist organization in April 2019, the Iranian regime has looked for ways to exploit vulnerabilities and undermine U.S. interests not only abroad but also along the U.S. borders. (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted text block]

[xxviii],[xxix]

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7) (E)

~~(U) Warning: This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policies regarding FOUO information. Information contained herein is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with authorized DHS Official Force and Information Security policies. Information contained herein is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with authorized DHS Official Force and Information Security policies. Information contained herein is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with authorized DHS Official Force and Information Security policies.~~

(U) US person information has been minimized. Should you require the minimized US person information on weekends or after normal weekday hours during exigent and time sensitive circumstances, contact the (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E) For all other inquiries, please contact the (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(U) Feedback: For general comments or questions related to the dissemination of this document, please e-mail CETD at (b) (7)(E)

- [i] ABC | 3 January 2020 | (U) World Braces for 'dramatic escalation' in tensions after key Iranian general killed (U) | (U) | <https://abcnews.go.com/International/world-braces-dramatic-escalation-tensions-key-iranian-general/story?id=68051827>
- [ii] USA Today | 3 January 2020 | (U) Timeline: How tensions escalated with Iran since Trump withdrew US from nuclear deal | (U) | (U) | <https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/2020/01/03/us-iran-conflict-since-nuclear-deal/2803223001/>
- [iii] ABC | 3 January 2020 | (U) World Braces for 'dramatic escalation' in tensions after key Iranian general killed (U) | (U) | <https://abcnews.go.com/International/world-braces-dramatic-escalation-tensions-key-iranian-general/story?id=68051827>
- [iv] NPR | 4 January 2020 | (U) Timeline: How the U.S. Came to Strike and Kill a Top Iranian General | (U) | (U) | <https://www.npr.org/2020/01/04/793364307/timeline-how-the-u-s-came-to-strike-and-kill-a-top-iranian-general>
- [v] [Evening Standard | 4 January 2020 | (U) Qasem Soleimani: Timeline of Events Leading to US Killing of Iranian General | (U) | (U) | <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/qasem-soleimani-airstrike-timeline-iran-iraq-a4326311.html>
- [vi] [FOX | 3 January 2020 | (U) Replacement Named for Gen. Qassem Soleimani | (U) | (U) | <https://www.foxnews.com/world/irans-supreme-leader-qassem-soleimani-replacement>
- [vii] [Haaretz | 5 January 2020 | (U) Iran Has Already Replaced Soleimani, Here is Everything we Know About Esmail Ghaani | (U) | (U) | <https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/iran-has-already-replaced-soleimani-here-is-everything-we-know-about-esmail-ghaani-1.8353694>
- [viii] [The New York Times | 5 January 2020 | (U) Iraq Calls for Expulsion of US Troops over Deadly Airstrike | (U) | (U) | <https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2020/01/05/world/middleeast/ap-ml-iraq-us.html>
- [ix] [Newsweek | 5 January 2019 | (U) Iran Fully Withdraws from Nuclear Deal and Criticizes European Response to Soleimani's Killing | (U) | (U) | <https://www.newsweek.com/iran-fully-withdraws-nuclear-deal-criticizes-european-response-soleimanis-killing-1480475>
- [x] The Epoch Times | 5 January 2020 | (U) Iran to Target US 'Military Sites', White Following General's Death: Officials | (U) | (U) | https://www.theepochtimes.com/top-iranian-general-issues-stark-warning-to-us-trump-america-started-the-war_3194185.html
- [xi] [USA TODAY | 4 January 2020 | (U) Iran Official on Soleimani Killing: 'The Response for Military Action is Military Action' | (U) | (U) | <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2020/01/04/iran-iraq-united-states-qasem-soleimani-trump/2804237001/>
- [xii] [White House | 8 April 2019 | (U) Statement from the President on the Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization | (U) | (U) | <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-designation-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-foreign-terrorist-organization/>
- [xiii] DHS | 4 January 2020 | (U) National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin | (U) | (U) | https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ntas/alerts/20_0104_ntas_bulletin.pdf
- [xiv] [FOX | 5 January 2020 | (U) Iranian MP Threatens to 'Attack the White House' | (U) | (U) | <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/iranian-mp-threatens-to-attack-the-white-house-report>
- [xv] [USA Today | 4 January 2020 | (U) Iran Official on Soleimani Killing: 'The Response for a Military Action is Military Action' | (U) | (U) | <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2020/01/04/iran-iraq-united-states-qasem-soleimani-trump/2804237001/>
- [xvi] [The New York Times | 3 January 2020 | (U) Homeland Security Sees 'No Specific, Credible Threat' From Iran, but Warns of Cyberattacks | (U) | (U) | <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/us/politics/homeland-security-iran-threat.html>
- [xvii] The Washington Institute | 17 April 2018 | (U) Examining Iran's Global Terrorism Network | (U) | (U) | <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/examining-irans-global-terrorism-network>
- [xviii] [Washington Post | 4 January 2020 | (U) Iran has Vowed Revenge Against the U.S. But it Seems to be in No Hurry | (U) | (U) | https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iran-has-vowed-revenge-against-the-us-but-it-seems-to-be-in-no-hurry/2020/01/04/150283e8-2e62-11ea-bffe-020c88b3f120_story.html
- [xix] Yahoo | 18 November 2019 | (U) Saudi-led coalition says Yemeni rebels hijacked vessel | (U) | (U) | <https://news.yahoo.com/saudi-led-coalition-says-yemeni-163021117.html>

[^{xx}] The United States Institute of Peace | 16 September 2019 | (U) Timeline of Houthi Attacks on Saudi Arabia | (U) | (U) | <https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/sep/16/timeline-houthi-attacks-saudi-arabia>

[^{xxi}] The Guardian | 14 September 2019 | (U) Major Saudi Arabia oil facilities hit by Houthi drone strikes | (U) | (U) | <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/14/major-saudi-arabia-oil-facilities-hit-by-drone-strikes>

[^{xxii}] [The Washington Post | 4 January 2020 | (U) Iran Has Vowed Revenge Against the U.S. but it Seems to be in No Hurry | (U) | (U) | https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iran-has-vowed-revenge-against-the-us-but-it-seems-to-be-in-no-hurry/2020/01/04/150283e8-2e62-11ea-bffe-020c88b3f120_story.html]

[^{xxiii}] [The Washington Post | (U) Iran has Invested in Allies and Proxies Across the Middle East. Here's Where they Stand After Soleimani's Death | (U) | (U) | <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/03/iran-has-invested-allies-proxies-across-middle-east-heres-where-they-stand-after-soleimanis-death/>]

[^{xxiv}] [PBS | 4 January 2020 | (U) Iran General Steps out of Soleimani's Shadow to Lead Proxies | (U) | (U) | <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/iran-general-steps-out-of-soleimanis-shadow-to-lead-proxies>]

[^{xxv}] NBC | 19 September 2019 | (U) Hezbollah plot terror attacks on U.S. landmarks | (U) | (U) | <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/new-jersey-man-charged-helping-hezbollah-plot-terror-attacks-u-n1056716>

[^{xxvi}] (U) | DOJ | 19-157 | 16 May 2019 | Ali Kourani Convicted In Manhattan Federal Court For Covert Terrorist Activities On Behalf Of Hizballah's Islamic Jihad Organization | Extracted information is U | Overall document classification is U

[^{xxvii}] DOJ | 8 June 2017 | (U) Two Men Arrested for Terrorist Activities on Behalf of Hizballah's Islamic Jihad Organization | (U) | (U) | <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-men-arrested-terrorist-activities-behalf-hizballahs-islamic-jihad-organization>

(b) (7)(E)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 1:44 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: HOFFMAN, TODD A; HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Blaine POE Questions from Members

10-4

To answer your question, no one from OCA will be attending this evening's brief. This evening's classified brief will reportedly center around Iran.

C1 will have a limited window to speak, so I'm not sure if the topic of Blaine will enter the main discussion.

If I hear of any getbacks, I'll be sure to reach out.

(b) (6)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Director (B&A) Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection | Department of Homeland Security
O: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | C: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | ✉ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 1:29 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: HOFFMAN, TODD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Blaine POE Questions from Members

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

As previously stated, we are going to defer answering these questions until after tonight's hill brief. We have provided C1/C2 with all the relevant information they requested and want to ensure answers to these requests are in-line with their responses. Will OCA have someone there getting notes on what was said by C1?

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 1:21 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
>
Subject: RE: Blaine POE Questions from Members

Hello Sir-

If it isn't too much of an inconvenience, I'd like to piggyback on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) previous email.

I'm the Director of the OCA Budget and Appropriations portfolio and we are now starting to receive questions from our staffers/Members.

A (b) (6), (b) (7) stated earlier, OCA is compiling a running list of all incoming questions and passing them along to you as needed.

I just received a set of questions from the Chairwoman of the House Appropriations Committee, regarding the Blaine POE.

As time permits, can you try to run down some answers for the following:

1. "Did wait times increase across the board at this rate, or was this location an anomaly?"
2. "What about the reports that some (even trusted traveler program members) were held (in secondary?) for up to 8 hours while others who did not appear to be "of Middle Eastern descent" seemed to be processed fairly rapidly? Was this specific to the Blaine POE of the Seattle AOR?"
3. "Are there any data available showing diversion to secondary and/or length of time in secondary by country of origin; k membership in a trusted traveler program; etc?"

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Director (B&A) Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection | Department of Homeland Security
O: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | C (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | ✉ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 12:48 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
; FREEMAN, MICHAEL T
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E) ; HOFFMAN, TODD A
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Blaine POE Questions from Members

(b) (6), (b) (7)

What is the current staff level at the Blaine Port of Entry - Peace Arch? SFO staffing numbers below.

SFO Onboard

(b) (7)(E)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

How has the staff level changed over the last five years? See above chart

What has the average wait time been for each month over the last year? See attachment (wait time in minutes)

In regards to the response to CHS, we recommend deferring till after the hill brief later today to see how C1 wishes to address this to ensure consistency.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From [Redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 11:39 AM
To: OFO-FIELD LIAISO [Redacted] (b) (7)(E) [Redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc [Redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
Subject: Blaine POE Questions from Members

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /OFO,

Attached are the combined follow up questions so far from Hill staff. These are all the follow ups OCA has received so far, but if additional are received we will continue to update this spreadsheet and send, unless they are duplicates. As you are able, please send the responses back to OCA so we can respond to staff.

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Direct Line: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 2:02 PM
To: WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO)
Cc: HOFFMAN, TODD A; HOWE, RANDY J
Subject: Re: MPAC Call tomorrow at 11:30AM

C1 is meeting with the congressional members at 5:30 EST today. We'll see what comes out of that.

Todd C. Owen
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

On Jan 7, 2020, at 11:02 AM, WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) > wrote:

Just FYI. I will be doing this call tomorrow. If there's anything new I should tell them, please let me know. But for now I plan to stick to the statement we put out.

Begin forwarded message:

From: "QUINN, TIMOTHY [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Date: January 7, 2020 at 11:13:18 AM CST
To: "WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: MPAC Call tomorrow at 11:30AM

Hi John,

I just forwarded the call in information (repeated below) for tomorrow's call with the Muslim Public Affairs Council. I'll touch base in the morning to see if you need anything before the call. Mary and I will be on it for IPL.

Best,

Tim

CALL-IN INFORMATION

Dial In [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

Participant Pin [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

Leader Code [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

POC

(b) (6) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6)

PURPOSE

To discuss the recent reports of delaying Americans of Iranian descent at our border points of re-entry.

From: HOFFMAN, TODD A
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 2:56 PM
To: Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO); WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO); HOWE, RANDY J
Subject: FW: Blaine

More follow up.

Todd A. Hoffman
Executive Director, Admissibility and Passenger Programs
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

From: HOFFMAN, TODD A
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 2:54 PM
To: PEREZ, ROBERT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Blaine

Sir,

As outlined below, we had a total of 41 individuals held over 6 hours. The aggravating factors are poor staffing to workload during a holiday weekend with increased vigilance to include (b) (7)(E), not holding staff over during the overnight shift to assist with the volume of referrals, and the watch commander not having proper oversight of the shift. Those with the highest wait times were in secondary during the peak time of referrals and their wait increased exponentially due to the volume and backlog of processing b (b) (7)(E). There is no additional rationale for the two cases over 9 hours.

6-7 hours 10
7-8 hours 12
8-9 hours 17
9+ hours 2

Todd A. Hoffman
Executive Director, Admissibility and Passenger Programs
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

From: PEREZ, ROBERT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 2:00 PM
To: HOFFMAN, TODD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Blaine

Thanks Todd!

REP

Robert E. Perez
Deputy Commissioner

From: HOFFMAN, TODD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 12:57 PM

To: PEREZ, ROBERT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: FW: Blaine

Sir,

Per your request....

Q1: What were the actual wait times at Blaine POE over Saturday night?

A1: During the period from Saturday 1/3 at 1200 to Sunday 1/4 at 1200 there were 277 individuals referred to secondary (USCs - 85, LPRs - 48, foreign visitors - 144). Processing wait times in secondary ranged from under one hour to 9 hours 15 minutes.

- a. 4% processed in under 1 hour
- b. 15% processed in 1-2 hours
- c. 11% processed in 2-3 hours
- d. 23% processed in 3-4 hours
- e. 15% processed in 4-5 hours
- f. 32% processed in over 5 hours, with maximum of 9 hours and 15 minutes.

Q2: What was the initial guidance locally?

A2: In response to potential retaliatory threats and heightened vigilance Seattle Field Office advised area ports to refer all encounters with individuals from areas of national concern to secondary for additional inspection and vetting. Additionally any individuals with national security concerns required Border Security Coordinator (BSC), Assistant Director of Field Operations (ADFO) and the Director of Field Operations (DFO) approval prior to releasing.

Q3: What was the clarifying guidance?

A3: At 1245 hours local time, Seattle Field Office provided clarifying guidance to area ports that USCs, US LPR and Canadian Citizens could be admitted on primary provided there was no associated derogatory information, while Iranian non-immigrants were to be referred to secondary to determine ties to IRGC or Hezbollah which would impact admissibility.

Q4: Did the Persian Pop Concert impact wait times at the Blaine POE?

A4: The concert had minimal impact (18 people total).

Q5: What were the number of Iranian national (b) (7)(E) encounters in FY2019.

A5 (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

○ (b) (7)(E) [Redacted]

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 5:54 PM
To: Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO); WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO); HOWE, RANDY J; FORET, VERNON T
Subject: Fwd: Letter from House Members re: CBP/Iranian Americans
Attachments: CBP Iran Letter 01072019.pdf

EAC, DEAC, XDs,

FYSA. OCA will task out the document request first thing in the morning. Additionally, we will work to setup the requested briefing.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 5:38 PM
To: CongressstoDHS (b) (6) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); WILLIAMS, KENNETH
Cc (b) (6)
Subject: Letter from House Members re: CBP/Iranian Americans

Good evening,

Please find attached a letter from Congresswoman Jayapal, Chairman Nadler, Subcommittee Chair Lofgren, Chairman Thompson, Chairwoman Maloney, and Subcommittee Chairwoman Rice requesting more information on reports of large numbers of people of Iranian heritage being held in secondary inspection over the weekend in Blaine, Washington. We request a briefing on these matters and document production by January 21, 2020.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Best,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)
Legislative Director
Office of Congresswoman Pramila Jayapal (WA-07)
1510 Longworth House Office Building | Washington, DC 20515

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

January 7, 2020

The Honorable Chad Wolf
Acting Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, D.C. 20528

Mark A. Morgan
Acting Commissioner
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Washington, D.C. 20004

Kenneth L. Williams
Port Director, Blaine Sector
Blaine, WA 98230

Dear Acting Secretary Wolf, Acting Commissioner Morgan, and Port Director Williams:

We write to express our alarm about U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) reportedly holding large numbers of people of Iranian heritage in secondary inspection for up to 12 hours over the weekend of January 4-5, 2020, at the Peace Arch Border Crossing in Blaine, Washington.

The *New York Times* reported that more than 60 people were held in secondary inspection for up to 10 hours.¹ Observers on the ground have reported that as many as 200 people were held for secondary inspection during this period.² Many impacted individuals were U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, including seniors and children. In one case, CBP held a family of four U.S. citizens of Iranian descent—who were pre-screened for expedited processing as Nexus pass holders—for nearly five hours.³

In response to criticism, CBP stated that “CBP field leadership participated in a teleconference with Acting Commissioner Morgan and Deputy Commissioner Perez, where the field was asked to remain vigilant and increase their situational awareness given the evolving threat environment.”⁴ CBP also released statements attributing long waits to high traffic during late hours, when the port has lower staffing levels.⁵ These statements, however, do not explain why impacted persons were overwhelmingly of Iranian heritage, nor why pre-cleared U.S. citizen travelers would have been placed in secondary inspection and delayed for five hours. The

¹ Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Mike Baker & Mariel Padilla, *U.S. Stops Dozens of Iranian-Americans Returning from Canada*, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2019), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/us/politics/iranian-americans-border.html>.

² Mike Baker & Caitlin Dickerson, *Iranian-Americans Questioned at the Border: ‘My Kids Shouldn’t Experience Such Things’*, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2019), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/us/border-iranians-washington-patrol.html>.

³ Priscillia Alvarez, *Iranian-American Describes 5 Hour Delay For Questioning at US Border Crossing*, CNN (Jan. 6, 2020), <https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/06/politics/iranian-american-border-questioning/index.html>.

⁴ *Id.*

⁵ *Id.*

statements also do not explain why individuals appear to have been detained throughout the day on January 4, beginning as early as 8:00 am.

In response to these troubling reports, we request a briefing on the matters discussed above by no later than January 21, 2020. We also request the following documents, including transcripts or written descriptions of any verbal communications, by January 21, 2020:

1. Any directives, orders, guidance, instructions, musters, whether verbal or in writing, or other documents and communications—issued on or after January 2, 2020—from any Department of Homeland Security or CBP official to CBP Agents or Officers regarding the screening of individuals of Iranian heritage or any other changes in screening procedures in response to the death of Qasem Soleimani.
2. Any directives, orders, guidance, instructions, musters, whether verbal or in writing, or other documents and communications specific to the Blaine Sector regarding the screening of individuals of Iranian heritage or any other changes in screening procedures in response to the death of Qasem Soleimani.
3. Any directives, orders, guidance, instructions, musters, whether verbal or in writing, or other documents and communications to Port Directors regarding the screening of individuals of Iranian heritage or any other changes in screening procedures in response to the death of Qasem Soleimani.
4. Any directives, guidance, instructions, musters, whether verbal or in writing, or other documents and communications from any Port Director to CBP Agents or Officers regarding the screening of individuals of Iranian heritage or any other changes in screening procedures in response to the death of Qasem Soleimani.
5. For the Blaine Port of Entry (POE) from January 3-6, 2020, data on the number of people subject to secondary inspection, including a breakdown by age, ethnicity, country of birth, immigration status, and length of time in secondary inspection.
6. For the Blaine POE, from January 3-6, 2020, the total number of on-duty CBP agents assigned to the processing of travelers, for each hour of the day.


Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Sincerely,


		
PRAMILA JAYAPAL Vice Chair, Immigration Subcommittee House Judiciary Committee	JERROLD NADLER Chairman House Judiciary Committee	ZOE LOFGREN Chair, Immigration Subcommittee House Judiciary Committee



BENNIE G. THOMPSON
Chair
Committee on Homeland Security



CAROLYN B. MALONEY
Chairwoman
Committee on Oversight and Reform



KATHLEEN RICE
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border
Security, Facilitation, & Operations
Committee on Homeland Security

From: CONROY, DONALD E
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 7:56 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOFFMAN, TODD A
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOWE, RANDY J; FORET, VERNON T
Subject: Re (b) (7)(E) LAREDO: SAR: Possible Iranian Influx / Gateway to the Americas Bridge -Laredo Texas.

Th (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Appreciate the updates.

Donald Conroy
Executive Director
National Targeting Center
Customs and Border Protection
Dept of Homeland Security
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Get [Outlook](#) for iOS

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 4:58:50 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOFFMAN, TODD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
FORET, VERNON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CONROY, DONALD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Fwd (b) (7)(E) LAREDO: SAR: Possible Iranian Influx / Gateway to the Americas Bridge -Laredo Texas.

Chief/XD,

Laredo interviews could not corroborate the information as being valid.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 4:50 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Fwd (b) (7)(E) LAREDO: SAR: Possible Iranian Influx / Gateway to the Americas Bridge Laredo Texas.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Director, Field Liaison Division
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Washington, DC

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (O)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 11:25:31 AM

To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: FW (b) (7)(E) LAREDO: SAR: Possible Iranian Influx / Gateway to the Americas Bridge -Laredo Texas.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

I'm not sure if anyone has reached out to you re: you inquiry. I can give you a call if you still need to discuss this. Bottom line, a (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]

Again, let me know if I need to give you a call to discuss this further.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

CBP Office of Field Operations

Laredo Field Office

Director, Northern Operations

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) O

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) C

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 12:00 AM

To: LAREDO-CMD CNT (b) (7)(E) > (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SA_JTTF_LARED (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc: Subject (b) (7)(E) LAREDO: SAR: Possible Iranian Influx / Gateway to the Americas Bridge -Laredo Texas.

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS REPORT

(b) (7)(E)

LAREDO, TEXAS

Incident: Possible Iranian Influx.
Date: January 6, 2020
Location: Gateway to the Americas Bridge.

Synopsis:

On January 6, 2020 at approximately 1530 hour (b) (7)(E) received a call from subject (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stating that 100 citizens of Iran might attempt illegal entry into the U.S.

Details:

At approximately 1530 hours (b) (7)(E) received a call from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The caller stated that 100 Iranians might attempt to forcefully enter the United States. Crossing the border at points between Piedras Negras/ Eagle Pass and Nuevo Laredo/ Laredo AOR.

At 1545 hours (b) (7)(E)/SCBP (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted SCBP (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and advised him of the phone call.

At 1559 hours, DN (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was contacted and advised of situation.

At 1615 hours (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived a (b) (7)(E).

At 1618 hours, DDN (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted ADF (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

At 1640 hours (b) (7)(E)/SCBP (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) notified (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

At 1700 hours (b) (7)(E) and HSI S (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) commenced initial Interview with subject (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) during which subject (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reiterated information he'd previously disclosed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he received information from co-worker (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

At approximately 1705 hours (b) (7)(E) stated they would respond along with Border Patrol Intelligence.

At 1730 hours (b) (7)(E) and HSI concluded first interview.

At 1732 hours, acting Border Security Coordinator Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted (b) (7)(E) SCBP (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and was briefed on the situation.

At approximately 1735 hours (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) SCBP (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OBP Inte (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) an (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived at POE.

At 1740 hours (b) (7)(E) began second interview. Contact was made via phone call with subject's co-worker (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had obtained his information from his brother-in-law, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), with the following;

At 1800 hours (b) (7)(E) CBP (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contacted SCBP O Inte (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of Eagle Pass Port of Entry.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) attended a gathering with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E) during which, the smuggler mentioned a group of 200 Iranian citizens in Piedras Negras, Coahuila, that are intending to illegally enter the United States. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated the Iranians will cross the river in smaller groups of (ten) through the state of Coahuila, possibly, through the Los Indios region.

At 2000 hours (b) (7)(E) concluded interview with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(E).

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has agreed to meet with his brother- in- law (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico in order to obtain more information.

Additional (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has agreed meet wit (b) (7)(E) before and after his visit to Mexico.

Further developments to follow.



Subject's Information:

Name: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
DOB: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
COC: U.S.A
DL#: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Customs and Border Protection Officer
(b) (7)(E)
Field Training Officer

Laredo, Texas Port of Entry

Phone (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

GOV Cell (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

HSDN (SIPR (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of LAREDO OPS CENTER
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 6:25 AM
To: OFO-FIELD LIAISON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOWE, RANDY J; BROPHY, ROSE M (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]
Cc: LAREDO OPS CENTER
Subject: Heightened Vigilance - Laredo Field Office Daily Reporting Wednesday, January 8, 2020

Good morning,

Please see the below response for the Laredo Field Office (LFO) as it relates to proactive measures being taken in response to the current threat and heightened vigilance.

Laredo Field Office Operational Actions:

- Messaging to LFO management on heightened level of vigilance due to the recent airstrike on Iranian assets with verbal mustering to all frontline CBPOs.
- Recurring musters to frontline employees on threat awareness.
- Reminder to LFO employees of the potential of Cyberattack and how to mitigate risk, highlighting the recent OIT messaging on Phishing sent out on Friday, January 3rd.
- Coordination with all Task Force Officers, JTTF, Law Enforcement and Intel community partners to ensure open lines of communication and identify if any local concerns exist.
- Immediate coordination with USBP Del Rio, Laredo and Rio Grande Valley Sectors within the LFO AOR to ensure coordinated efforts and outbound assistance support if required.
- Prepared for immediate deployment of outbound operations if required.
- Ensured employee safety/accountability procedures are updated and ready for implementation if required.
- Increased review of port security measures and enhanced security sweeps.

Significant Encounters:

- **No Encounters**

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Supervisory CBP Officer
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Laredo Field Office - Laredo Operations Center

Desk (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



Report Smuggling Activities at ReportSmuggling@cbp.dhs.gov

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 9:01 AM
To: HOFFMAN, TODD A; HOWE, RANDY J
Subject: FW: 2020-COR-00002732 Iran letter- DHS Tier 1
Attachments: CBP Iran Letter 01072019.pdf

FYI. Congressional COR came in on Blaine. We will prepare response and forward through leadership.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) **On Behalf Of** OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 8:56 AM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: BROWN, LISA BETH (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); FASANO, ADEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E) > (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: 2020-COR-00002732 Iran letter- DHS Tier 1

Good Morning,

FLD received a congressional inquiry surrounding the supposed detention of Iranians last weekend at Blaine. Please do not respond to this inquiry as it will be handled by Headquarters.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Supervisory CBP Officer
Field Liaison Division
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Room 2.3A-17
Washington, DC 20229
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
E-Mail: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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From [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 8:49 AM
To: OFO-TASKING [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) >; OFO-FIELD LIAISON [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) >
Cc [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED] J [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]
Subject: 2020-COR-00002732 Iran letter- DHS Tier 1

FLD,

Please see attached DHS Tier 1 and prepare a response as well as a cover memo for C1 signature. Responses are due back to OFO-Tasking NLT 12PM January 13, 2020. Notification is required if you will be unable to meet the deadline, thus placing this DHS Tier 1 on OES' Overdue report to the Commissioner.

Thank you,

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Management and Program Analyst
Office of Field Operations
Business Operations and Communications Division
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 10:32 AM
To: SITROOM; CBP SITROOM- SWOS
Cc: Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO); WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
HOWE, RANDY J; FORET, VERNON T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: 20200108 Operational Actions/Significant Encounters Report
Attachments: 20200108 - U.S. Airstrike on Iranian Military Leader (with OFO Input) (003).docx

Good Morning,

Please see OFO's input to the Operational Actions/Significant Encounters report for today.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Supervisory CBP Officer
Field Liaison Division
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Room 2.3A-17
Washington, DC 20229
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
E-Mail: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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U.S. Customs and Border Protection
National Targeting Center
January 8, 2020

Issue: Information Regarding Iran and Actions Taken Prior to U.S. Airstrike on Iranian Military Leader

On January 2, 2020, the United States successfully targeted General Qassem Soleimani, the head of Iran's elite Quds Force via an airstrike in Baghdad. Prior to this event the National Targeting Center (NTC) had implemented a number of actions in response to the Department of State's designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Tier I Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

Office of Field Operations

OFO continues to remain vigilant and has increased its enforcement posture at CBP land, air, and sea ports of entry (POEs), both domestically and OCONUS. All POEs are working cohesively with National Targeting Center (NTC), as well as our Federal and State/Local partners, to intercept and thoroughly examine and interview travelers with ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Beginning January 4, 2020, all Field Offices were instructed to provide daily updates on significant encounters/ incidents from ports in their AOR related to the U.S. airstrike on the Iranian Military Leader Qasem Soleimani / encounters with IRGC members.

National Targeting Center:

The National Targeting Center (NTC) has undertaken various actions in response to the IRGC's designation as a Tier 1 FTO and will continue to coordinate with the Intelligence Community (IC) to modify operations based on additional information obtained through the IC, CBP inspections, or in working with our international, federal, and state/local partners (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

(b) (7) (E)

Counter Network Division

- NTC supports and enforces the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) licensing and sanctions programs by targeting, detaining, and when necessary seizing shipments of restricted commodities and shipments destined to sanctioned countries or entities.
- NTC assists th (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
- NTC continues to suppo (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED], as well as the laundering of funds generated from these sales.

(b) (7) (E)

Historical Data (through January 3 2020)

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7)(E)

Land Border

(b) (7)(E)

Field Office Response and Preparedness Efforts:

Atlanta:

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.
- There have been no refusals for contact/linkage to Iran.

Baltimore

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- (b) (7)(E)
- Local CBP JTTF Liaisons and FBI providing threat briefings to port personnel.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time

Boston

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information

- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time

Buffalo

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
 - Irania (b) (7)(E) Encounters Buffalo 4, Champlain 0, Alexandria Bay 0
 - (b) (7)(E) Encounters Buffalo 1, Champlain 2, Alexandria Bay 0
 - Significant Encounters-Iranian Nexus-Adverse Actions: Buffalo 0, Champlain 0, Alexandria Bay 0
 - Significant Encounters-Iranian Nexus- Admissions: Buffalo 1, Champlain 0, Alexandria Bay 0
- (b) (7)(E) interview of an Iranian citizen was conducted, who was (b) (7)(E) to obtain Permanent Resident status in Canada. A basic media exam was performed on subject's cellphone and concluded with negative results (b) (7)(E)
- [REDACTED] The subject was processed for withdrawal of application for admission and was returned to Canada.

Chicago

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- The Area Port of Chicago has inspected 30 citizens of Iran, 19 inbound and 11 outbound.
- The Area Port of Minneapolis has inspected 1 citizen of Iran, 0 inbound and 1 outbound.
- TTRT conducted 4 inbound and 1 outbound interviews with negative derogatory findings.

Detroit

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

El Paso

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- A social media post attempting to organize a protest over the death of Senior Iranian Military Official Qasem Soleimani. The protest is scheduled to take place on January 11, 2020 and is being organized by a Facebook group called ChucoPedia. The group has 3,228 members and is claimed to be a public group for bilingual news and culture for El Paso, TX, southern New Mexico, and Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua Mexico. If this protest is carried out, it would be considered a significant encounter related to the U.S. military action in Iraq. Situation will be monitored and updates will follow.

Houston

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Laredo

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Los Angeles

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HO

[REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7) (E)

- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Miami

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].

New Orleans

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.
- CBP is engaged with all 5 State Fusion Centers and sharing information as it becomes available.
- (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].

New York

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Preclearance

- **Abu Dhabi:** Due to the expected retaliation towards U.S. assets in the region in response to the killing of Iranian General Soleimani, the Department of State (DOS) will increase its force protection at the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi. Additionally, DOS will review the overall security posture of U.S. resources and has messaged the need for increased vigilance throughout the U.S. government community in country. (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

Temporary Shelter in Place order from U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi established throughout the evening and expired at 0600 HRS local. The Chief of Mission order to all Mission UAE personnel was based on information received that “Iran has launched an attack, likely on Iraq and Kuwait”. It has now been determined that the information pertained to the confirmed strikes in Iraq.

Currently, there are no known specific threats to the UAE and preclearance operations in Abu Dhabi, however a heightened state of awareness is in effect resulting in the below actions by Abu Dhabi management:

1. All CBP Preclearance employees are accounted for; 47 direct hires and 71 dependents. Currently 4 direct hires with 10 dependents are confirmed out of the country.
 2. Consistent communication with the DOS and local police has been established.
 3. Security awareness muster for all staff assigned to Abu Dhabi have been conducted.
 4. Emergency contact information for staff and dependents updated and validated.
 5. Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) reviewed with all staff.
 6. (b) (7)(E)
 7. (b) (7)(E)
 8. Additional local police presence is in and outside the Preclearance Facility (PCF).
 9. All Government travel cards are valid should the need for evacuation arise.
 10. All CBP Preclearance personnel and dependents fall under Department of State Chief of Mission authority and DoS has the decision authority and lead for evacuation. At this time there are no evacuation orders in place.
- **Aruba:** Due to proximity and connection flights to South America, which have flights from Iran, along with constant Iranian/Canadian travelers, Aruba preclearance has increased daily assignments to PAU and Rovers through shift reassignments or overtime to provide for more detailed targeting.
 - **Halifax:** Anticipated protest at Victoria Park (1.8km from U.S. Consulate) on January 11, 2020 at 1400 hrs. Expected to be peaceful protest.

- **Canada, Embassy Ottawa:** No specific information to indicate U.S. personnel in Canada are subject to an increased security threat. As a matter of due diligence personnel are reminded of the standing status quo on security, which generally entails maintaining a low profile and exercising regular vigilance.
- **Embassy Nassau:** No specific threat information related to the embassy or U.S. interests in The Bahama (b) (7)(E). Washington is continuously updating the threat analysis for posts across the globe, not just NEA (Middle East). The Surveillance Detection Teams are on high alert and will expand coverage to high profile residential and school zones.
- **Toronto:** Anticipated protest at U.S. Consulate on January 11, 2020 at 1200. Expected to be peaceful protest.
 - (b) (7)(E) interview of an Iranian citizen was conducted revealing previous service in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Due to his apparent membership in the IRGC, the subject was allowed to withdraw his application for admission and advised to go to the U.S. consulate to apply for a U.S. visa and (b) (7)(E). Subject was escorted outside of the CBP secondary inspection area and was (b) (7)(E)
 - (b) (7)(E) interview of an Iranian citizen who intended to transit through the United States to his final destination Tehran, Iran via Washington Dulles International Airport, revealed previous service in the Iranian Army; however, declined knowledge of the IRGC. Due to subject's deceptive behavior and discrepancies in answers, the subject was inadmissible to the United States pursuant to 212(a)(7)(a)(i)(I) of the INA. Subject was refused entry pending a U.S. Visa and (b) (7)(E) and was allowed to withdraw his application for admission.
 - (b) (7)(E) interview of an Iranian born Canadian citizen was conducted, and the subject could not overcome the presumption of being an intending immigrant and was permitted to withdraw her application for admission per § 235(a)(4) INA pursuant to § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) INA.
- **Vancouver:** RCMP assigned to CBP preclearance carryin (b) (7)(E), and continue coordination with RCMP headquarters for awareness and determine needs and ability for increased presence.
- **Dublin:** Anticipate protest at Dublin Embassy for Thursday, January 9, 2020 at 1900 HRS local. CBP staff will be advised to stay away from the Embassy at that time. Expected to be a peaceful protest.

San Diego

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E)
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- (b) (7)(E) encountered a U.S. citizen at the Port of San Diego with recent travel to Iran. Vetting was conducted yielding no derogatory information. The subject was admitted into the United States without incident.

San Francisco

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- CBP Foreign Liaison Units in Mexico: For both the CBP International Liaison Unit and Border Patrol's Foreign Operations Branch will provide information, which will assist in building general domain awareness of key demographics for potential future outreach opportunities.

San Juan

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Seattle

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- Significant encounters:
 - PAU targeted 7 potential targets and created 1 UPAX Events for further research.

Tucson

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Container Security Initiative and Immigration Advisory Program:

- Similar to Preclearance, all overseas assigned personnel to CSI and IAP fall under Department of State Chief of Mission authority and DoS has the decision authority and lead for evacuation. At this time there are no evacuation orders in place.
- All CBP Personnel has been accounted for.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Office of Intelligence

- To facilitate rapid update exchanges, OI made positive contact with partners in the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (I&A, TSA ICE, and USCIS) and US Intelligence Community (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E)) and CBP's representative in Jordan.
- OI's is augmenting its Watch staffing, which includes moving to a 24/7 schedule to monitor Iran-related threats until further notice.
- OI supports (b) (7)(E) that DHS/I&A led with Key Intelligence Officers of DHS components to share threat updates and operational responses.
- To apprise CBP personnel in the field, OI prepared UNCLASSIFIED talking points for a 3 January teleconference with INA to inform our CBP teammates overseas on Iran-related threats.
- OI is planning multiple UNCLASSIFIED intelligence products for customers, including a formal bulletin and a (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) ”.

Air and Marine

- HQ Ops: In light of increasing tensions between the U.S. and Iran, Air and Marine Operations field leadership is proactively leveraging its strategic partnerships with local, state, and federal counter-terrorism partners in order to enhance the Nation's security preparedness and response posture.
- AMOC: The Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) is on heightened alert and is shifting resources (equipment and personnel) as necessary in order to support interagency partners such as the (b) (7)(E) . AMOC's intelligence cell is actively monitoring relevant message traffic to immediately identify and process additional threat streams. The Joint PED Operations Center West (JPOC-W) is prepared to support emergent contingency operations that may require full motion video (i.e. Humanitarian Aid Disaster Relief (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E)) and analytical processing.

Office of International Affairs

- Maintaining global accountability of personnel stationed overseas, including those with dependents at foreign locations, and teaming with OI to provide immediate intelligence updates
- Attaches and deployed personnel are maintaining access to classified systems to report and receive sensitive information.
- INA/HQ is working to provide requisite personal protective gear to personnel stationed overseas.
- Monitoring information to integrate updates to (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) ”.

- Teaming with “Five Eyes” partners to ensure shared awareness of threat activit (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]

CBP000031

CBP0000040

CBP000041

CBP000042

CBP0000032

CVP0000033

CBP0000034

CBP0000035

CBP0000036

CBP0000037

CBP0000038

CBP0000039

**Office of Field Operations
Seattle Field Office
Centralized Area Surveillance Centers
January 8, 2020**

Action Required: Information Only

Issue: Seattle Field Office (SFO) Blaine response to heighten vigilance

Executive Summary:

Beginning Friday, January 3, SFO increased their security posture due to an increased threat from Iran following an air strike which resulted in the death of an Iranian general. The below timeline details the guidance provided by SFO and subsequent port guidance provided to officers.

The enhanced security measures, coupled with normally high holiday/weekend traffic resulted in excessive delays on primary and in secondary. Normal weekend secondary wait times can easily exceed two to four hours, but the additional referrals added to this wait time. The port experienced wait times from 50-100 minutes while opening three to five regular lanes and one to two NEXUS lanes; the port has 10 lanes. It appears that the port didn't adequately staff to workload on primary and secondary inspection areas as a high amount of officers were on A/L or S/L on January 4. Staffing was as follows for Peace Arch POE:

(b) (7) (E)

The port only staffed on (b) (7)(E) for the evening and midnight shifts, which caused lengthy delays in secondary. Once the single (b) (7)(E) interviewed subject they would pass information on to TAU and (b) (7)(E). Additionally, Blaine POE was experiencing VPC issues throughout the day on Saturday and OIT was installing a new computer on primary.

The course corrections began on Saturday at 1858 hours when AD Freeman sent an email message to APD Williams detailing shortfalls from the Area Port of Blaine.

The final course correction was on Sunday at 1245 hours when AD Freeman sent out the updated guidance to the area ports.


Timeline:

Friday, January 3, 2020

0938 Blaine WC message to supervisors:

For Immediate Muster:

Update & Clarification:



1008 TAU SCBP (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sends email to area port managers and (b) (7)(E) managers advising immediately that TAU was tasked to support research on all Iranian encounters and to notify TAU of all encounters with Iranian nationals. The research and names will be forwarded to the BSC and DFO for approval prior to release.

1127 Area port manager guidance from SFO:

In light of the US airstrike against Iranian IRGC-QF General Qassem Soleimani, it is prudent at this time to heighten our vigilance against any potential retaliation. All encounters with individuals from areas of national concern must be referred into secondary for additional layers of vetting (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E) It is imperative that DHS remains proactive and be alert in the interactions with individuals or commodities arriving from or departing to areas of national concern (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)
(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E) The Seattle Field Office TAU will assist in streamlining various vetting stages to ensure information is delivered timely. The Seattle Field Office TAU will notify the Border Security Coordinator (BSC), Assistant Director of Field Operations (ADFO) and the Director of Field Operations (DFO) simultaneously to obtain ADFO and DFO *approval prior to releasing* the subject (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)
(b) (7)(E)

To ensure timely reporting to the Seattle Field Office TAU, The Seattle Field Office recommends you staff a twenty-four hour (b) (7)(E) point of contact for your Area Ports. Area Ports may need to augment you (b) (7)(E) assets with experienced CBPO's who are capable of performing NTC/UPAX events for vetting.

Intelligence acquired from the Area Ports as well as intel acquired from outside agencies will be turned over to the Seattle Field Office (TAU) to assure that Senior Management is steadily

apprised of real time Intelligence information without any delay or withholding of that information.

If you have any questions or would like additional information, please contact

Border Security Coordinator, Seattle Field Office (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), or a member of your staff may contact Supervisor TAU Program Manage (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or (A) Program Manage (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

1145 Blaine Chief email to Blaine supervisors:

APD Williams held a meeting this morning to discuss concerns and preventative measures following the U.S. airstrike responsible for the death of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani. Retaliation for the airstrike is expected to be forthcoming.

The following preventative measures have been put into place until further notice;

24 Hour Staffing at All Ports of Entry

Officers will staff the outer ports that are normally left unmanned after closing. The outer ports will work on getting cooperation with local OBP to supplement their staffing.

Routine Security Patrols around the Port of Entry

Routine security patrols around the port of entry will be conducted to screen for persons or items out of the ordinary.

Officers Will Work in Pairs

When conducting security patrols, a minimum of two officers shall conduct the patrol. Midnight supervisor will assign two officers to the primary lane for security/backup concerns.

Increased Vehicle Check

Officers are encouraged to increase the frequency of vehicle hood/trunk checks and vehicle interior on primary.

100% VPC Screening of All Travelers Arriving at Primary

All arriving travelers will be screened utilizing Vehicle Primary Client when they arrive at a primary inspection booth.

Body Armor

Wearing body armor is encouraged, but not mandatory at this given time.

(b) (7)(E) Officers

(b) (7)(E) officer will be present at the port of entry 24/7 to assist in inspections

(b) (7)(E)

Supervisors at Primary Lanes

Shift supervisors will monitor officers primary inspections to ensure officers are engaged in focused, relevant inspections

A-TCET

A-TCET officers have been instructed to shift their focus to inbound vehicles to the United States.

A-TCET officers will be working the pre-primary areas at the ports of entry.

BCC Cameras/Notifications

If a suspicious person or inspection is noted, The Blaine Command Center will be notified to ensure that person/inspection is captured on video.

Derogatory Inspection (b) (7)(E)

APD Williams wishes to be notified of any derogatory inspections completed on persons from countries of concern.

APD Williams should be notified using the chain of command.

Cover Jackets

Officers are encouraged to utilize cover jackets when transiting to and from work so as not to draw undue attention to themselves as a target of opportunity.

1309 TAU Iranian Alert PDF emailed to entire SFO (Attachment 1)

1400 Blaine face to face muster to officers, which was then mustered on each subsequent shift:

• **Face to Face Muster notes:**

- We are in a state of heightened vigilance.
 - The Port Directors have been provided a briefing as to the gravity of the aforementioned situation, which is equivalent to a foreign power killing a member of the presidential cabinet
 - All encounters with non-immigrants from areas of national concern should be highly scrutinized
 - We are assigning officers to man all ports 24X7
 - We are working with our law enforcement counterparts to assist in this effort
 - (b) (7)(E)
 - (b) (7)(E)
 - (b) (7)(E)
 - Wear body armor
 - Wear cover jacket when traveling to and from work
 - Report negative contact with individuals posing a threat to CBP personnel or property to the APD through t (b) (7)(E)
 - Request assistance immediately when dealing with unruly passenger (b) (7)(E)
 - Increase trunk checks and NII scans
 - Conduct routine patrols around the FIS
 - Maintain the highest levels of professionalism, impartiality, and courtesy to the traveling public.
- Enforcement Teams
- (b) (7)(E)
 - (b) (7)(E)
 - JTTF TFO will provide any Intelligence updates upon receipt

- BEST TFO will assist in port operations

- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

1427 Additional guidance provided to area port managers by SFO:

Update Iranian Threat:

Whether the Iranian, Palestinian, Lebanese or any other subject of national concern is being formally refused or is allowed (b) (7)(E) back to Canada to obtain immigration benefits, notifications must be made to The Office of Border Patrol (OBP) to apprise them of the situation. Please follow your local Area Ports procedures when contacting OBP.

As additional processing procedures are received they will be sent out accordingly.

Saturday, January 4, 2020

1054 Area port manager guidance from SFO (Attachment 2):

Thank you for your patience the last 24 hours, we have had some lessons learned and best practices and have updated the guide for secondary vetting for the field (please see attached).

(b) (7) (E)

Thank you and your team for the excellent work being done! Please feel free to reach out if there are any questions.

1858 Clarification of guidance from ADFO Freeman to APD Williams:

The Field Office has provided guidance to the Area Ports regarding work flow of this specific operation. Due to the magnitude of the DFO's request for final vetting and approval from the Field Office the Area Ports are to streamline their submissions to the Field Office TAU. The three other Area Ports have complied with the guidance, however there are significant shortfalls from the Area Port of Blaine.

Unlike the other three area ports, Blaine is not providing required information:

1. They are referring plate numbers to the Field Office TAU (not the subjects name) to be pulled from CSIS so TAU can conduct Blaine's inspection.
2. The Blaine CBPO's are completing t (b) (7)(E) check sheet and forwarding them to the Field Office TAU to conduct Blaine's inspection.
3. The Blaine CBPO's are not giving a synopsis of their inspection. The Field Office TAU does not know where the subject is going, what the subject is doing or who they are going to meet.
4. The Blaine CBPO's are not annotating that any CBP system queries have been conducted or if there are any positive or negative results from the queries.

5. Blaine is not producing a inspectional product of these subjects for the Field Office TAU to complete a final vetting analysis.

The other Area Ports are conducting full inspections of these subjects, conducting vetting and providing a detailed product to the Field Office TAU o [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E).

The Field Office TAU is mandated to support all Area Ports within the Seattle Field Office for the final vetting.


Again thank you for all the support and hard work your officers, supervisors and managers have been providing. I fully understand your ports are overwhelmed with normal and holiday traffic, however until we receive further guidance this will be the normal state of operations.

2046 APD Williams advised they were making course corrections.

Sunday, January 5

1039 Area port guidance sent by AD Freeman at the direction of DFO Fasano:

The Field Office has provided guidance to the Area Ports regarding work flow [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]. Due to the magnitude of the vetting and approval process from the Field Office to the Area Ports, the following guidelines will now take effect to streamline this



(b) (7) (E)

Lastly as long as you don't have a credible threat at a specific port you are no longer required to staff your non 24- hour ports after hours or enhanced security patrols. Please ensure you have adequate staffing in the CASC to monitor the ports of entry

Please call me if you have any questions.

1140 XD Howe provided further clarification to AD Freeman for the field not to target people based on nationality but rather on threat indicators.

1215 DFO Fasano held a conference call with all of the SFO APDs.

1213 WC clarification message to Blaine supervisors:

Please review the following information for worksheets and complete inspections so t (b) (7)(E) can review and forward to TAU for the final review.

It remains important to follow these steps so that we provide as nearly complete a product as possible for TAU to work on.

For the Sumas and Oroville AORs, please review and continue to follow your current forwarding procedures.

At this point we are having the Officers complete as much research as possible on t (b) (7)(E) and complete a synopsis for review by the Shift Supervisor.

This information is then forwarded to AEU to review followed b (b) (7)(E) review.

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7)(E)

1245 Updated guidance from SFO:
USCs, US LPR and Canadian Citizens

If primary officer is satisfied no derogatory information is present that can admit on primary

(b) (7)(E)

If you have 10 or more in secondary call DFO or processing time for them reaches 2 hours call DFO

(b) (7)(E)

1300 APD message to entire Blaine Area, additionally this was orally mustered at 1300 and subsequent shifts:

The Seattle Field Office has updated the guidance regarding the ongoing (b) (7)(E) [redacted].

1. When inspecting USCs, US LPRs or Canadian Citizens, if primary officer is satisfied that no derogatory information is present, they can admit on primary

(b) (7)(E)

1344 APD message to Blaine Area managers:

As you have been advised, the SFO has updated the guidance fo (b) (7)(E) [redacted]

[redacted] With that, it is important that you provided a high level of oversight to ensure that

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officers are not targeting by nationality. If derogatory information is identified during the primary or secondary inspection, those aliens should be referred and the guidance followed. Please ensure that the guidance is mustered right away.

If any secondary examination exceeds 2 hours, please contact me directly via my cellular.

From: MARTEL, CARLOS C
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 2:10 PM
To: HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) FORET, VERNON T
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: (U//FOUO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Referral
Attachments: 08JAN202 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).doc

FYSA

Carlos C. Martel
Director, Field Operations
Los Angeles Field Office
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Office
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - Mobile

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 11:05 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: MARTEL, CARLOS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: (U//FOUO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Referral

Write-In Threat Related t (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Border Security Coordinator

Los Angeles Field Office

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Unclassified//~~For Official Use Only~~

(b) (7)(E), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(E)

From: HOFFMAN, TODD A
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 3:45 PM
To: Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO); WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOWE, RANDY J
Subject: FW: Blaine POE Questions from Members
Attachments: Heightened Vigilance IP.docx; HIGH THREAT ALERT (b) (7)(E) form for Iran Threat and UPDATED GUIDANCE On BEST PRACTICES in the FIELD

Please see summary of events.

Todd A. Hoffman
Executive Director, Admissibility and Passenger Programs
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 1:59 PM
To: HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOFFMAN, TODD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: Blaine POE Questions from Members

XD,

Just received this. Reviewing now.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 1:39 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: FASANO, ADEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) FREEMAN, MICHAEL T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: Blaine POE Questions from Members

DX (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Please find attached SFO's comprehensive readout and two attachments.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Supervisory Program Manager
Border Security and Facilitation
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Seattle Field Office
Office (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cell (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 7:01 AM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: CAMPBELL, CARL S (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); HOFFMAN, TODD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C);
HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Blaine POE Questions from Members

Forgot to add, we need this well in advance for OFO leadership to review and ask subsequent questions.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 10:00 AM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); TODD A HOFFMAN
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); RANDY J HOWE
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Blaine POE Questions from Members

Mike,

Leadership has a call this afternoon at 5:30 to discuss this. I know there has been a lot of piecemeal responses to inquiries yesterday. We need you to provide a comprehensive read out of what transpired to include a detailed timeline starting after C1s call Friday.

It needs to include guidance given from the Field Office to the ports and then port leadership to the troops, staffing issues (detailed breakdown CBPOS, managers (b) (7)(E)) and why they occurred, engagement by the PD and port management throughout, when did you begin to course correct, how was this accomplished, how the exams were required to be conducted (b) (7)(E)),etc....

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 3:33 PM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Re: Blaine POE Questions from Members

Mike,

I think we need a complete comprehensive response painting the picture of what had occurred from the beginning to help address all these piecemeal requests. Like we would do for an official congressional correspondence letter. We need to be clear what occurred Otherwise we will continue to have questions come in.

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 3:25:44 PM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Fwd: Blaine POE Questions from Members

Can you work on #3 highlighting staffing, increased vigilance, etc.

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 3:19:12 PM
To [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; OFO-FIELD LIAISO [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED]
Cc [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; HOWE, RANDY [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]; FREEMAN, MICHAEL T [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OFO-FIELD LIAISO [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED]; HOFFMAN, TODD [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Blaine POE Questions from Members

Clarification. # 1&2 were addressed by the previous information. We will prepare a response to #3 tomorrow.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 3:07:16 PM

To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E)

Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

FREEMAN, MICHAEL T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E)

HOFFMAN, TODD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: RE: Blaine POE Questions from Members

Good Afternoon,

Please see the additional questions in the attachment under Line 7 that staffers from HSGAC would like to address. Please let me know the responses that I can move forward with.

Thank you in advance,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Office of Congressional Affairs | U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20229

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (main line) (b) (7)(E)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 12:54 PM

To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

FREEMAN, MICHAEL T

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E) HOFFMAN, TODD A

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Re: Blaine POE Questions from Members

Thank you!

On Jan 7, 2020, at 12:47 PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

What is the current staff level at the Blaine Port of Entry - Peace Arch? SFO staffing numbers below.

(b) (7)(E)

How has the staff level changed over the last five years? See above chart

What has the average wait time been for each month over the last year? See attachment (wait time in minutes)

In regards to the response to CHS, we recommend deferring till after the hill brief later today to see how C1 wishes to address this to ensure consistency.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 11:39 AM
To: OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E) > (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY J
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Blaine POE Questions from Members

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /OFO,

Attached are the combined follow up questions so far from Hill staff. These are all the follow ups OCA has received so far, but if additional are received we will continue to update this spreadsheet and send, unless they are duplicates. As you are able, please send the responses back to OCA so we can respond to staff.

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Direct Line: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

<Wait times 2020.xlsx>

<Blaine POE Questions from Members Updated.xlsx>

CBP000017

CBP0000018

CBP0000019

CBP000020

CBP000021

CBP000022

CBP0000023

CBP000024

CBP0000025

CBP000026

CBP000027

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 3:50 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: HOWE, RANDY J
Subject: RE: Approps Iran briefing Thursday

Need a name for the below.

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Chief of Staff
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Mobil (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Des (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 3:44 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: Approps Iran briefing Thursday
Importance: High

Good afternoon-

I'm trying to nail down a CBP OFO SME who can participate in a classified briefing tomorrow with Senate/House Appropriations staff. The topic of the briefing is Iran.

C1 and EAC Ferrara participated as the CBP SMEs yesterday, but scheduling conflicts are preventing both from attending tomorrow's brief at 12:00 p.m.

Our SMEs level of participation will not be a robust or involved one.

DHS Legislative Affairs has outlined the levels of participation as such:

"The approps staff has asked that we limit any opening remarks to 1-2mins per person, with the expectation it will only be a few ppl. OLAs recommendation would be to have PLCY, I&A, OPS, and CISA be the opening "speakers", but we can obviously flex to include TSA and USCG if you all would like, with CBP and USSS in Q&A mode only."

The "leads" for the discussion will be CISA, INA, and Ops.

While they were not a participant in yesterday's briefing, TSA's attendance has now been requested and they will be sending DA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as their representative.

Per DHS OLA, SME levels will vary and do not have to be confined to comparable, leadership roles.

EAC Ferrara is happy to provide a back brief to the SME that OFO offers up.

I know there will be questions, so please don't hesitate to reach out.

V/r,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Director (B&A) Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection | Department of Homeland Security
O: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | ☒ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 3:21 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: Re: Approps Iran briefing Thursday

OI won't be able to address questions about field interviews or actions. Let's move to have OFO take this one. If their briefer has questions about last night's briefs, we can put them in touch with Ferrara. Thank you.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Senior Policy Advisor
Operations Support
U. S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On Jan 8, 2020, at 3:19 PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
wrote:

What about having the AC/DAC for OI or OFO step in as a SME to step in for EAC Ferrara?

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Director (B&A) Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection | Department of Homeland Security
O: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | C (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | ☒ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 2:09 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: Re: Approps Iran briefing Thursday

Sorry. In a mtg now. Will try to call before 2:30 mtg begins. But if you could reiterate Ferrara's availability at 3pm tomorrow, is best direction. I spoke with him as we walked into this mtg and this is his preference as well.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Policy Advisor
Operations Support
U. S. Customs and Border Protection

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On Jan 8, 2020, at 2:06 PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

He (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Do you have time for a quick call?

I'm going to conference in DHS Leg. Affairs to see if we can work out a feasible alternative.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Director (B&A) Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection | Department of Homeland Security
O: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | C (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | ✉ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 1:15 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: RE: Approps Iran briefing Thursday

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) In talking with EAC Ferrara, he'd like to know if he is the lead or if like last night, C1 will take the lead. If the latter, EAC Ferrara noted he would like some information on the side-bar conversation that occurred with the Senator from WA.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Senior Policy Advisor
Operations Support
U. S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 12:12 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: RE: Approps Iran briefing Thursday

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Please give me a call; I just tried your desk and cell. In speaking with our intelligence team members, we do not believe the CBP should be briefing this as it would be better suited for DHS or a member of the IC. If it is determined that CBP is going to do this, we would need to discuss the desired content in detail.

For awareness, EAC Ferrara has a meeting offsite from 1230-1430 that he truly should not miss or bow out of. He could predictably depart the RRB at 3:00pm if needed.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Senior Policy Advisor
Operations Support
U. S. Customs and Border Protection

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 11:26 AM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: FW: Approps Iran briefing Thursday

Good mornin (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

EAC Ferrara has been volunteered by the 4th Floor to participate in a staff-level, classified briefing on Iran tomorrow. Can you check his availability between 12pm 4pm?

At the moment, it looks like this will be a rewind of last night's Iran briefing.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Director (B&A) Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection | Department of Homeland Security
O: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | C (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | ☒ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 7:42 AM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: PEREZ, ROBERT E (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Approps Iran briefing Thursday

Thank (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) will be there for House Approps Majority.

From [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 7:40 AM
To [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: Fwd: Approps Iran briefing Thursday

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - assume that since it's staff level, we'll ask EAC Ferrara to brief. If it escalates to Members later, obviously we'll elevate to C1.

Thanks.

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From [REDACTED] (b) (6) >
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 7:14 AM
To [REDACTED] (b) (6)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]
Cc [REDACTED] (b) (6)
[REDACTED]
Subject: Approps Iran briefing Thursday

I&A, Ops, CISA, USCG, USSS, CBP, PLCY
The four corners appropriations staff have requested a classified staff briefing on Iran for Thursday afternoon.
It's possible this could eventually elevate to Members, but as of now, only staff are expected.

By noon today, please Identify an appropriate briefer and let me know their Thursday 1/9 between 12-4.

Thank you,
[REDACTED] (b) (6)

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