
From: WILLIAMS, KENNETH
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 1:57 PM
To: BROWN, LISA BETH M; SCHMELZ, JASON W (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); THOMAS, ZACHARY C
Cc: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T; SAAR, DIRK J. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); FASANO, ADELE
Subject: RE: Heightened Vigilance

Acknowledged.

Kenneth Williams
Area Port Director
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
9901 Pacific Highway
Blaine, WA 98230
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cellular: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Fax: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: BROWN, LISA BETH M (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 10:53 AM
To: WILLIAMS, KENNETH (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); SCHMELZ, JASON W
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
THOMAS, ZACHARY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); SAAR, DIRK J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) FASANO, ADELE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: Heightened Vigilance

Confirmation from PAO- all media inquiries to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). HQ is drafting statement for local inquiries.

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 10:48 AM
To: BROWN, LISA BETH (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Heightened Vigilance

Good morning,

At this point, they are working on a statement that will be used in response to inquiries. HQ received an inquiry regarding it from the New York Times about a 45 minutes ago, so they are working that and once they respond I will have the statement I can use for any local inquiries.

Any inquiries received should be routed to me for response.

From: BROWN, LISA BETH (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 10:36 AM

To [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >

Cc: FREEMAN, MICHAEL [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Heightened Vigilance

Good mornin [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),

OFO is heightening its vigilance for possible retaliation stemming from last evening's drone strike against Iranian leadership. Has CBP established any PAO/reporting protocols if we get media inquiries?

Lisa Beth M. Brown
Assistant Director, Trade
Seattle Field Office
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Blaine, WA

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

CBP000017

CBP000018

CBP000019

CBP000020

CBP000021

CBP0000022

From: FASANO, ADELE
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 9:51 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T; BROWN, LISA BETH M
Subject: RE: Proposed TAU Procedure for Iranian Vetting

ok

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 2:39 PM
To: FASANO, ADELE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); BROWN, LISA BETH M
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: Proposed TAU Procedure for Iranian Vetting

Director,

Please see work flow for these individuals that the TAU wishes to instruct the Area Ports with, upon your approval.

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(A) Border Security Coordinator
U. S. Customs and Border Protection
Seattle Field Office
Des (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Ce (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)


Warning: This email and any attachments are UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public or other personnel who do not have a valid "need-to-know" without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. No portion of this email should be furnished to the media, either in written or verbal form. If you are not an intended recipient or believe you have received this communication in error, please do not print, copy, retransmit, disseminate, or otherwise use this information. Please inform the sender that you received this message in error and delete the message from your system.

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 2:15 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
>
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Proposed TAU Procedure for Iranian Vetting

Team,

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Supervisor Tactical Analytical Unit

Program Manager Border Security and Facilitation

U. S. Customs and Border Protection

Seattle Field Office

9901 Pacific Highway

Blaine, WA 98230

Des (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cell (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

This message contains information intended only for the addressee named above. If you believe you have received this email in error, please notify the sender immediately.

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 11:06 PM
To: THOMAS, ZACHARY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SFO AP Seattle Leadership; SFO AP Blaine Leadership; SFO AP Pembina Leadership; SFO AP Sweetgrass Leadership; TAU-SEATTLE; OFO TACOPS SEATTLE MGMT; FASANO, ADELE; FREEMAN, MICHAEL T; BROWN, LISA BETH M (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]; SEA TAC MGMT
Subject: Area Port of Seattle Daily Report: 01 03 2020
Attachments: Daily Report 01 03 20.docx; 01 03 2020.xls

Area Port of Seattle Daily Report: 01/03/2020

Area Port Duty Lead:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

OFO – SIT Room Reports:

None during the reporting period.

Significant Events/Visits:

None during the reporting period.

Special Operations Conducted:

None during the reporting period.

BP – SIT Room Reports: Situational Awareness Only:

None during the reporting period.

HSI/AMO Seizure/Significant Event: Situational Awareness Only:

None during the reporting period.

S/A/S Reports:

(b) (7)(E)

IOIL Reports:

(b) (7)(E)

Agriculture:

Significant Agriculture Incident Reports: 0

Emergency Action Notifications: 0

Trusted Traveler (NEXUS/GLOBAL ENTRY) Administrative IOILs:

Application Denied: 0

Cards Revoked: 0

Electronic Media Reports:

None during the reporting period.

Passenger Offloads:

None during the reporting period.

Outbound Biometric Overstays:

None during the reporting period.

Admissibility Adverse Actions:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

Expedited Removal 2

Notice to Appear 0

Visa Waiver Refusal 0

WD in lieu of NTA 0

Deferred Inspection 0

Parole 0

Crewmember Refused Landing 0

WD in lieu of ER 0

Land Border Wait Times:

Not applicable.

Airport Processing/Wait Times:

- Total number of passengers processed: 6187
- Total number flights is 35 with 2 flights exceeding 60 minutes.
- Number of flights exceeding 120 minutes: 0
- Significant delays (over 180 minutes): 0
- Facial Recognition Biometric Exit flight 179 passengers / 24 minutes

Passenger Processing – Cruise Ships/Cargo Vessels:

Total number of passengers: 264

Total number of crew: 41

Local Enforcement measure against Iranian Threat

- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- Contact has been made with local law enforcement for joint enforcement efforts and/or concerns.
- Staff have been mustered for increased vigilance and heightened alert on/off duty.
- NET and VBT will have increased patrols throughout the terminals.

(b) (7)(E)

Thank you,

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Assistant Area Port Director, Tactical Operations

Area Port of Seattle

US Customs and Border Protection

Office of Field Operations

Cell Phone [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Saturday, January 4, 2020 9:44 AM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T
Subject: Re: Operational Actions/Significant Encounters - Reporting for January 3, 2020

Please add our facility security measures

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 4, 2020, at 6:41 AM, FREEMAN, MICHAEL T
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

OFO Field Liaison - response for Seattle Field Office

Negative significant encounters for Jan 3rd

Seattle Field Office

Based on the heightened level of alert, the Seattle Field Office has initiated the following:

- The Management Team will muster all staff on the enhanced measures and heightened vigilance (including out ports) level.
 - Including mandatory reporting requirements prior to admitting and / or refusing a traveler of interest.

(b) (7) (E)

- (b) (7)(E) will communicate with Area Port Management on relevant intelligence and host agencies heightened alert status if applicable

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7) (E)

Michael Freeman
Assistant Director, Field Operations
Seattle Field Office

Action please. Please advise the Field of this reporting requirement. Field Liaison will consolidate for OFO.

Randy J. Howe
Executive Director, Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) V">
Date: January 3, 2020 at 21:05:52 EST
To: "HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)", "WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)", "FORET, VERNON T" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Fwd: Operational Actions/Significant Encounters- Reporting

Randy, pls have Ops take for action.

Thank you.

Todd C. Owen
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

<20200103 Iran (with AMO and INA).docx>

VERNON T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: **UPDATED REQUIREMENT Operational Actions/Significant Encounters - Reporting**

Good morning DFOs,

As previously relayed, Operations Support is required to provide C1's office with updates to the operational posture and/or actions taken by your AOR and significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on the Iranian Military Leader.

Additionally, C1 has requested a daily report on all refusals with linkages to Iran and asked to **ensure the ports are contactin (b) (7)(E) on each of these such encounters; annotating whether or no (b) (7)(E) chooses to respond.** The information on refusals with linkages to Iran will be handled by the NTC; however, it is imperative the ports relay the information regarding the encounter, responses, and particulars to the NTC for awareness and completeness in their reporting.

Please continue to provide significant action(s) or encounter(s) by 10:00 am (EST) ***daily*** to Field Liaison Division. Although negative responses are not required to Operations Support, FLD requires a response from each Field Office. The attached document is the running template that will be used for consolidation and submission to Operations Support.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Director, Business Operations and Communications

Operations Directorate

Office of Field Operations

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, 3.4D-15

Washington D.C. 20229

Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Email: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

U.S. Customs and Border Protection
National Targeting Center
January 3, 2020

Issue: Information Regarding Iran and Actions Taken Prior to U.S. Airstrike on Iranian Military Leader

On January 2, 2020, the United States successfully targeted General Qassem Soleimani, the head of Iran's elite Quds Force via an airstrike in Baghdad. Prior to this event the National Targeting Center (NTC) had implemented a number of actions in response to the Department of State's designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Tier I Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7) (E)

- There are currently no direct flights between Iran and the U.S.

Counter Network Division

- NTC supports and enforces the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) licensing and sanctions programs by targeting, detaining, and when necessary seizing shipments of restricted commodities and shipments destined to sanctioned countries or entities.
- NTC assists th [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- NTC continues to support upcomi [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Conclusion

The NTC has taken various actions in response to the IRGC’s designation as a Tier 1 FTO and will continue to coordinate with the Intelligence Community (IC) to modify operations based on additional information obtained through the IC, CBP inspections, or in working with our international, federal, and state/local partners [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Historical Data (through June 2019)

(b) (7) (E)

Land Border



Office of Intelligence

- To facilitate rapid update exchanges, OI made positive contact with partners in the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (I&A, TSA, ICE, and USCIS) and US Intelligence Community (D) (7)(E) NCTC, FB (b) (7)(E) and CBP's representative in Jordan.
- OI's is augmenting its Watch staffing, which includes moving to a 24/7 schedule to monitor Iran-related threats until further notice.
- OI supported Secret Video Teleconferences at 0815 and 1000 that DHS/I&A led with Key Intelligence Officers of DHS components to share threat updates and operational responses.
- To apprise CBP personnel in the field, OI prepared UNCLASSIFIED talking points for a 3 January teleconference with INA to inform our CBP teammates overseas on Iran-related threats.
- OI is planning multiple UNCLASSIFIED intelligence products for customers, including a formal bulletin and an update to a previously published classified product title (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]

Air and Marine

- HQ Ops: In light of increasing tensions between the U.S. and Iran, Air and Marine Operations field leadership is proactively leveraging its strategic partnerships with local, state, and federal counter-terrorism partners in order to enhance the Nation's security preparedness and response posture.
- AMOC: The Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) is on heightened alert and is shifting resources (equipment and personnel) as necessary in order to support interagency partners such as the FAA, Dept. of Defense, and the FBI. AMOC's intelligence cell is actively monitoring relevant message traffic to immediately identify and process additional threat streams. The Joint PED Operations Center West (JPOC-W) is prepared to support emergent contingency operations that may require full motion video (i.e. Humanitarian Aid Disaster Relief (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]) and analytical processing.

Office of International Affairs

- Maintaining global accountability of personnel stationed overseas, including those with dependents at foreign locations, and teaming with OI to provide immediate intelligence updates
- Attaches and deployed personnel are maintaining access to classified systems to report and receive sensitive information.
- INA/HQ is working to provide requisite personal protective gear to personnel stationed overseas.
- Monitoring information to integrate updates t [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- Teaming with “Five Eyes” partners to ensure shared awareness of threat activit [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED]

(b) (7) (E)

Thank you and your team for the excellent work being done! Please feel free to reach out if there are any questions.

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Supervisor Tactical Analytical Unit

Program Manager Border Security and Facilitation

U. S. Customs and Border Protection

Seattle Field Office

9901 Pacific Highway

Blaine, WA 98230

Des (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Ce (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

This message contains information intended only for the addressee named above. If you believe you have received this email in error, please notify the sender immediately.

CBP0000040

CBP0000041

CBP0000042

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CBP0000033

CBP0000034

CBP0000035

CBP0000036

CBP0000037

CBP0000038

CBP0000039

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Saturday, January 4, 2020 11:27 PM
To: THOMAS, ZACHARY C (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SFO AP Seattle Leadership; SFO AP Blaine Leadership; SFO AP Pembina Leadership; SFO AP Sweetgrass Leadership; TAU-SEATTLE; OFO TACOPS SEATTLE MGMT; FASANO, ADELE; FREEMAN, MICHAEL T; BROWN, LISA BETH M (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: SEA TAC MGMT
Attachments: Area Port of Seattle Daily Report: 01 04 2020
01 04 2020.xls; 01 04 20.docx

Area Port of Seattle Daily Report: 01/04/2020

Area Port Duty Lead:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

OFO – SIT Room Reports:

None during the reporting period.

Significant Events/Visits:

None during the reporting period.

(b) (7)(E)

BP – SIT Room Reports: Situational Awareness Only:

None during the reporting period.

HSI/AMO Seizure/Significant Event: Situational Awareness Only:

None during the reporting period.

S/A/S Reports:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

IOIL Reports:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

Agriculture:

Significant Agriculture Incident Reports: 0

Emergency Action Notifications: 0

Trusted Traveler (NEXUS/GLOBAL ENTRY) Administrative IOILs:

Application Denied: 0

Cards Revoked: 0

Electronic Media Reports:

(b) (7)(E): A female from Iran arrived aboard Lufthansa Airlines flight LH 490 from Tehran via Frankfurt, Germany. (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E). Subject's electronic devices were returned to them and they departed the FIS without further incident.

(b) (7)(E)

Passenger Offloads:

None during the reporting period.

Outbound Biometric Overstays:

None during the reporting period.

Admissibility Adverse Actions:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

Expedited Removal 2
Notice to Appear 0
Visa Waiver Refusal 0
WD in lieu of NTA 0
Deferred Inspection 0
Parole 0
Crewmember Refused Landing 0
WD in lieu of ER 0

Land Border Wait Times:

Not applicable.

Airport Processing/Wait Times:

- Total number of passengers processed: 8669
- Total number flights is 39 with 19 flights exceeding 60 minutes.
- Number of flights exceeding 120 minutes: 5
- Significant delays (over 180 minutes): 0
- Facial Recognition Biometric Exit flight None during reporting period.

Passenger Processing – Cruise Ships/Cargo Vessels:

Total number of passengers: 257

Total number of crew: 82

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) • Watch Commander • Area Port of Seattle
U.S. Customs and Border Protection • Office of Field Operations
O (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) • BB (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
E (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) • (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 3:15 AM
To: FASANO, ADELE; WILLIAMS, KENNETH; FREEMAN, MICHAEL T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BROWN, LISA BETH M (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BLAINE-OFO
WATCH COMMANDERS; BLAINE-OFO CHIEFS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Blaine, WA: (b) (7)(E) – Citizen of Canada and Iran
Attachments: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (7)(E).pdf

(b) (7)(E).

**U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Office of Field Operations Blaine Area Port
Pacific Highway Port of Entry
Blaine, WA
January 4, 2020**

Blaine, WA: (b) (7)(E) Encounter-Citizen of Canada and Iran

Summary:

On January 04, 2020 U.S Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers assigned to the Pacific Highway Port of Entry (POE), Blaine, WA intercepted a 38-year old male citizen of Iran and Canada, traveling alone, who

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) declined to interview the subject.

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

. With concurrence from the Area Port Director (APD), Duty Watch Commander (WC), and Duty Chief, the subject was returned to Canada at 2355 hours (PST).

Details:

On January 04, 2020 at approximately 1846 hours (PST (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); COC: Iran and Canada; COB: Iran) arrived at the Pacific Highway POE seeking admission to the United States as a B2 visitor.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) declared a trip to Seattle, WA for two days to pick his girlfriend up at the SEATAC Airport and return to Canada.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was referred to secondary for inspectio (b) (7)(E).

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

(b) (7)(E), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E) CBP (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) S/ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) declined to interview.

The Commissioner's Situation Room was notified and initiated Significant Incident Report (SIR) No (b) (7)(E)

With Duty Chief, WC, and APD concurrence (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was returned to Canada at 2355 hours (PST).


(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

Submitted by: SCBP (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Reviewed by: Chie (b) (6), (b) (7) / W (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date/Time: January 04, 2019 / 2355 hours (PST)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)



From: FASANO, ADELE
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 9:08 AM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Fwd: REMIDER: Operational Actions/Significant Encounters - Reporting
Attachments: image001.jpg; ATT00001.htm; image001.jpg; ATT00002.htm; 20200104 - U.S. Airstrike on Iranian Military Leader (with OFO Input).docx; ATT00003.htm

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E)
Date: January 5, 2020 at 3:18:14 AM PST
To: OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E), "BROPHY, ROSE M"
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
"DURST, CASEY OWEN (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), "FASANO, ADELE"
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "FLORES, PETE ROMERO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),
"FORET, VERNON T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
"HOFFMAN, TODD A"
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
"HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),
"HUMPHREY, BRIAN J (DFO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
"LAMM, CLINT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >, "MANCHA, HECTOR"
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >,
"MARTEL, CARLOS C (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), "MILLER, TROY A"
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), "MURDOCK, JUDSON W (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),
"OVERACKER, THOMAS F" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >, "Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO)"
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >, "PERRY, CHRISTOPHER M (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >,
"RAMIREZ, GUADALUPE H (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), "ROBLES, ALFONSO"
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
"SUTTON-BURKE, LAFONDA D"
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO)"
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "WHITE, ROBERT E (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "YANDO,
DONALD F (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "FORET, VERNON T"
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "CONROY, DONALD E (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , "HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] >, OFO-
FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E) , (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: REMIDER: Operational Actions/Significant Encounters - Reporting

Good Morning DFOs,

Just a gentle reminder....Operations Support is required to provide C1's office with updates to the operational posture and/or actions taken by your AOR and significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader. **Please provide significant action(s) or encounter(s) by 10:00 am (EST) daily to Field Liaison Division.** Although negative responses are not required to Operations Support, FLD requires a response from each Field Office. The attached document is the running template that will be used for consolidation and submission to Operations Support.

Attached is a copy of yesterday's report for reference (the OFO portion begins on the 3rd page).

Thank you,

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
CBP Officer/ Program Mgr
Field Liaison Division/ Commissioner's Situation Room
US Customs & Border Protection
Unclass (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Office (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

U.S. Customs and Border Protection
National Targeting Center
January 4, 2020

Issue: Information Regarding Iran and Actions Taken Prior to U.S. Airstrike on Iranian Military Leader

On January 2, 2020, the United States successfully targeted General Qassem Soleimani, the head of Iran's elite Quds Force via an airstrike in Baghdad. Prior to this event the National Targeting Center (NTC) had implemented a number of actions in response to the Department of State's designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Tier I Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7) (E)

- There are currently no direct flights between Iran and the U.S.

Counter Network Division

- NTC supports and enforces the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) licensing and sanctions programs by targeting, detaining, and when necessary seizing shipments of restricted commodities and shipments destined to sanctioned countries or entities.
- NTC assists th [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].
- NTC continues to suppo [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Conclusion

The NTC has taken various actions in response to the IRGC’s designation as a Tier 1 FTO and will continue to coordinate with the Intelligence Community (IC) to modify operations based on additional information obtained through the IC, CBP inspections, or in working with our international, federal, and state/local partners [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

Historical Data (through June 2019)

(b) (7) (E)

Land Border



Office of Field Operations

OFO continues to remain vigilant and has increased its enforcement posture at CBP land, air, and sea ports of entry (POEs), both domestically and OCONUS. All POEs are working cohesively with NTC, as well as our Federal and State/Local partners, to intercept and thoroughly examine and interview travelers with ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Beginning January 4, 2020, all Field Offices were instructed to provide daily updates on significant encounters/ incidents from ports in their AOR related to the U.S. airstrike on the Iranian Military Leader Qasem Soleimani / encounters with IRGC members.

Atlanta:

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- ~~(b) (7)(E)~~
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Baltimore

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- ~~(b) (7)(E)~~
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- ~~(b) (7)(E)~~
- Local CBP JTTF Liaisons and FBI providing threat briefings to port personnel.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time

Boston

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- ~~(b) (7)(E)~~
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.

- BOS TTRT encountered a U.K. national (COC: Kuwait) who wa (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] and had recently traveled to Iraq. The subject was traveling to Dearborn, MI for an engagement party and to visit family friends. In an interview, the subject admitted frequent communication with subject's listed on th (b) (7)(E). An electronic media exam revealed that the subject was sympathetic to Hezbollah and made inflammatory remarks against the U.S. and Israel. The subject was processed for an expedited removal (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]

Buffalo

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
 - Irania (b) (7)(E) Encounters Buffalo 0, Champlain 0, Alexandria Bay 0
 - (b) (7)(E) Encounters Buffalo 5, Champlain 0, Alexandria Bay 0

Chicago

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- The Area Port of Chicago has inspected 18 citizens of Iran, 10 inbound and 8 outbound.

Detroit

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
- (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

El Paso

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.

- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Houston


- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- DF (b) (7)(E) encountered a LPR (COB: Iran) whose boyfriend [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]. The subject was returning from a religious pilgrimage in Baghdad, Iraq. An electronic media exam revealed that the subject's boyfriend made inflammatory statements in regards to General Solemani's death (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].

Laredo

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Los Angeles

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.



- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Miami

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information

- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

New Orleans

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

New York

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- JFK TTRT encountered a returning LPR (COB: Iran) that is currently being inspected.

○ **Preclearance:**

- **Abu Dhabi:** Due to the expected retaliation towards U.S. assets in the region in response to the killing, the Department of State (DOS) will increase force protection at the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi. Additionally, DOS will review the overall security posture and has messaged the need for increased vigilance throughout the U.S. government community in country. There are currently no known threats specific to the UAE and preclearance operations in Abu Dhabi, however a heightened state of awareness is in effect resulting in the below actions by Abu Dhabi management:

1. Phone tree executed with all employee [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) and dependents [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) accounted for without issue.
2. Consistent communication with the DOS and local police established.
3. Security awareness muster for all staff assigned to Abu Dhabi.
4. Emergency contact information for staff and dependents updated and validated.
5. Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) reviewed with all staff.
6. [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
7. [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

- 8. Additional local police presence in and outside the Preclearance Facility (PCF).
- 9. All Government travel cards validated should the need for evacuation arise.
- **Aruba:** Due to proximity and connection flights to South America, which have flights from Iran, along with constant Iranian/Canadian travelers, Aruba preclearance has increased daily assignments to PAU and Rovers through shift reassignments or overtime to provide for more detailed targeting.
- **Canada, Embassy Ottawa:** No specific information to indicate U.S. personnel in Canada are subject to an increased security threat. As a matter of due diligence personnel are reminded of the standing status quo on security, which generally entails maintaining a low profile and exercising regular vigilance.
- **Embassy Nassau:** No specific threat information related to the embassy or U.S. interests in The Bahama [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) Washington is continuously updating the threat analysis for posts across the globe, not just NEA (Middle East). The Surveillance Detection Teams are on high alert and will expand coverage to high profile residential and school zones.
- **Vancouver:** RCMP assigned to CBP preclearance [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E), and continue coordination with RCMP headquarters for awareness and determine needs and ability for increased presence.
 - On January 3, 2020, a Canadian national was referred for a TTRT exam [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

San Diego

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- SYS TTRT encountered a dual U.S./Iranian national that was referred for a TTRT exam with negative results.

San Francisco

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

San Juan

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Seattle

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Tucson

- Mustered all employees and will continue with any updated information
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Coordination with local, state and federal LEO partners in regards to information received by HQ.
- There have been no significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader at this time.

Office of Intelligence

- To facilitate rapid update exchanges, OI made positive contact with partners in the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (I&A, TSA ICE, and USCIS) and US Intelligence Community (b) (7)(E) NCTC, FB (b) (7)(E) and CBP's representative in Jordan.
- OI's is augmenting its Watch staffing, which includes moving to a 24/7 schedule to monitor Iran-related threats until further notice.
- OI supported Secret Video Teleconferences at 0815 and 1000 that DHS/I&A led with Key Intelligence Officers of DHS components to share threat updates and operational responses.
- To apprise CBP personnel in the field, OI prepared UNCLASSIFIED talking points for a 3 January teleconference with INA to inform our CBP teammates overseas on Iran-related threats.
- OI is planning multiple UNCLASSIFIED intelligence products for customers, including a formal bulletin and an update to a previously published classified product title (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]

Air and Marine

- HQ Ops: In light of increasing tensions between the U.S. and Iran, Air and Marine Operations field leadership is proactively leveraging its strategic partnerships with local, state, and federal counter-terrorism partners in order to enhance the Nation's security preparedness and response posture.
- AMOC: The Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) is on heightened alert and is shifting resources (equipment and personnel) as necessary in order to support interagency partners such as the FAA, Dept. of Defense, and the FBI. AMOC's intelligence cell is actively monitoring relevant message traffic to immediately identify and process additional threat streams. The Joint PED Operations Center West (JPOC-W) is prepared to support emergent contingency operations that may require full motion video (i.e. Humanitarian Aid Disaster Relief [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]) and analytical processing.

Office of International Affairs

- Maintaining global accountability of personnel stationed overseas, including those with dependents at foreign locations, and teaming with OI to provide immediate intelligence updates
- Attaches and deployed personnel are maintaining access to classified systems to report and receive sensitive information.
- INA/HQ is working to provide requisite personal protective gear to personnel stationed overseas.
- Monitoring information to integrate updates t [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]
- Teaming with "Five Eyes" partners to ensure shared awareness of threat activit [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 9:35 AM
To: OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C);
BROWN, LISA BETH M; FASANO, ADELE; FREEMAN, MICHAEL T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Situational Daily Report
Attachments: Situational Daily Report 01-05-20.docx

Field Liaison,



**U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Seattle Field Office**

**Operational Actions/Significant Encounters
Reporting for January 4, 2020**

Seattle Field Office current operational posture and/or actions taken within our AOR and/or reporting of significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader. Daily reporting of significant action(s) or encounter(s) will be completed by 10:00 am (EST) to Field Liaison Division.

Significant Encounters:

One Visa Waiver Program refusal based on discovery of prior travel to Iran

(b) (7)(E)

One immigration refusal based on a discovery of a prior overstay

(b) (7)(E)

Total Vetting for the 24 hour period: (b) (7)(E)

Land Border Environment:

- The Management Team will muster all staff on the enhanced measures and heightened vigilance (including out ports) level.
- Muster mandatory reporting requirements prior to admitting and / or refusing a traveler of interest.
- (b) (7)(E)
- (b) (7)(E)
- Taskforce Officers will communicate with Area Port Management on relevant intelligence and host agencies heightened alert status if applicable.
- TTRT, PAU and Intel offices will liaise directly with the Seattle Field Office TAU on subjects of concern to ensure timely vetting.

(b) (7)(E)

Airport Environment:

- The Management Team will muster all staff on the enhanced measures and heightened vigilance (including out ports) level.
- Muster mandatory reporting requirements prior to admitting and / or refusing a traveler of interest.
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- Taskforce Officers will communicate with Area Port Management on relevant intelligence and host agencies heightened alert status if applicable.
- TTRT, PAU and Intel offices will liaise directly with the Seattle Field Office TAU on subjects of concern to ensure timely vetting.

Seaport Environment:

- CBP staff located at the Tacoma and Seattle Seaport have been mustered on the enhanced security posture and to remain vigilant on and off-duty.
- CBP located at JAHOC have been coordinating with the US Coast Guard and local Law Enforcement to increase patrols and visibility is critical infrastructure areas.
- The Northwest Enforcement Team will continue to increase port patrols and its visibility on the terminals.
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].

(b) (7)(E)

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(A) Border Security Coordinator
U. S. Customs and Border Protection
Seattle Field Office

Des (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Ce (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)


~~Warning: This email and any attachments are UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public or other personnel who do not have a valid "need-to-know" without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. No portion of this email should be furnished to the media, either in written or verbal form. If you are not an intended recipient or believe you have received this communication in error, please do not print, copy, retransmit, disseminate, or otherwise use this information. Please inform the sender that you received this message in error and delete the message from your system.~~

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 9:59 AM
To: BLAINE-CMD CNTR DAILY REPORT
Subject: Daily Report for 01042020
Attachments: CC Daily Report for 01042020.docx

01/04/2020

Command Center Operations for the Blaine AOR 01/05/2020:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)



OFO – SIT Room Reports:

(b) (7)(E)

Significant Events/Visits:

None

BP – SIT Room Reports: Situational Awareness Only:

None

HSI/AMO Seizure/Significant Event: Situational Awareness Only:

None

S/A/S Reports:

Blaine: 6
Oroville: 1

IOIL Reports:

Blaine: 2
Point Roberts: 1

NEXUS/FAST Lane Violations:


Blaine: 5



Agriculture EAN:


None

Electronic Media Reports:

Blaine:

-  (b) (7) (E)
-  (b) (7)(E) – **Basic Phone Examination:** A citizen of Canada (COB: Iran) was referred to secondary for inspection  (b) (7)(E)

, subject's cell phone was returned and was provided an electronic media tear sheet  (b) (7)(E)
 Subject was refused entry 7A1 and returned to Canada.

 (b) (7) (E)

Admissibility Adverse Action:

Expedited Removal: 0
Notice to Appear: 0
Visa Waiver Refusal: 1
WD in lieu of NTA: 5
Deferred Inspection: 0
Parole: 0
Crewmember Refused Landing: 0

WD in lieu of ER: 1
WD2: 3

Reviewed by: Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

CBPO Blaine Command Center
U.S. Customs & Border Protection
9901 Pacific HWY Blaine, WA 98230

P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



CBP000046

CBP0000047

From: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 2:00 PM
To: FASANO, ADELE
Cc: BROWN, LISA BETH M
Subject: Lessons Learn (b) (7)(E)
Attachments: (b) (7)(E) Lessons Learned.docx; ATT00001.htm

DFO - I had a call with my supervisors this morning on how we could have provided a better service to the ports during our current threat. Our main goal is to ensure the ports have the resources to do their job to address this threat and to provide you accurate information to make informed decisions. I may have lapsed on that as I was unaware of the long delays at certain ports and should have taken action sooner.

See attached document for our initial assessment

Michael Freeman
Assistant Director, Field Operations
Seattle Field Office

**Seattle Field Office
Tactical Analytical Unit, Seattle, Washington
January 5, 2020**


Action Required: Informational

Issue [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) Best Practices

Executive Summary: The current threat posed by the tensions between the Iranian government and the United States over recent attacks in Iraq has necessitated the enforcement of enhanced screening of potential targets of interest that may be used to conduct retaliatory attacks on the Homeland [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) provided the Tactical Analytical Unit (TAU) the opportunity to set up an around the clock operational support for the frontline. The following information are some lessons learned that could be employed to streamline information and improve processes for this existing operation and future operations.

Best Practices and Lesson Learned:

- TAU must have a plan and procedure in place for these types of contingent operations. A “Team of Teams” approach was the most effective approach to running this operation as follows:
 - The Area Ports set up a command structure and a way to log and organize the targets that enter the port of entry.



(b) (7) (E)

- TAU should muster a standardized approach or workflow for these types of Operations.
 - Communication errors by all parties contributed to significant delays in passenger processing.

(b) (7) (E)

- TAU needs to know who the points of contacts (POCs) will be on shift.
- TAU should work with the port to ensure who will be sending an email to TAU and how TAU will communicate and acknowledge receipt of target to cut down on the emails back and forth.
- TAU should issue guidance that reminds officers to refrain from sending one-on-one emails as this led to emails being missed. The officer conducting the inspection should be the only one communicating with TAU with regards to the target.
 - Confusion arose when further questions were asked by TAU and the secondary officer asked a third officer to ask the question from the subject and respond to TAU. This was exacerbated by the confusing subject lines of the emails that were not consistent.
- TAU will prioritize United States Citizens (USCs) and United States Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs). TAU will then prioritize Canadian citizens followed by other immigration classifications.
- TAU will conduct in person musters to explain the threats and target frontline and secondary officers to develop a cadre of experts that will be able to generate a Team of Teams concept where they can make fact based determinations based on threats.
- A “Hot Wash” should follow any Special Operations to find ways to improve for the next threat.
- Barriers to communication between TAU, TTRT, and the frontline should be removed on a daily basis to allow the units to be used to the collaboration.
 - This operation was the first time that TAU was allowed to communicate directly with port personnel for real-time support. The more officers working together on a consistent basis, the more trust is developed, operations will be run more

cohesively and efficiently (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]

- A Team of Teams approach where small, expert teams working in collaboration are more effective than having one or two specialized teams waiting for top-down instruction (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]. A specialized team needs to be able to make decisions and determinations.

(b) (7)(E)

- (b) (7)(E). TAU will be flexible in scheduling these briefs, will make them short, easy to understand and digestible.
- TAU should aid in keeping a well informed and well prepared frontline to face the challenges today.
- Loc (b) (7)(E) access to run checks would have also aided in this special operation.
 - (b) (7)(E)
 - The Northern Border Coordination Center was closed this weekend and could not support (b) (7)(E)
 - The Field Intelligence Group was on annual leave due to the holiday season and were unable to support this weekend.
 - (b) (7)(E)
- TAU will continue to reach out to partners to build up relationships in hopes that in the future, other agencies can support these types of operations.
 - (b) (7)(E)
 - [Redacted]. An ops center would make operations like this a norm, versus something that is new and becomes a double challenge in learning how to operate while addressing the threat.

Conclusion: TAU is still writing the TAU Tactical Intelligence Standard Operating Procedure for the Seattle field Office. These recommendations are a starting point for further input from managers, TTRT, port personnel, partner agencies. Feedback will be included in the SOP and guidelines will be developed for conducting future operations to make sure each one is better than the next.

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 5:00 PM
To: CONROY, DONALD E
Subject: Re: Seattle Field Office encounters on 1/4

Were good. We have fine tuned our process so hopefully that will cut off the adverse publicity. I had no idea that we would see almost 200 Iranian nationals in 2 days. Thanks for reaching out.

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 5, 2020, at 12:04 PM, CONROY, DONALD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

Adele
we also missed the call. Let me know if you need anything from NTC perspective.
Don

Donald Conroy
Executive Director
National Targeting Center
Customs and Border Protection
Dept of Homeland Security
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Get [Outlook](#) for iOS

From: FASANO, ADELE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 2:47:17 PM
To: HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); CONROY, DONALD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); FORET, VERNON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Re: Seattle Field Office encounters on 1/4

I'm sorry I missed your call. I was just brief my ADFO Freeman. We had already adjusted our procedures and will adjust further immediately. Please advise if you have any further concerns

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 5, 2020, at 11:15 AM, HOWE, RANDY J

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

Randy J. Howe
Executive Director, Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)

On Jan 5, 2020, at 14:05 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
> wrote:

<Seattle Field Office encounters on 1_4>

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 6:11 PM
To: FASANO, ADELE
Subject: Re: Seattle Field Office encounters on 1/4

Was a group effort...

On Jan 5, 2020, at 5:48 PM, FASANO, ADELE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

Who wrote the statement. It looks like Howe sent an email at 215 to you with no text.

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 5, 2020, at 2:36 PM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
> wrote:

Here's where ended up:

STATEMENT

Social media posts that CBP is detaining Iranian-Americans and refusing their entry into the U.S. because of their country of origin are false. Reports that DHS/CBP has issued a related directive are also false.

ON BACKGROUND

Based on the current threat environment, CBP is operating with an enhanced posture at its ports of entry to safeguard our national security and protect the America people while simultaneously protecting the civil rights and liberties of everyone. CBP routinely adjusts staffing and operations to maintain the dual missions of border security and facilitation of lawful trade and travel. Processing times are the result of the current circumstances, including staffing levels, volume of traffic, and threat posture.

At the Blaine POE, wait times increased to an average of two hours [on Saturday evening](#), although some travelers experienced wait times of up to four hours due to increased volume and reduced staff during the holiday season. Wait times [Sunday morning](#) were about 40 minutes for passenger vehicles.

CBP does not discriminate based on religion, race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.

On Jan 5, 2020, at 2:15 PM, HOWE, RANDY J

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) > wrote:

Randy J. Howe
Executive Director, Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)

On Jan 5, 2020, at 14:05 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

> wrote:

<Seattle Field Office encounters on 1_4>

From: FASANO, ADELE
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 8:09 PM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Fwd: **UPDATED REQUIREMENT** Operational Actions/Significant Encounters - Reporting
Attachments: image001.jpg; ATT00001.htm; 20200103 Iran (with AMO and INA).docx; ATT00002.htm

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E)
Date: January 5, 2020 at 4:07:58 PM PST
To: "BROPHY, ROSE M (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] "DURST, CASEY OWEN"
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "FASANO, ADELE"
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "FLORES, PETE ROMERO"
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , "FORET, VERNON T"
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED] , "HARRIGER, KEVIN C"
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , "HOFFMAN, TODD A"
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED] "HOWE, RANDY J"
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "HUMPHREY, BRIAN J (DFO)"
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED] "LAMM, CLINT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ,
"MANCHA, HECTOR (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED] "MARTEL, CARLOS C"
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "MILLER, TROY A"
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , "MURDOCK, JUDSON W"
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , "OVERACKER, THOMAS F"
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , "Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO)"
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , "PERRY, CHRISTOPHER M"
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , "RAMIREZ, GUADALUPE H"
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , "ROBLES, ALFONSO"
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , "SABATINO, DIANE J"
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] "SUTTON-BURKE, LAFONDA D"
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO)"

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), "WHITE, ROBERT E"

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), "YANDO, DONALD F"

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), "HOWE, RANDY J"

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >, OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc: "Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >, "WAGNER, JOHN P (DEAC OFO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), "HOWE, RANDY J"

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), "FORET, VERNON T"

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: FW: **UPDATED REQUIREMENT Operational Actions/Significant Encounters - Reporting**

Good Evening DFOs,

The Department of Homeland Security National Operations Center has just set a suspense time of **0900 hours (EST) on Monday, January 6, 2010** for this tasking. Please ensure you provide your AOR's operational posture, actions taken and significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader by **0800 hours (EST) tomorrow** to FLD for consolidation and submission to Ops Support.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Supervisory CBP Officer
Field Liaison Division
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Room 2.3A-17
Washington, DC 20229
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
E-Mail: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: HOWE, RANDY J
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 8:14 PM
To: FASANO, ADELE
Cc: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Re: DHS Directive?

OCA is meeting with the commissioner tomorrow morning on this.

Randy J. Howe
Executive Director, Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)

On Jan 5, 2020, at 20:11, FASANO, ADELE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

Ok

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 5, 2020, at 3:19 PM, HOWE, RANDY J
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

Info. Let's see if we need more information

Randy J. Howe
Executive Director, Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)

Begin forwarded message:

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date: January 5, 2020 at 18:17:27 EST
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), "Owen, Todd C
(EAC OFO) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)", "HOWE,
RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Re: DHS Directive?

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

We just issued the below, which I think mike provided OCA a copy of. Are you looking for information beyond?

STATEMENT

Social media posts that CBP is detaining Iranian-Americans and refusing their entry into the U.S. because of their country of origin are false. Reports that DHS/CBP has issued a related directive are also false.

ON BACKGROUND

Based on the current threat environment, CBP is operating with an enhanced posture at its ports of entry to safeguard our national security and protect the America people while simultaneously protecting the civil rights and liberties of everyone. CBP routinely adjusts staffing and operations to maintain the dual missions of border security and facilitation of lawful trade and travel. Processing times are the result of the current circumstances, including staffing levels, volume of traffic, and threat posture. At the Blaine POE, wait times increased to an average of two hours on Saturday evening, although some travelers experienced wait times of up to four hours due to increased volume and reduced staff during the holiday season. Current wait times Sunday morning were about 40 minutes for passenger vehicles. CBP does not discriminate based on religion, race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(A) Chief of Staff, CBP

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 6:14:33 PM
To: Owen, Todd C (EAC OFO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) V>
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: DHS Directive?

EAC, XD,

I'm receiving a lot of questions from the Hill regarding the Iranians at Blaine. They are claiming that they are hearing that DHS has issued a directive to CBP to stop and inspect all Iranians, whether or not they are now USCs and/or LPRs. Is this factual? How should we respond?

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 8:41 PM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T
Subject: Re: Inquiry regarding reports of Iranian-American citizens detained in Blaine

What is the status of the data I requested. I also need estimates of time in secondary. I want to send to Howe this evening.

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 5, 2020, at 3:13 PM, FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) > wrote:

Disregard sorry

Michael Freeman
Assistant Director, Field Operations
Seattle Field Office

On Jan 5, 2020, at 3:12 PM, FREEMAN, MICHAEL T
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

Michael Freeman
Assistant Director, Field Operations
Seattle Field Office

On Jan 5, 2020, at 1:57 PM, FASANO, ADELE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

No local contact with press or congressional offices. Mike Freeman will review with OFO and OCA

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 5, 2020, at 1:05 PM, WILLIAMS, KENNETH (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

DFO,

Is it your preference that this matter be forwarded to Congressional Affairs or would you like for me to take this call? If you want me to take this call, who would you like to be on the call?

Kenneth Williams

*Area Port Director
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
9901 Pacific Highway
Blaine, WA 98230*

Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cellular: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Fax: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From [REDACTED] (b) (6) >

Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 12:56 PM

To: WILLIAMS, KENNETH [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc [REDACTED] (b) (6)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] >

Subject: Inquiry regarding reports of Iranian-American citizens detained in Blaine

Dear Mr. Williams,

I am writing to inquire about reports our office received this afternoon regarding US citizens and legal permanent residents with Iranian heritage or nationality who were detained and questioned this weekend.

Our office received reports that DHS issued a national order to CBP to report and detain anyone with Iranian heritage entering the country who is deemed potentially suspicious, regardless of citizenship status. Further, we received reports that individuals were questioned about their political beliefs, allegiances, and other questions.

We would like to speak with you tomorrow about this. I will plan to give you a call at 12:30pm Eastern / 9:30am Pacific. If that time doesn't work, we can accommodate later in the afternoon, but need to give Senator Murray an update no later than COB tomorrow. Please let us know (b) (6) [REDACTED] our Senior National Security Advisor (copied here), may join the call as well.

Thank you in advance,

(b) (6)

[REDACTED] (b) (6)

Legislative Counsel

Office of U.S. Senator Patty Murray

Direct (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cell (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 12:21 AM
To: SFO AP Seattle Leadership; SFO AP Blaine Leadership; SFO AP Pembina Leadership; SFO AP Sweetgrass Leadership; TAU-SEATTLE; OFO TACOPS SEATTLE MGMT; FASANO, ADELE; FREEMAN, MICHAEL T; BROWN, LISA BETH M (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); SEA
Subject: TAC MGMT
Daily Report 1/5/2020 - Area Port of Seattle
Attachments: Daily Report 01 05 20.docx (b) (7)(E)

Area Port of Seattle Daily Report: 01/05/2020

Area Port Duty Lead:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

OFO – SIT Room Reports:

None during the reporting period.

Significant Events/Visits:

None during the reporting period.

(b) (7)(E)

BP – SIT Room Reports: Situational Awareness Only:

None during the reporting period.

HSI/AMO Seizure/Significant Event: Situational Awareness Only:

None during the reporting period.

S/A/S Reports:

None during the reporting period.

IOIL Reports:

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Agriculture:

Significant Agriculture Incident Reports: 0

Emergency Action Notifications: 0

Trusted Traveler (NEXUS/GLOBAL ENTRY) Administrative IOILs:

Application Denied: 0

Cards Revoked: 0

Electronic Media Reports:

(b) (7)(E)

Passenger Offloads:

None during the reporting period.

Outbound Biometric Overstays:

None during the reporting period.

Admissibility Adverse Actions:

Expedited Removal 1

Notice to Appear 0

Visa Waiver Refusal 1

WD in lieu of NTA 0

Deferred Inspection 0

Parole 0

Crewmember Refused Landing 0

WD in lieu of ER 0

(b) (7)(E), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Land Border Wait Times:

Not applicable.

Airport Processing/Wait Times:

- Total number of passengers processed: 6828
- Total number flights is 39 with 10 flights exceeding 60 minutes.
- Number of flights exceeding 120 minutes: 0
- Significant delays (over 180 minutes): 0
- Facial Recognition Biometric Exit flight 248 passengers / 16 minutes

Passenger Processing – Cruise Ships/Cargo Vessels:

Total number of passengers: 395

Total number of crew: 29

Acting Watch Commande (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
United States Customs and Border Protection
Office of Field Operations
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport | Seattle, WA 98158
Offic (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | Mobil (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | Fa (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 7:18 AM
To: FASANO, ADELE; BROWN, LISA BETH M; FREEMAN, MICHAEL T; SAAR, DIRK J.
Subject: US Customs and Border Protection denies detaining Iranians, Iranian Americans - ABC News

All,

An article listing Blaine POE regarding detaining Iranians.

https://abcnews.go.com/US/us-customs-border-protection-denies-detaining-iranians-iranian/story?id_68082232

Sincerely,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | U.S. Customs & Border Protection Chief of Staff
Customs and Border Protection | Office of Field Operations | Seattle Field Office
123 2nd Street | Blaine, WA 98230
[Phone (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)] [Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)]
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | www.cbp.gov

From: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 7:51 AM
To: FASANO, ADELE
Subject: RE: Inquiry regarding reports of Iranian-American citizens detained in Blaine
Attachments: Copy of Iranian LOG MASTER TAU COPY.xlsx

Also included on attachment (1st tab)

		Jan						
		4-5						
		(b) (7) (E)						
Blaine								
Lynden								
Metalline Falls								
Pembina								
Portal								
Seattle								
Sumas								
Sweetgrass								
Total								

Michael Freeman
Assistant Director, Border Security
Seattle Field Office
OFO - U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Blaine, Washington

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: FASANO, ADELE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 6:16 PM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Inquiry regarding reports of Iranian-American citizens detained in Blaine

I need the data to be summarized in a chart by port by immigration status with subtotals and SFO totals

From: FREEMAN, MICHAEL [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >

Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 5:47 PM

To: FASANO, ADELE [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Re: Inquiry regarding reports of Iranian-American citizens detained in Blaine

See attached. Times in secondary are difficult to get not sure if we will have in tonight.

	Jan 4-5					
	(b) (7) (E)					
Blaine						
Lynden						
Metalline Falls						
Pembina						
Portal						
Seattle						
Sumas						
Sweetgrass						
Total						

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(E) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted content]

[Redacted content]

[Redacted content]

[Redacted content]

[Redacted content]

[Redacted content]

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 7:57 AM
To: OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BROWN, LISA BETH M;
FASANO, ADELE; FREEMAN, MICHAEL T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Seattle Field Office Situational Daily Report
Attachments: Situational Daily Report 01-06-20.docx



**U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Seattle Field Office**

**Operational Actions/Significant Encounters
Reporting for January 5, 2020**

Seattle Field Office current operational posture and/or actions taken within our AOR and/or reporting of significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader. Daily reporting of significant action(s) or encounter(s) will be completed by 10:00 am (EST) to Field Liaison Division.

Significant Encounters:

One Visa Waiver Program refusal based on discovery of prior travel to Iran

Total Vetting for the 24 hour period: (b) (7)(E)

Land Border Environment:

- The Management Team will muster all staff on the enhanced measures and heightened vigilance (including out ports) level.
- Muster mandatory reporting requirements prior to admitting and / or refusing a traveler of interest.
- Targeting teams will develop local targets based on enhanced measure identifying travelers of interest both inbound and outbound.
- (b) (7)(E)
- Taskforce Officers will communicate with Area Port Management on relevant intelligence and host agencies heightened alert status if applicable.
- (b) (7)(E)
- (b) (7)(E)
- Port staff will be conducting security and perimeter checks of the FIS every hour

Airport Environment:

- The Management Team will muster all staff on the enhanced measures and heightened vigilance (including out ports) level.
- Muster mandatory reporting requirements prior to admitting and / or refusing a traveler of interest.

- Targeting teams will develop local targets based on enhanced measure identifying travelers of interest both inbound and outbound.
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- Taskforce Officers will communicate with Area Port Management on relevant intelligence and host agencies heightened alert status if applicable.
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

Seaport Environment:

- CBP staff located at the Tacoma and Seattle Seaport have been mustered on the enhanced security posture and to remain vigilant on and off-duty.
- CBP located at JAHOC have been coordinating with the US Coast Guard and local Law Enforcement to increase patrols and visibility is critical infrastructure areas.
- The Northwest Enforcement Team will continue to increase port patrols and its visibility on the terminals.
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

Intelligence and Vetting Environment:

[REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

Respectfully,

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(A) Border Security Coordinator
 U. S. Customs and Border Protection
 Seattle Field Office

De [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)


Ce [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Warning: This email and any attachments are UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public or other personnel who do not have a valid "need-to-know" without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. No portion of this email should be furnished to the media, either in written or verbal form. If you are not an intended recipient or believe you have received this communication in error, please do not print, copy, retransmit, disseminate, or otherwise use this information. Please inform the sender that you received this message in error and delete the message from your system.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection
National Targeting Center
January 3, 2020

Issue: Information Regarding Iran and Actions Taken Prior to U.S. Airstrike on Iranian Military Leader

On January 2, 2020, the United States successfully targeted General Qassem Soleimani, the head of Iran's elite Quds Force via an airstrike in Baghdad. Prior to this event the National Targeting Center (NTC) had implemented a number of actions in response to the Department of State's designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Tier I Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).



(b) (7) (E)

Counter Network Division

- NTC supports and enforces the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) licensing and sanctions programs by targeting, detaining, and when necessary seizing shipments of restricted commodities and shipments destined to sanctioned countries or entities.
- NTC assists th [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].
- NTC continues to suppo [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Conclusion

The NTC has taken various actions in response to the IRGC’s designation as a Tier 1 FTO and will continue to coordinate with the Intelligence Community (IC) to modify operations based on additional information obtained through the IC, CBP inspections, or in working with our international, federal, and state/local partners [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

Historical Data (through June 2019)

(b) (7) (E)

Land Border



Office of Intelligence

- To facilitate rapid update exchanges, OI made positive contact with partners in the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (I&A, TSA ICE, and USCIS) and US Intelligence Community (b) (7)(E), NCTC, FB (b) (7)(E) and CBP's representative in Jordan.
- OI's is augmenting its Watch staffing, which includes moving to a 24/7 schedule to monitor Iran-related threats until further notice.
- OI supported Secret Video Teleconferences at 0815 and 1000 that DHS/I&A led with Key Intelligence Officers of DHS components to share threat updates and operational responses.
- To apprise CBP personnel in the field, OI prepared UNCLASSIFIED talking points for a 3 January teleconference with INA to inform our CBP teammates overseas on Iran-related threats.
- OI is planning multiple UNCLASSIFIED intelligence products for customers, including a formal bulletin and an update to a previously published classified product title (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED].

Air and Marine

- HQ Ops: In light of increasing tensions between the U.S. and Iran, Air and Marine Operations field leadership is proactively leveraging its strategic partnerships with local, state, and federal counter-terrorism partners in order to enhance the Nation's security preparedness and response posture.
- AMOC: The Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) is on heightened alert and is shifting resources (equipment and personnel) as necessary in order to support interagency partners such as the FAA, Dept. of Defense, and the FBI. AMOC's intelligence cell is actively monitoring relevant message traffic to immediately identify and process additional threat streams. The Joint PED Operations Center West (JPOC-W) is prepared to support emergent contingency operations that may require full motion video (i.e. Humanitarian Aid Disaster Relief (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED]) and analytical processing.

Office of International Affairs

- Maintaining global accountability of personnel stationed overseas, including those with dependents at foreign locations, and teaming with OI to provide immediate intelligence updates
- Attaches and deployed personnel are maintaining access to classified systems to report and receive sensitive information.
- INA/HQ is working to provide requisite personal protective gear to personnel stationed overseas.
- Monitoring information to integrate updates t [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- Teaming with “Five Eyes” partners to ensure shared awareness of threat activity, including [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 2:11 PM
To: SAAR, DIRK J.; BROWN, LISA BETH M; FREEMAN, MICHAEL T
Subject: Fwd: FPS Information Bulletin - (U//FOUO) Security and Protective Measures – U.S. Military Air Strikes in Iraq
Attachments: FPS INFORMATION BULLETIN -(U FOUO) Security and Protective Measures U.S. Military Air Strikes in Iraq FINAL.pdf; ATT00001.htm

In case you didn't receive this

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date: January 6, 2020 at 10:03:35 AM PST
Subject: Fwd: FPS Information Bulletin - (U//FOUO) Security and Protective Measures – U.S. Military Air Strikes in Iraq

----- Forwarded message -----

Date: Mon, Jan 6, 2020 at 5:07 AM
Subject: **FPS Information Bulletin - (U//FOUO) Security and Protective Measures – U.S. Military Air Strikes in Iraq**

Federal Executive Board Members,

In light of recent international events, attached please find and FPS Information Bulletin titled (U//FOUO) *Security and Protective Measures U.S. Military Air Strikes in Iraq*.

This bulletin may be disseminated without further approval to the law enforcement and intelligence community, officials within the Federal Executive Board, Interagency Security Committee (ISC), Government Facilities Sector (GFS), and those private sector security officials in the GFS with a demonstrated need-to-know. Dissemination to members of the public or any individual or organization associated with a media affiliate is prohibited.

As a reminder, to immediately report any incidents or suspicious activities, please contact the FPS MegaCenter at this 24-hour number: 1-877-4-FPS-411

Very respectfully,

The Federal Protective Service

Best,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | Division Director, Intergovernmental Affairs

Department of Homeland Security | Federal Protective Service

Mobil (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | Email (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7) (E)

From: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 6:08 PM
To: FASANO, ADELE
Subject: Re: BREAKING: CAIR-WA Assisting Iranian-Americans Detained at U.S. Border

No, I specifically gave Ken the talking points to stick with and prep him with questions in advance to see how he would answer. If Ken had questions he couldn't answer she was going to be referred to me. If she wanted to raise it up the chain I wanted to be the next in line.

Michael Freeman
Assistant Director, Field Operations
Seattle Field Office

On Jan 6, 2020, at 3:03 PM, FASANO, ADELE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

How about the 1st one

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 6, 2020, at 5:02 PM, FREEMAN, MICHAEL T
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

No The 2nd call was only a staffer

Michael Freeman
Assistant Director, Field Operations
Seattle Field Office

On Jan 6, 2020, at 3:01 PM, FASANO, ADELE
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

Did you listen in on both calls
Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "WILLIAMS, KENNETH" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date: January 6, 2020 at 4:54:59 PM CST
To: "FASANO, ADELE" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "FREEMAN, MICHAEL T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: BREAKING: CAIR-WA Assisting Iranian-Americans Detained at U.S. Border

DFO,

I had a call with Congressman Larsen's staffer (b) (6), the following is a Q&A from the call:

Intro (b) (6), I have spoken with Congresswoman DelBene and wanted to extend the courtesy to Congressman Larsen. You have likely received the press release from CBP speaking to the fact that we are on high alert due to the events that transpired in Iraq last week resulted in the death of a high ranking Iranian General and potential retaliation. Our officers on primary only have seconds to screen passengers arriving from foreign. Certain areas of the world want to do the homeland harm and travelers arrive in Blaine can be arriving from those locations via the Vancouver International Airport.

Q: Did the department send out a directive that specifically mentioned Iran?

A: The only reference specific to Iran was the strike that killed the Iranian general, and each Field Office was instructed to enhance our security posture at the port of entry

Q: One of the largest concerns is the primary reason they were pulled in.

A: The primary officer has the discretionary authority to refer travelers who arouse their suspicion. If there is one person in a conveyance containing several occupants, all are referred to secondary for further screening. They have a short time to make a determination of risk. Often times when travelers arrive in secondary, they see travelers of the same demographics and come to the conclusion that CBP is looking at all Indians or Chinese, when in reality, these folks are from countries who require a document (I-94) in their passport to accompany their visa. So suspicion becomes reality. CBP Officers are looking for risks in the primary booth, a totality of the circumstances

Q: Do you keep records of demographics of travelers referred.

A: CBP does not track the demographics of USC travelers.

Q: If you were looking for that, where would you get it

A: I have never requested that information, so I would likely start at our HQ

(b) (6) stated, "I appreciate you returning my call and I will likely have additional questions after speaking with the Congressman, can you send them to you". I informed her that inquiries can be forwarded to the CBP Office of Congressional Affairs, as I would be doing the same if she were to send them to me.

(b) (6) stated, "I want to be transparent, we will continue to pursue this matter, as there are discrepancies between what our office has heard and what you are saying".

I reminded her that there will be a CRCL meeting in Ferndale, WA next week, where representatives from DHS and OFO will be present.

Call end....

Kenneth Williams
Area Port Director
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
9901 Pacific Highway
Blaine, WA 98230

Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cellular: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Fax: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 10:02 AM
To: WILLIAMS, KENNETH (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: BREAKING: CAIR-WA Assisting Iranian-Americans Detained at U.S. Border

Hi Ken-

Could I please get a name and phone number for whomever is running point? I'm familiar with the general inbox and your protocol.

(b) (6)

From: WILLIAMS, KENNETH (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 06, 2020 1:00 PM
To (b) (6) >
Subject: RE: BREAKING: CAIR-WA Assisting Iranian-Americans Detained at U.S. Border

(b) (6)

Currently the POC is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Kenneth Williams
Area Port Director
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
9901 Pacific Highway
Blaine, WA 98230

Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cellular: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Fax: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 9:35 AM
To: WILLIAMS, KENNETH (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: BREAKING: CAIR-WA Assisting Iranian-Americans Detained at U.S. Border

Hi Ken-

Understood. Could you please connect me with the best POC at the Seattle office to direct our questions too?

(b) (6)

From: WILLIAMS, KENNETH (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 06, 2020 12:32 PM
To: (b) (6) >
Subject: RE: BREAKING: CAIR-WA Assisting Iranian-Americans Detained at U.S. Border

(b) (6)

Due to the level of inquiries and media interest, CBP Office of Field Operations Seattle is working in concert with OFO HQ and the CBP Office of Congressional Affairs on a response.

Respectfully,

Kenneth Williams
Area Port Director
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
9901 Pacific Highway
Blaine, WA 98230
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cellular: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Fax: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6)
Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 1:51 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; WILLIAMS, KENNETH (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Fwd: BREAKING: CAIR-WA Assisting Iranian-Americans Detained at U.S. Border

Hi Ken an (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

I'm trying to get ahead of questions on the below. Can we connect ASAP? My cell number is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), I'm around all day.

Thanks,

(b) (6)

BREAKING:
CAIR-WA
Assisting
Iranian-Americans

Detained at U.S. Border

(SEATTLE, WA,
1/5/20) – The
Washington state
chapter of the
Council on
American-Islamic
Relations (CAIR-
WA) is assisting
more than 60
Iranians and
Iranian-
Americans of all
ages who were
detained at length
and questioned at
the Peace Arch
Border Crossing
in Blaine, Wash.

Many more were
reportedly refused
entry to the
United States due
to a lack of
capacity for
Customs and
Border Patrol

(CBP) to detain them.

Other Iranian-Americans are about to cross the Peace Arch Border as they return back to their homes in the United States from an Iranian pop concert that was taking place on Saturday in Vancouver, Canada.

Those detained reported that their passports were confiscated and they were questioned about their political views and allegiances. CBP officials contacted at the Blaine Port of Entry provided no comment or

reasons for the detentions.

[NOTE: CAIR published “Know Your Rights” materials online in English, Arabic, Somali, Urdu, Farsi, Bengali, and Bosnian. The multi-language civil rights materials may be printed out for personal use or for distribution at local events. **GO TO:** <https://www.cair.com/KnowYourRights>]

Crystal, a 24-year-old American citizen and medical student was allegedly detained and interrogated for more than 10 hours with her family at the

Peace Arch
Border Crossing
before being
released early this
morning. “The
vast majority of
people being held
last night were
American
citizens,” said
Crystal. “We kept
asking why we
were being
detained and
asked questions
that had nothing
to do with our
reason for
traveling and was
told ‘I’m sorry
this is just the
wrong time for
you guys.’”

A source at CBP
reported that the
Department of
Homeland
Security (DHS)
has issued
a national order to
CBP to “report”

and detain anyone with Iranian heritage entering the country who is deemed potentially suspicious or “adversarial,” regardless of citizenship status. CBP at the Peace Arch Border Crossing did not confirm or deny this report.

“These reports are extremely troubling and potentially constitute illegal detentions of United States citizens,”

said **Masih Fouladi,**
executive director of CAIR-WA.

“We are working to verify reports of a broad

nationwide
directive to detain
Iranian-
Americans at
ports of entry so
that we can
provide
community
members with
accurate travel
guidance. We will
continue to update
the community
and other civil
rights
organizations as
we obtain more
information.”

CAIR is
America's largest
Muslim civil
liberties and
advocacy
organization. Its
mission is to
enhance
understanding of
Islam, protect
civil rights,
promote justice,
and empower

American
Muslims.

La misión de
CAIR es proteger
las libertades
civiles, mejorar la
comprensión del
Islam, promover
la justicia, y
empoderar a los
musulmanes en
los Estados
Unidos.

END

<https://www.cair.com/breaking-cair-wa-assisting-iran-american-s-detained-us-border>

(b) (6)
Legislative Director
Rep. Rick Larsen,
WA-02

From: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 9:25 PM
To: FASANO, ADELE
Subject: Re: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 DELBENE iranian

Yes, that was yesterday and the DAC OCA this morning

Michael Freeman
Assistant Director, Field Operations
Seattle Field Office

On Jan 6, 2020, at 6:21 PM, FASANO, ADELE [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

Is the reference to HQ contacting Blaine mean the conversation you had with XD Howe?

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "FREEMAN, MICHAEL T [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)"
Date: January 6, 2020 at 4:40:26 PM CST
To: "FASANO, ADELE" [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 DELBENE_iranian

I talked with DA [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (OCA), they felt this was the best way to go initially as OCA has been briefing the congressional delegation. Ken and Delbene know each other and we wanted to add a sense of credibility to the conversation. I briefed Ken on what to say and not to say, he did a very good job.

Michael Freeman
Assistant Director, Border Security
Seattle Field Office
OFO - U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Blaine, Washington

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: FASANO, ADELE [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 2:36 PM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: Fwd: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 DELBENE_iranian

Who authorized APD Williams to talk to Congresswoman?
Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "WILLIAMS, KENNETH" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date: January 6, 2020 at 3:57:34 PM CST
To: "FASANO, ADELE" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "FREEMAN, MICHAEL T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 DELBENE_iranian

DFO,

I had a call with Congresswoman DelBene, the following is a Q&A from the call:

Q: Their offices received complaints of USCs being held at the border for 6 10 hours over the weekend;

Q: Is this s change from previous weeks?

A: The agency's policy is that we do not profile. Due to the events that occurred in Iraq where a senior Iranian general was killed, CBP was placed on high alert. We implements several measures to ensure that safety of the homeland. On Saturday, there was a popular Persian Pop band concert in Vancouver that resulting in many of those attendees arriving at the border simultaneously. This stretched our resources. It is no secret that certain demographics are higher risk and during the inspectional process if we identify concerns in a traveler's travel history it can slow the inspectional process down when we determine the risk. When travelers state that they wait several hours at the border, they often include the time spent in line awaiting primary inspection and at that time the waits were 1 2 hours, so the actual secondary inspection time is the balance of that. During the secondary inspection we have several layers of management engage in the inspectional process.

Q: If someone crossed today, would they be treated differently?

A: We have brought in additional officers to assist with the workload the comes with increase holiday traffic and currently there are practically no waits at the ports.

Q: They felt like they were targeted for their heritage:

A: The process can be lengthy and if our concern is for one individual in the vehicle, all occupants are detained until the inspection process is complete. So, as the articles state that were 60 people of Iranian decent (I can validate that), that could be roughly 11 12 refers.

Q: Did we confiscated Passports

A: No, we did not confiscate passports, holding the passport until the inspection is completed is our normal process.

Q: People were given orange cards and sent to a different area;

A: This is a normal process when a traveler is referred to secondary

Closing: There will be a CRCL next week in Ferndale, WA where someone from the Seattle Field Office will be there.

*Kenneth Williams
Area Port Director
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
9901 Pacific Highway
Blaine, WA 98230*

Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cellular: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Fax: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 11:52 AM
To: WILLIAMS, KENNET (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: FW: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 DELBENE_iranian

Michael Freeman
Assistant Director, Border Security
Seattle Field Office
OFO - U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Blaine, Washington

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 11:49 AM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 DELBENE_iranian

FYSA

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Direct Line (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 2:43 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 DELBENE_iranian

This is the approved statement:

As previously stated, there is no national directive, memo, etc. from DHS or CBP leadership with instructions to detain Iranian-Americans and refusing their entry into the U.S because of their country of origin.

On Friday, CBP field leadership participated in a teleconference with Acting Commissioner Morgan and Deputy Commissioner Perez, where the field was asked to remain vigilant and increase their situational awareness given the evolving threat environment. On Saturday, January 4, 2020, Acting Secretary Wolf issued the National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin, which stated that DHS was operating under an enhanced posture due to the current threat environment. Again, there is no national directive from DHS or CBP leadership with instructions to detain Iranian-Americans and refusing their entry into the U.S because of their country of origin. Field Leadership has discretion on how to enhance operational posture based upon the totality of circumstances, including AOR specific information.

When CBP leadership was made aware of the reports at Blaine, they quickly contacted the Blaine POE for additional information and discussion to ensure that secondary screening determinations are based upon a totality of circumstances. CBP leadership will continue to engage the field with respect to operational responses to the current threat to safeguard national security and protect the American people.

Please close the loop with CHS and Judiciary. Along with the others who have asked.

Thanks.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Assistant Commissioner
Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 2:16 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
>
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 DELBENE_iranian

Any word on the enhanced statement yet?

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Director (B&A) Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection | Department of Homeland Security
O: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | C (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | ✉ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 2:14 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
>
Subject: Re: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 DELBENE_iranian

Can you please reach out to them regarding the Member's call to the port director? Thanks.

From [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 1:52:37 PM
To [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Cc [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: RE: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 DELBENE_iranian

I gave staff the statement you sent out yesterday. Other than that I have not received any communication back from Rep. DelBende's office.

Thanks,

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Direct Line [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 1:50 PM
To [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Cc [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: RE: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 DELBENE iranian

Have you responded to the staff yet? The Field just called and said the Member herself has called and left 3 voicemails for the port director. I told the ADFO that I was fine with he or the Port Director speaking to her directly; however, I want to ensure that we close the loop with the staff. If you haven't already, please reach out to the staffer and also check about the Member calling the field.

Thanks.

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Assistant Commissioner
Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 10:54 AM
To [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Cc [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: RE: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 DELBENE iranian

10-4, thanks.

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Direct Lin (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 10:52 AM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: RE: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 DELBENE iranian

I have not gotten clearance on the enhanced statement, so, for now, you can use the cleared OPA statement from yesterday.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Deputy Assistant Commissioner
Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 10:28 AM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: FW: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 DELBENE iranian

H (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

We're getting inquiries into our OCA Inbox on the Iranian/Blaine issue as well. Can we use the statement you're working on to send to them as well?

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Direct Line (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From: OCAINQUIRY <OCAINQUIRY@cbp.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 10:15 AM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Cc: OCAINQUIRY <OCAINQUIRY@cbp.dhs.gov>
Subject: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 DELBENE iranian

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Please review the incoming below - no docs included. Let me know if/when I can log as closed or if you assign it out. Any assistance is appreciated. Thanks!

V/R,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Office of Congressional Affairs | U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave N.W. | Room 5.4-A | Washington, D.C. 20229

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (fax)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From (b) (6) >

Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 9:45 PM

To: OCAINQUIRY <OCAINQUIRY@cbp.dhs.gov>

Subject: Iranian Detention in Blaine

H (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),

I work in Congresswoman DelBene's office. She has asked for an update on the detention of Iranians earlier this morning in Blaine.

If you could provide us with an update it would be greatly appreciated.

Thank you in advance,

(b) (6)

Senior Policy Advisor

Congresswoman Suzan DelBene (WA-01)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 12:23 AM
To: SFO AP Seattle Leadership; SFO AP Blaine Leadership; SFO AP Pembina Leadership; SFO AP Sweetgrass Leadership; TAU-SEATTLE; OFO TACOPS SEATTLE MGMT; FASANO, ADELE; FREEMAN, MICHAEL T; BROWN, LISA BETH M (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
SEA
TAC MGMT
Subject: Daily Report 1/6/2020 - Area Port of Seattle
Attachments: (b) (7)(E); Daily Report 01 06 20.docx

Area Port of Seattle Daily Report: 01/06/2020

Area Port Duty Lead:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

OFO – SIT Room Reports:

None during the reporting period.

Significant Events/Visits:

None during the reporting period.

(b) (7)(E)

BP – SIT Room Reports: Situational Awareness Only:

None during the reporting period.

HSI/AMO Seizure/Significant Event: Situational Awareness Only:

None during the reporting period.

S/A/S Reports:

(b) (7)(E)

IOIL Reports:

(b) (7)(E), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (7)(E), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Agriculture:

Significant Agriculture Incident Reports: 0

Emergency Action Notifications: 1

Trusted Traveler (NEXUS/GLOBAL ENTRY) Administrative IOILs:

Application Denied: 0

Cards Revoked: 0

Electronic Media Reports:

None during the reporting period

Passenger Offloads:

None during the reporting period.

Admissibility Adverse Actions:

Expedited Removal 2

Notice to Appear 0

Visa Waiver Refusal 0

WD in lieu of NTA 0

Deferred Inspection 0

Parole 0

Crewmember Refused Landing 0

WD in lieu of ER 1

(b) (7)(E), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Land Border Wait Times:

Not applicable.

Airport Processing/Wait Times:

- Total number of passengers processed: 6355
- Total number flights is 34 with 4 flights exceeding 60 minutes.
- Number of flights exceeding 120 minutes: 0
- Significant delays (over 180 minutes): 0
- Facial Recognition Biometric Exit flight 248 passengers / 21 minutes

Passenger Processing – Cruise Ships/Cargo Vessels:

Total number of passengers: 128

Total number of crew: 20

Acting Watch Commande (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

United States Customs and Border Protection

Office of Field Operations

Seattle-Tacoma International Airport | Seattle, WA 98158

Offic (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | Mobil (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | Fa (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 7:50 AM
To: OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BROWN, LISA BETH M;
FASANO, ADELE; FREEMAN, MICHAEL T (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Situational Daily Report
Attachments: Situational Daily Report 01-07-20.docx



**U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Seattle Field Office**

**Operational Actions/Significant Encounters
Reporting for January 6, 2020**

Seattle Field Office current operational posture and/or actions taken within our AOR and/or reporting of significant encounters/incidents related to the U.S. airstrike on Iranian Military Leader. Daily reporting of significant action(s) or encounter(s) will be completed by 10:00 am (EST) to Field Liaison Division.

Significant Encounters:

Total Vetting for the 24 hour period: (b) (7)(E)

Land Border Environment:

- The Management Team will muster all staff on the enhanced measures and heightened vigilance (including out ports) level.
- Muster mandatory reporting requirements prior to admitting and / or refusing a traveler of interest.
- Targeting teams will develop local targets based on enhanced measure identifying travelers of interest both inbound and outbound.
- (b) (7)(E)
- Taskforce Officers will communicate with Area Port Management on relevant intelligence and host agencies heightened alert status if applicable.
- (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

Airport Environment:

- The Management Team will muster all staff on the enhanced measures and heightened vigilance (including out ports) level.
- Muster mandatory reporting requirements prior to admitting and / or refusing a traveler of interest.

- Targeting teams will develop local targets based on enhanced measure identifying travelers of interest both inbound and outbound.
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- Taskforce Officers will communicate with Area Port Management on relevant intelligence and host agencies heightened alert status if applicable.
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

Seaport Environment:

- CBP staff located at the Tacoma and Seattle Seaport have been mustered on the enhanced security posture and to remain vigilant on and off-duty.
- CBP located at JAHOC have been coordinating with the US Coast Guard and local Law Enforcement to increase patrols and visibility is critical infrastructure areas.
- The Northwest Enforcement Team will continue to increase port patrols and its visibility on the terminals.
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
- [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

Intelligence and Vetting Environment:

[REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)

Respectfully,

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(A) Border Security Coordinator
 U. S. Customs and Border Protection
 Seattle Field Office
 Des [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
 Ce [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 8:00 AM
To: OFO-FIELD LIAISON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CONROY, DONALD E; DIRECTORS FIELD OPS;
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS HQ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); MORGAN, MARK A; Operations Directors (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SULIVERAS, ROLAND (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BORDER SECURITY
ASST DIRECTORS; SBTU; SITROOM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); TRADE
OPERATIONS ASST DIRECTORS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) FERRARA, WILLIA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); CETD-Watch
Subject: 20200107 EAC Daily Operations Report
Attachments: 20200107 - EAC Daily Operations Report.docx




Executive Assistant
Commissioner's
Daily Operations Report
Operations - Field Liaison
Division
January 7, 2020




Significant Items of Interest

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7)(E), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



(b) (7)(E), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



(b) (7)(E)

Non-Threshold Items on Situation Room Commissioner's Report

Date of Incident: January 6, 2020

Location of Incident: (b) (7)(E)
(b) (7)(E)

CBP Officers Encounter Canadian Citizen with IRGC Ties – Refused Entry

Summary:

On January 6, 2020, CBP officers assigned to th (b) (7)(E) at th (b) (7)(E) encountered a 51 year old male Canadian citizen, born in Iran, driving an Ontario plated vehicle, who applied for admission by presenting a TN visa (Trade NAFTA). The subject was referred to secondary due to (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E). During the secondary exam, the subject stated he was traveling to his place of employment in Rensselaer, NY. CBP officers forwarded results of their inspection t (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E), visa was cancelled and he was returned to Canada.

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7) (E)

Significant Visits

None


End of Report

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 9:59 AM
To: BLAINE-CMD CNTR DAILY REPORT
Subject: Daily Report for 01062020
Attachments: CC Daily Report for 01062020.docx

01/06/2020

Command Center Operations for the Blaine AOR 01/07/2020:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)



OFO – SIT Room Reports:

None.

Significant Events/Visits:

None.

BP – SIT Room Reports: Situational Awareness Only:

None

HSI/AMO Seizure/Significant Event: Situational Awareness Only:

None

S/A/S Reports:

Blaine: 1

IOIL Reports:

Blaine: 5

Sumas: 1

NEXUS/FAST Lane Violations:

None.

Agriculture EAN:

Blaine: 10

Electronic Media Reports:

(b) (7)(E)

- (b) (7)(E) - **Basic Phone Examination:** A citizen of Iran arrived t (b) (7)(E) to acquire immigration benefits for Canada. (b) (7)(E)

The subject was provided an Electronic Media Inspection Tear Sheet, processed as a WD2 and returned to Canada.

- (b) (7)(E) - **Basic Phone Examination:** A citizen of Iran arrived t (b) (7)(E) to acquire immigration benefits for Canada. (b) (7)(E)

The subject was provided an Electronic Media Inspection Tear Sheet, processed as a WD2 and returned to Canada.

(b) (7)(E) :

- (b) (7)(E) - **Basic Phone Examination:** A citizen of Iran arrived t (b) (7)(E) to acquire immigration benefits for Canada (b) (7)(E)

. The subject was provided an Electronic Media Inspection Tear Sheet, processed as a WD2 and returned to Canada.

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7)(E)

Admissibility Adverse Action:

Expedited Removal:	0
Notice to Appear:	0
Visa Waiver Refusal:	0
WD in lieu of NTA:	4
Deferred Inspection:	0
Parole:	0
Crewmember Refused Landing:	0
WD in lieu of ER:	3
WD2:	7

Reviewed by: Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

CBPO Blaine Command Center
U.S. Customs & Border Protection
9901 Pacific HWY Blaine, WA 98230

P (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



From: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 10:56 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: FASANO, ADELE; BROWN, LISA BETH M
Subject: FW: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 CANTWELL iranians
Attachments: (b) (7)(E)

1st one....

1) What is the current staff level at the Blaine Port of Entry - Peace Arch? We do not provide staffing numbers to specific POEs. I have included the SFO numbers and staffing for the Area Port of Blaine, you guys can decide which to give to OCA.

SFO Onboard	Area Port of Blaine Onboard
(b) (7)(E)	(b) (7)(E)

2) How has the staff level changed over the last five years? Same as #1

3) What has the average wait time been for each month over the last year? See attachment

Michael Freeman
Assistant Director, Border Security
Seattle Field Office
OFO - U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Blaine, Washington

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 5:54 AM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 CANTWELL_iranians
Importance: High

Hi Mike,

Senator Cantwell's office has some follow up questions from their initial questioning regarding the Blaine POE. I know we don't usually give out port-specific staffing information, so we can probably give them FO info instead. Do you have the answers to these, or would it be better to go through OFO Field Liaison?

- 1) What is the current staff level at the Blaine Port of Entry - Peace Arch?
- 2) How has the staff level changed over the last five years?
- 3) What has the average wait time been for each month over the last year?

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Direct Line (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 8:47 AM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: OCAINQUIRY <OCAINQUIRY@cbp.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 CANTWELL_iranians
Importance: High

Senator Cantwell has the following additional questions.

What is the current staff level at the Blaine Port of Entry - Peace Arch?

How has the staff level changed over the last five years?

What has the average wait time been for each month over the last year?

-----Original Message-----

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 06, 2020 10:57 AM
To (b) (6)
Cc: OCAINQUIRY <OCAINQUIRY@cbp.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Incoming Correspondence: 01-05-2020 CANTWELL_iranians

Good morning,

Please see below for an official statement from CBP.

STATEMENT

Social media posts that CBP is detaining Iranian-Americans and refusing their entry into the U.S. because of their country of origin are false. Reports that DHS/CBP has issued a related directive are also false.

ON BACKGROUND

Based on the current threat environment, CBP is operating with an enhanced posture at its ports of entry to safeguard our national security and protect the America people while simultaneously protecting the civil rights and liberties of

everyone. CBP routinely adjusts staffing and operations to maintain the dual missions of border security and facilitation of lawful trade and travel. Processing times are the result of the current circumstances, including staffing levels, volume of traffic, and threat posture.

At the Blaine POE, wait times increased to an average of two hours on Saturday evening, although some travelers experienced wait times of up to four hours due to increased volume and reduced staff during the holiday season. Wait times Sunday morning were about 40 minutes for passenger vehicles.

CBP does not discriminate based on religion, race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

-----Original Message-----

From (b) (6) >

Sent: Sunday, January 5, 2020 7:21 PM

To: OCAINQUIRY <OCAINQUIRY@cbp.dhs.gov>

Subject: Re: Iranian detentions in WA state

The Senator would also like a briefing on this matter. Thanks

Sent from my iPhone

> On Jan 5, 2020, at 2:52 PM (b) (6) > wrote:

>

> Senator Cantwell has heard reports of mass detention of people of Iranian descent at the Northern Border in Washington state. Could you please let us know, what happened, how this situation is being handled and how individuals' rights are being respected?

>

> Thank you (b) (6)

>

> Sent from my iPhone

From: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 1:03 PM
To: FASANO, ADELE
Subject: RE: Blaine
Attachments: FW: Iran Threat; Re: Updated Seattle Field Office Policy fo [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
[REDACTED]

First message was after the conference call you had Friday at 1215 and we send email at 1427
Second message was Sunday at 1039 after I recommended we adjust the thresholds
Third message was Sunday 1245 after I further recommended we adjust further after the call I had with the XD

Michael Freeman
Assistant Director, Border Security
Seattle Field Office
OFO - U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Blaine, Washington
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: FASANO, ADELE [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 9:53 AM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Re: Blaine

I need to see write up on direction to APDs and timing of changes. I started the process of pulling back before the media exploded. Lack of reporting from Blaine management was major issue as I was not advised at any time that we had long processing times.

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 7, 2020, at 11:22 AM, FREEMAN, MICHAEL [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wrote:

9hours and 15 minutes... see below

LAST NAME	FIRST AND MIDDLE NAME	DOB	Referral DATE	Port Time of Arrival
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)				

Michael Freeman
Assistant Director, Border Security
Seattle Field Office
OFO - U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Blaine, Washington

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >

Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 9:07 AM

To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc: FASANO, ADEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); BROWN, LISA BETH M

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: RE: Blaine

Thank you for the follow up. Do you know what the maximum wait times were beyond 5+ hours?

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Deputy Executive Director
National Targeting Center
Office of Field Operations
Customs and Border Protection

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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From: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 12:03 PM

To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >

Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); FASANO, ADELE

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BROWN, LISA BETH M (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: RE: Blaine

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) please see responses below

1. What was the local guidance provided to the ports in the Blaine AOR following C1s Friday call See attachment #1 (Iran Threat)
2. How many individuals were referred based on this guidance starting Saturday 1/3 at 1200 to Sunday 1/4 at 1200
 - a. Breakdown # USC/LPR vs foreign visitors (USCs - 85, LPRs - 48, foreign visitors - 144)
 - b. # of refusals (USCs 0, LPR 0, foreign visitors 6)
3. What is the breakdown of wait times in secondary for these individuals. Please break down as follows:
 - a. 4% processed in under 1 hour
 - b. 15% processed in 1-2 hours
 - c. 11% processed in 2-3 hours

- d. 23% processed in 3-4 hours
 - e. 15% processed in 4-5 hours
 - f. 32% processed in over 5 hours
4. What was the redirect from the original guidance once media/congressional/HQ engagement began See attachment #2 (Updated Seattle Field Office Policy for (b) (7)(E))

Was this standard traffic volume/make up for Saturday evening? This was normal holiday/weekend traffic, however with the enhanced security measures in place secondary inspection experienced lengthy delays. What we also have to consider are the high volume of I-94 interviews (which the average wait on the weekends are over 2 hours) and the other secondary referrals that were send into secondary (which could average 2-4 hours).

Was the guidance provided orally or written? Both, DFO Fasano had a conference call with the Area Port Directors and asked Border Security to follow up in writing. (Attachments 1 and 2)

Any other outliers that may have contributed to extended wait times (port not staffing to workload, local events on either side, etc.. (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E) It appears that the port didn't adequately staff to workload o (b) (7)(E) as a high (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) What we also have to consider are the high volume of I-94 interviews (which the average wait on the weekends are over 2 hours) and the other secondary referrals that were send into secondary (which could average 2-4 hours). The port also was experiencing VPC issues throughout the day and OIT was installing new computer on primary.

What role did the Persian pop duo concert in Vancouver play on this situation? The concert had a minor role in the events. We had a total of 5 vehicles returning from the concert and 1 additional vehicle with 2 US LPRs that were refused entry into Canada (unknown reasons). The 5 vehicles entered between 2347 hrs and 0350 hrs. There was a total of 18 people in the 5 vehicles (16 USC's and 2 LPRs). (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E) . Once the single (b) (7)(E) officer interviewed subject they would pass information on to TAU an (b) (7)(E)

Michael Freeman
Assistant Director, Border Security
Seattle Field Office
OFO - U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Blaine, Washington

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 7:24 AM

To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >

Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >

Subject: RE: Blaine

Mike,

Few more things to add:

Was this standard traffic volume/make up for Saturday evening?

Was the guidance provided orally or written?

Any other outliers that may have contributed to extended wait times (port not staffing to workload, local events on either side, etc..)

Also, I assume the congressional responses you are working on were tasked from Field Liaison.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 10:09 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: RE: Blaine

I'm on it, almost finished with 2 congressional responses

Michael Freeman
Assistant Director, Border Security
Seattle Field Office
OFO - U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Blaine, Washington
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 7:08 AM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Blaine

One additional piece:

What role did the Persian pop duo concert in Vancouver play on this situation?

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 10:00 AM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: Blaine

Mike,

C2 has requested the following information to prepare for a hill brief this evening:

1. What was the local guidance provided to the ports in the Blaine AOR following C1s Friday call
2. How many individuals were referred based on this guidance starting Saturday 1/3 at 1200 to Sunday 1/4 at 1200
 - a. Breakdown # USC/LPR vs foreign visitors
 - b. # of refusals
3. What is the breakdown of wait times in secondary for these individuals. Please break down as follows:
 - a. XX% processed in under 1 hour
 - b. XX% processed in 1-2 hours
 - c. XX% processed in 3-4 hours
 - d. XX% processed in 4-5 hours
 - e. XX% processed in over 5 hours
4. What was the redirect from the original guidance once media/congressional/HQ engagement began

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 11:00 AM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T
Subject: FW: Iran Threat

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 2:27 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SCHMELZ, JASON W (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) WILLIAMS, KENNET (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: Re: Iran Threat

ALCON,

Update Iranian Threat:

Whether the Iranian, Palestinian, Lebanese or any other subject of national concern is being formally refused or is allowed to flagpole back to Canada to obtain immigration benefits, notifications must be made to The Office of Border Patrol (OBP) to apprise them of the situation. Please follow your local Area Ports procedures when contacting OBP.

As additional processing procedures are received they will be sent out accordingly.

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(A) Program Manager Border Security and Facilitation

U. S. Customs and Border Protection

9901 Pacific Highway

Blaine, WA 98230

De (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Friday, January 3, 2020 11:27 AM

To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] SCHMELZ, JASON W (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted];

WILLIAMS, KENNET (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted] THOMAS, ZACHARY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Iran Threat

Good Morning,

In light of the US airstrike against Iranian IRGC-QF General Qassem Soleimani, it is prudent at this time to heighten our vigilance against any potential retaliation. All encounters with individuals from areas of national concern must be referred into secondary for additional layers of vetting (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]

It is imperative that DHS remains proactive and be alert in the interactions with individuals or commodities arriving from or departing to areas of national concern (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]

The Seattle Field Office TAU will assist in streamlining various vetting stages to ensure information is delivered timely. The Seattle Field Office TAU will notify the Border Security Coordinator (BSC), Assistant Director of Field Operations (ADFO) and the Director of Field Operations (DFO) simultaneously to obtain ADFO and DFO *approval prior to releasing* the subject (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

To ensure timely reporting to the Seattle Field Office TAU, The Seattle Field Office recommends you staff a twenty-four hour (b) (7)(E) point of contact for your Area Ports. Area Ports may need to augment your TTRT assets with experienced CBPO's who are capable of performin (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]

Intelligence acquired from the Area Ports as well as intel acquired from outside agencies will be turned over to the Seattle Field Office (TAU) to assure that Senior Management is steadily apprised of real time Intelligence information without any delay or withholding of that information.

If you have any questions or would like additional information, please contact

Border Security Coordinator, Seattle Field Office (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), or a member of your staff may contact Supervisor TAU Program Manager (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or (A) Program Manager (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(A) Program Manager Border Security and Facilitation

U. S. Customs and Border Protection

Seattle Field Office Peace Arch

9901 Pacific Highway

Blaine, WA 98230

De (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

CBP000048

CBP0000049

CBP000050

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 2:40 PM
To: FASANO, ADELE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Meeting with DHS CRCL

Director,

The DHS CRCL meeting will now be taking place at Peace Arch POE in the small or large conference room on January 15th at 11:30am. It will be on your calendar as soon as I receive confirmation on the call-in information. I also let (b) (6) know to include (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and I on future meeting correspondence.

Respectfully,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | Staff Assistant | Office of the DFO | Seattle Field Office | U.S. Customs and Border Protection
t (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | m (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) | e (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: FASANO, ADELE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 9:56 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: Fwd: Meeting with DHS CRCL

The meeting needs to take place at Peace Arch. I don't know how it ended up at BP. This is a port issue and I want to show them our process

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: (b) (6) >
Date: January 7, 2020 at 10:49:14 AM CST
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >, "FASANO, ADELE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "FREEMAN, MICHAEL T" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6) >, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "QUINN, TIMOTHY" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >, "SALAZAR, REBEKAH A. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Meeting with DHS CRCL

Good morning,

Looping in DFO Fasano and ADFO Freeman to check for their availability at 11:30AM on 1/15 at Sector HQ in Blaine. Please feel free to give me a call if there are any questions or concerns.

Thank you!

(b) (6)
Senior Policy Advisor
Office for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties
Department of Homeland Security
Office (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Email (b) (6)

~~This message may contain agency deliberative communications, privacy information or other information that may be privileged and exempt from disclosure outside the agency or to the public. Please consult with the US Department of Homeland Security, Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the Office of General Counsel before disclosing any information contained in this email.~~

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 10:40 AM
To (b) (6); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >;
WILLIAMS, KENNETH (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc (b) (6)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; QUINN, TIMOTHY
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SALAZAR, REBEKAH A (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: RE: Meeting with DHS CRCL

Great- thank you!

We can use the Sector HQ conference room.

2410 Natures Path Way
Blaine, WA

Upon arrival, please use the intercom to gain access and park in the front lot.

For those calling, please utilize the information below:

Call In (b) (7)(E)
Access Code (b) (7)(E)

Thank you and I look forward to meeting all of you next week at 1130 on January 15!

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(A) Chief Patrol Agent
U.S. Border Patrol
Blaine Sector Headquarters
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Desk)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From [REDACTED] (b) (6) >
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 7:04 AM
To [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; WILLIAMS, KENNETH [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc [REDACTED] (b) (6) >; [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; QUINN, TIMOTHY [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; SALAZAR, REBEKAH A [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: RE: Meeting with DHS CRCL

Good morning,

That should not be a problem for our folks.

Thanks,

[REDACTED] (b) (6)

From [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 10:01 AM
To [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (6) >; WILLIAMS, KENNETH [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc [REDACTED] (b) (6) >; [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; QUINN, TIMOTHY [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; SALAZAR, REBEKAH A [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: RE: Meeting with DHS CRCL

All

Would it be possible to move this to 1130? I have a meeting at 1000 with the local Chiefs of Police and Sheriff that I need to attend- I should be clear and able to meet at 1130 instead.

I apologize for any inconvenience. If it is not possible, (A)DCP [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) can meet at 1100 and I will join when my meeting is over.

Thanks

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(A) Chief Patrol Agent
U.S. Border Patrol
Blaine Sector Headquarters
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Desk)
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 5:55 AM
To [REDACTED] (b) (6) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; WILLIAMS, KENNETH [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc: Mina, Pete (b) (6)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) QUINN, TIMOTHY
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); SALAZAR, REBEKAH A (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Meeting with DHS CRCL

(b) (6)

That's correct. Mr. Quinn will also be a remote participant. Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Director, Custody Support and Compliance Division
& Prevention of Sexual Assault Coordinator
Privacy and Diversity Office (PDO)
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Phone: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Mobil (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Fax: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Email Address: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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Please consider the environment before printing this e mail.

From (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 6:31 AM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
>; WILLIAMS, KENNETH (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: Mina, Pete (b) (6)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) QUINN, TIMOTHY
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); SALAZAR, REBEKAH A. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Meeting with DHS CRCL

Good morning,

Looping in Mr. Quinn and Ms. Salazar.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) 11am sounds great. We appreciate all of you making the time, and we will be done well in advance of your 1345 meeting.

Mr. Williams would you or someone else from your office be available at 11am?

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) we're happy to have you and Mr. Quinn join us. I assume Mr. Quinn will be joining us remotely as well?

Thank you, everyone, for the coordination. We're looking forward to meeting and speaking with all of you.

V/R,

(b) (6)
Senior Policy Advisor
Office for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties
Department of Homeland Security

(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

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From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 5:49 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6) >;
WILLIAMS, KENNETH (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: Mina, Pete (b) (6) >;
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: RE: Meeting with DHS CRCL

(b) (6)

(A) Deputy Chief (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and I are available at 1100. We have a 1345 meeting with some of the local congressional staffers so just need to be clear for that. We can meet at Sector HQ or any other location.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(A) Chief Patrol Agent
U.S. Border Patrol
Blaine Sector Headquarters
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Desk)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Cell)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 1:12 PM
To (b) (6) > (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) WILLIAMS, KENNETH (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Cc: Mina, Pete (b) (6) >
Subject: RE: Meeting with DHS CRCL

Good Afternoon (b) (6)

I would like to participate. Unfortunately, I won't be on site in Blaine but can participate remotely.

Thank you and good luck with the round table.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Director, Custody Support and Compliance Division
& Prevention of Sexual Assault Coordinator
Privacy and Diversity Office (PDO)
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Phone: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Fax: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Email Address (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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Please consider the environment before printing this e mail.

From (b) (6) >
Sent: Monday, January 6, 2020 2:05 PM
To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) WILLIAMS, KENNETH
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: Mina, Pete (b) (6)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Meeting with DHS CRCL

Good afternoon,

We are looking forward to CBP's participation at our roundtable next week and thank you both for your extremely fast responses to my inquiries today.

DHS CRCL's Deputy Officer for Programs & Compliance Peter Mina and Senior Policy Advisor (b) (6) from our Compliance Branch will be joining me from CRCL. We were hoping to touch base with all of you in advance of the roundtable particularly in light of recent allegations regarding prolonged secondary questioning of Iranian-Americans at the POE in Blaine. Would you both be available Wednesday morning (1/15) at around 10 or 11AM? We are happy to meet in Blaine at one of your offices.

Thank you!

(b) (6)
Senior Policy Advisor
Office for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties
Department of Homeland Security
(b) (6)
(b) (6)
(b) (6)

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~~Please consult with the US Department of Homeland Security, Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the Office of General Counsel before disclosing any information contained in this email.~~

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 7:36 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); Sweetgrass Agriculture Specialists GML (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); ANACORTES OFO ALL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); ATU-SEATTLE FIELD OFFICE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); BELLINGHAM OFO GML; BLAINE-CMD CNTR; BLAINE-OFO AREA MGT; BLAINE-OFO INTEL GROUP OFFICERS; BLAINE-OFO SUPERVISORS; BLAINE-OFO UNIFORMED; BLW392; BLW-COMM (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); BROWN, LISA BETH M (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); DANVILLE-FERRY OFO ALL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); FASANO, ADELE; OI PacNW FIG Team (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); FREEMAN, MICHAEL T; FRIDAY HARBOR-ROCHE HARBOR OFO ALL; FRONTIER-BOUNDARY OFO ALL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); LAURIER OFO ALL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); METALINE FALLS OFO ALL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); OFO TACOPS SEATTLE MGMT; OROVILLE-NIGHTHAWK OFO ALL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); PEMBINA AREA - DUNSEITH; PEMBINA AREA - IFALLS; PEMBINA AREA - PORTAL; PEMBINA AREA - ROSEAU; PEMBINA INTEL TEAM; PEMBINA PORT PERSONNEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); POINT ROBERTS OFFICERS; PORT ANGELES OFO ALL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); SCHMELZ, JASON W; SEA TAC CBP; Seattle ATU; Seattle Tactical Ops (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); SPW-SIU; SUMAS OFO ALL; Sweetgrass 1895 Uniformed Officers GML; TAU-SAN FRANCISCO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); THOMAS, ZACHARY C (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Iran Launches Missiles in Iraq
Attachments: (b) (7)(E); Enhanced screening alert.pdf

Alcon,

Please see alert regarding recent missile launches from Iran on US bases in Iraq.

(b) (7) (E)

CBP000052

Sincerely,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Tactical Analytical Unit (TAU)
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Seattle Field Office
9901 Pacific Highway
Blaine, WA 98230
Des (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Work Cel (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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From: FASANO, ADELE
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 7:44 PM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T
Subject: Fwd: Letter from House Members re: CBP/Iranian Americans
Attachments: image001.png; ATT00001.htm; image002.png; ATT00002.htm; image003.png; ATT00003.htm; CBP Iran Letter 01072019.pdf; ATT00004.htm

Why is this stuff not being sent to me but directly to APD?

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "WILLIAMS, KENNETH" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Date: January 7, 2020 at 6:31:23 PM CST
To: OCAINQUIRY <OCAINQUIRY@cbp.dhs.gov>, OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E) >
Cc: "FASANO, ADELE" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >, "BROWN, LISA BETH M" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: Letter from House Members re: CBP/Iranian Americans

OCA, Field Liaison,

Please find the attached letter from the House of Members regarding the detention of Iranian Americans at the Blaine Port of Entry. House Members are requesting a briefing on these matters and document production by January 21, 2020.

Kenneth Williams
Area Port Director
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
9901 Pacific Highway
Blaine, WA 98230
Office: 360-332-2332
Cellular: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Fax: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 2:38 PM
To: CongressstoDH (b) (6) > (b) (6)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
>;
WILLIAMS, KENNETH (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc (b) (6) >
Subject: Letter from House Members re: CBP/Iranian Americans

Good evening,

Please find attached a letter from Congresswoman Jayapal, Chairman Nadler, Subcommittee Chair Lofgren, Chairman Thompson, Chairwoman Maloney, and Subcommittee Chairwoman Rice requesting more information on reports of large numbers of people of Iranian heritage being held in secondary inspection over the weekend in Blaine, Washington. We request a briefing on these matters and document production by January 21, 2020.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Best,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Legislative Director

Office of Congresswoman Pramila Jayapal (WA-07)

1510 Longworth House Office Building | Washington, DC 20515

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 8:56 AM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T
Cc: BROWN, LISA BETH M; FASANO, ADELE; OFO-FIELD LIAISON (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Subject: FW: 2020-COR-00002732 Iran letter- DHS Tier 1
Attachments: CBP Iran Letter 01072019.pdf

Good Morning,

FLD received a congressional inquiry surrounding the supposed detention of Iranians last weekend at Blaine. Please do not respond to this inquiry as it will be handled by Headquarters.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Supervisory CBP Officer
Field Liaison Division
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Room 2.3A-17
Washington, DC 20229
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
E-Mail: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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From [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 8:49 AM
To: OFO-TASKING (b) (7)(E) >; OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E) >
Cc [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] >
Subject: 2020-COR-00002732 Iran letter- DHS Tier 1

FLD,

Please see attached DHS Tier 1 and prepare a response as well as a cover memo for C1 signature. Responses are due back to OFO-Tasking NLT 12PM January 13, 2020. Notification is required if you will be unable to meet the deadline, thus placing this DHS Tier 1 on OES' Overdue report to the Commissioner.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Management and Program Analyst
Office of Field Operations
Business Operations and Communications Division

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

January 7, 2020

The Honorable Chad Wolf
Acting Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, D.C. 20528

Mark A. Morgan
Acting Commissioner
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Washington, D.C. 20004

Kenneth L. Williams
Port Director, Blaine Sector
Blaine, WA 98230

Dear Acting Secretary Wolf, Acting Commissioner Morgan, and Port Director Williams:

We write to express our alarm about U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) reportedly holding large numbers of people of Iranian heritage in secondary inspection for up to 12 hours over the weekend of January 4-5, 2020, at the Peace Arch Border Crossing in Blaine, Washington.

The *New York Times* reported that more than 60 people were held in secondary inspection for up to 10 hours.¹ Observers on the ground have reported that as many as 200 people were held for secondary inspection during this period.² Many impacted individuals were U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, including seniors and children. In one case, CBP held a family of four U.S. citizens of Iranian descent—who were pre-screened for expedited processing as Nexus pass holders—for nearly five hours.³

In response to criticism, CBP stated that “CBP field leadership participated in a teleconference with Acting Commissioner Morgan and Deputy Commissioner Perez, where the field was asked to remain vigilant and increase their situational awareness given the evolving threat environment.”⁴ CBP also released statements attributing long waits to high traffic during late hours, when the port has lower staffing levels.⁵ These statements, however, do not explain why impacted persons were overwhelmingly of Iranian heritage, nor why pre-cleared U.S. citizen travelers would have been placed in secondary inspection and delayed for five hours. The

¹ Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Mike Baker & Mariel Padilla, *U.S. Stops Dozens of Iranian-Americans Returning from Canada*, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2019), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/us/politics/iranian-americans-border.html>.

² Mike Baker & Caitlin Dickerson, *Iranian-Americans Questioned at the Border: ‘My Kids Shouldn’t Experience Such Things’*, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2019), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/us/border-iranians-washington-patrol.html>.

³ Priscillia Alvarez, *Iranian-American Describes 5 Hour Delay For Questioning at US Border Crossing*, CNN (Jan. 6, 2020), <https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/06/politics/iranian-american-border-questioning/index.html>.

⁴ *Id.*

⁵ *Id.*

statements also do not explain why individuals appear to have been detained throughout the day on January 4, beginning as early as 8:00 am.


In response to these troubling reports, we request a briefing on the matters discussed above by no later than January 21, 2020. We also request the following documents, including transcripts or written descriptions of any verbal communications, by January 21, 2020:

1. Any directives, orders, guidance, instructions, musters, whether verbal or in writing, or other documents and communications—issued on or after January 2, 2020—from any Department of Homeland Security or CBP official to CBP Agents or Officers regarding the screening of individuals of Iranian heritage or any other changes in screening procedures in response to the death of Qasem Soleimani.
2. Any directives, orders, guidance, instructions, musters, whether verbal or in writing, or other documents and communications specific to the Blaine Sector regarding the screening of individuals of Iranian heritage or any other changes in screening procedures in response to the death of Qasem Soleimani.
3. Any directives, orders, guidance, instructions, musters, whether verbal or in writing, or other documents and communications to Port Directors regarding the screening of individuals of Iranian heritage or any other changes in screening procedures in response to the death of Qasem Soleimani.
4. Any directives, guidance, instructions, musters, whether verbal or in writing, or other documents and communications from any Port Director to CBP Agents or Officers regarding the screening of individuals of Iranian heritage or any other changes in screening procedures in response to the death of Qasem Soleimani.
5. For the Blaine Port of Entry (POE) from January 3-6, 2020, data on the number of people subject to secondary inspection, including a breakdown by age, ethnicity, country of birth, immigration status, and length of time in secondary inspection.
6. For the Blaine POE, from January 3-6, 2020, the total number of on-duty CBP agents assigned to the processing of travelers, for each hour of the day.


Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

		
PRAMILA JAYAPAL	JERROLD NADLER	ZOE LOFGREN
Vice Chair, Immigration Subcommittee House Judiciary Committee	Chairman House Judiciary Committee	Chair, Immigration Subcommittee House Judiciary Committee



BENNIE G. THOMPSON
Chair
Committee on Homeland Security



CAROLYN B. MALONEY
Chairwoman
Committee on Oversight and Reform



KATHLEEN RICE
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border
Security, Facilitation, & Operations
Committee on Homeland Security

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of OFO-FIELD LIAISON
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 9:11 AM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL T
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OFO-FIELD LIAISON; FASANO, ADELE; BROWN, LISA BETH M
Subject: RE: 2020-COR-00002732 Iran letter- DHS Tier 1

Good Morning,

Per our conversation as well as your conversation with DX (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Seattle FO will submit the response to this congressional inquiry along with requested pertinent documentation by January 13, 2020 by 0800 hours (EST) for Ops management review.

If you have any questions please don't hesitate to call.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Supervisory CBP Officer
Field Liaison Division
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Room 2.3A-17
Washington, DC 20229
Office: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Mobile (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
E-Mail: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



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From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 8:49 AM
To: OFO-TASKINGS (b) (7)(E); OFO-FIELD LIAISON (b) (7)(E)
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >

Subject: 2020-COR-00002732 Iran letter- DHS Tier 1

FLD,

Please see attached DHS Tier 1 and prepare a response as well as a cover memo for C1 signature. Responses are due back to OFO-Tasking NLT 12PM January 13, 2020. Notification is required if you will be unable to meet the deadline, thus placing this DHS Tier 1 on OES' Overdue report to the Commissioner.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Management and Program Analyst
Office of Field Operations
Business Operations and Communications Division


(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 11:05 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); ANACORTES OFO ALL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ATU-
SEATTLE-SEATTLE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) BELLINGHAM OFO GML; BLAINE-OFO
UNIFORMED (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); BROWN, LISA BETH M;
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
DANVILLE-FERRY OFO ALL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) FASANO, ADELE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); FREEMAN, MICHAEL T; FRIDAY
HARBOR-ROCHE HARBOR OFO ALL; FRONTIER-BOUNDARY OFO ALL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
LAURIER OFO ALL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); METALINE FALLS OFO ALL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OFO TACOPS SEATTLE MGMT; OI PacNW FIG Team;
OROVILLE-NIGHTHAWK OFO ALL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); POINT ROBERTS OFFICERS; PORT ANGELES OFO ALL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SCHMELZ, JASON W; SEA TAC CBP; Seattle Tactical Ops (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SUMAS OFO ALL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); Sweetgrass 1895
Uniformed Officers GML; Sweetgrass Agriculture Specialists GML; TAU-SAN FRANCISCO;
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Seattle TAU Daily Summarization for 1-8-20
Attachments: (b) (7)(E).pdf; Iranian Threat Assessment.pdf (b) (7)(E).pdf;
TAU Daily Summarization 1-8-20.pdf


ALCON,

Seattle Field Office Reporting.

(b) (7)(E), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



(b) (7)(E), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)


CBP Office (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
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Pacific Highway Port of Entry
Blaine, Washington
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

INB-NIW-20-2191089

07 January 2020

(U) Reporting Notice: This product was prepared by U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Office of Intelligence.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Iranian Threat Assessment

(U) Background

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 2 January, the U.S. military confirmed that it conducted a strike on Iranian Major General Qassim Suleimani at the Baghdad airport. In the strike, the United States also killed the head of the Iraqi state sponsored Popular Mobilization Front (PMF), Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, and several other senior pro Iran figures in Iraq. Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that a "harsh retaliation is waiting for the criminals whose filthy hands spilled his blood" while Iran's President also vowed revenge.



(U) Iranian President Response
NBC

(U) Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) Tensions between the Government of Iran and the United States have been escalating since 2018 when the United States re imposed economic sanctions against the Government of Iran for violations of their nuclear agreement and the April 2019 designation of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard as a foreign terrorist organization. Tensions continued to increase with Iran suspected of targeting oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf, and with the 20 June 2019 Iranian shoot down of a U.S. surveillance drone.¹ These tensions recently escalated into violence.² Iran likely played a pivotal role in the strikes against Saudi Arabian oil fields in 2019 as well as a 27 December rocket attack in Kirkuk that killed an American contractor, despite Iranian backed proxies claiming credit.³ The 2 January drone strike at Baghdad airport removed a key Iranian military leader and has been the catalyst for Iranian government threats of an immediate and intense response.

(U) Timeline of Events

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 27 December 2019, the Iranian backed militia Kataib Hizballah (KH) reportedly conducted a rocket attack near the Iraqi city of Kirkuk, killing an American contractor and wounding several American and Iraqi personnel. In response, the United States conducted air strikes on three sites in Iraq and two in Syria linked to KH, reportedly killing 25 members of the group. Following the strikes, on 31 December, Iranian backed Iraqi KH supporters stormed the

U.S. embassy in Baghdad. The violence escalated with members attempting to enter the embassy, starting fires and damaging the outside and a reception area of the embassy. On 2 January, the United States responded with a strike on a convoy outside Baghdad airport, killing Major General Qassim Suleimani, Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, and several other senior pro Iran figures in Iraq.^{4,5}

(U//~~FOUO~~) Following the death of Suleimani, Iran announced that Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, who has served as Suleimani’s deputy commander since 1997, was named the new overall commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC QF) Quds Force. Qaani joined the IRGC QF in 1980 and served in the 1980 88 war with Iraq. Qaani has been described by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as one of the “most decorated commanders” of the Guards during the 1980 88 Iran Iraq war.^{6,7}

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 5 January, Iraqi lawmakers approved a resolution asking the Iraqi government to end the agreement under which Washington sent forces more than four years ago to help fight the Islamic State of Iraq and ash Sham (ISIS). The bill is nonbinding and subject to approval by the Iraqi government; however, the resolution has the backing of the outgoing prime minister. Additionally, on 5 January, Iran said it would fully withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In a government statement, Iran noted that its nuclear program will have no limitations on its uranium enrichment, production and research..^{8,9}

(U) Key Findings

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(U) Iranian Threats to U.S. Interests

(U//~~FOUO~~) Iranian leaders have vowed revenge against the United States for the death of Suleimani, which will likely increase geopolitical escalation and conflict between the U.S. and Iran, likely further destabilizing the region. In April 2019, IRGC QF was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) making it the first time the U.S. Department of State has labeled a state institution as a FTO. Iran has promised “harsh revenge” and threatened to respond on

American soil, with an Iranian Member of Parliament stating that Iran could attack the White House directly.¹⁰

(U) During an open session of parliament in Tehran, on 5 January, Iranian Parliament Member Abolfazl Abutorabi stated that the killing of Suleimani is a “declaration of war” and Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations stated that the response for a military action is military action. Potential targets for Iran would likely come from rocket attacks against U.S. bases or allies in the region or sabotaging oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, it could embark on a sustained campaign of cyber warfare or target American citizens and troops abroad near embassies and consulates.¹¹

(U) As of 5 January, the Department of Homeland Security stated that there were no specific, credible threats against the homeland; however, Iran and its proxies, including Hizballah, have shown an intent and capability to conduct attacks in the homeland. DHS has stated that Iran has a robust cyber program and is able to execute cyber attacks against the United States, to include temporarily disrupting critical infrastructure.^{12,13,14,15,16}

(U) Iranian-Backed Proxies


~~(U//LES)~~ The IRGC QF maintains influence throughout the Middle East by working with allied groups that allow the group that ability to present an asymmetrical threat to traditional military capabilities utilized by the U.S. and its regional allies. Those partners include Shia militias operating in the region such as the Lebanese Hizballah (LH) and the Houthi rebels in Yemen.¹⁷ Iranian military officials have suggested that Iran’s regional proxies, rather than Iran itself, will be charged with responding to the death of Suleimani.¹⁸ Iranian proxies have been responsible for targeting U.S. interests in the region to include oil infrastructure, military bases and shipping lanes. In September 2019, Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed responsibility for a major attack on Saudi oil facilities and KH have reportedly carried out a string of rocket attacks against Iraqi military bases where U.S. troops are located as well U.S. embassies in Iraq. Additionally, Iranian backed KH has warned Iraqi security forces to stay away from US bases in Iraq starting on 5 January.^{19,20,21}

(U//~~FOUO~~) LH, Iran’s most significant non state partner, has expanded its influence in Latin America, networking with organized crime and other violent groups. Iran has historically provided weapons, training, and financial support to LH for facilitating activities abroad. Iran remains intent on using and expanding its global reach by utilizing its proxy forces to potentially conduct attacks and create a destabilizing effect on Western interests. A DHS review of 63 disrupted terrorist operations or attacks from 2012 2018 across 26 countries highlights the broad reach of Iranian efforts, to include efforts within the United States.^{22,23,24}

- (U) On 9 July 2019, a New Jersey based individual who authorities believe was working on behalf of LH’s Islamic Jihad Organization was arrested on terrorism charges and is

suspected of conducting surveillance of landmarks including the Statue of Liberty, the United Nations, the White House, and Boston’s Fenway Park.²⁵

- (U) In May 2019, a U.S. Federal Court convicted Ali Mohamad Kourani^{USPER} of covertly providing material support for Hezbollah’s Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO). Kourani, a naturalized U.S. citizen, was recruited, trained, and deployed by IJO to procure weapons and gather intelligence on potential U.S. targets for future Hezbollah terrorist attacks. Kourani surveilled JFK Airport and law enforcement facilities in New York City.²⁶
- (U) In 2017, two men were arrested in New York and Michigan on charges related to their alleged activities on behalf of Hezbollah. Their activities included receiving military style training, conducting surveillance on potential targets in America, and assessing vulnerabilities of the Panama Canal and ships in the canal.²⁷



(U//FOUO) Attacks and Disrupted Operations Linked to Hezbollah or Iran
CBP

(U) Iranian Proxy Encounters at POEs

(b) (7)(E)

. Iran has historically provided weapons, training, and financial support to LH and the IRGC Qods Force—Iran’s primary arm for facilitating terrorist activities abroad. Since the United States designated IRGC as a terrorist organization in April 2019, the Iranian regime has looked for ways to exploit vulnerabilities and undermine U.S.



Suspicious Activity Reporting Indicators and Behaviors

Tools for
Analysts and
Investigators

Behaviors

Descriptions

Defined Criminal Activity and Potential Terrorism Nexus Activity	
Breach/Attempted Intrusion	Unauthorized personnel attempting to enter or actually entering a restricted area, secured protected site, or nonpublic area. Impersonation of authorized personnel (e.g., police/security officers, janitor, or other personnel).
Misrepresentation	Presenting false information or misusing insignia, documents, and/or identification to misrepresent one's affiliation as a means of concealing possible illegal activity.
Theft/Loss/Diversion	Stealing or diverting something associated with a facility/infrastructure or secured protected site (e.g., badges, uniforms, identification, emergency vehicles, technology, or documents (classified or unclassified)), which are proprietary to the facility/infrastructure or secured protected site.
Sabotage/Tampering/Vandalism	Damaging, manipulating, defacing, or destroying part of a facility/infrastructure or secured protected site.
Cyberattack	Compromising or attempting to compromise or disrupt an organization's information technology infrastructure.
Expressed or Implied Threat	Communicating a spoken or written threat to commit a crime that will result in death or bodily injury to another person or persons or to damage or compromise a facility/infrastructure or secured protected site.
Aviation Activity	Learning to operate, or operating an aircraft, or interfering with the operation of an aircraft in a manner that poses a threat of harm to people or property and that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person. Such activity may or may not be a violation of Federal Aviation Regulations.
Potential Criminal or Non-Criminal Activities Requiring Additional Information During Vetting	
<i>Note: When the behavior describes activities that are not inherently criminal and may be constitutionally protected, the vetting agency should carefully assess the information and gather as much additional information as necessary to document facts and circumstances that clearly support documenting the information as an ISE-SAR.</i>	
Eliciting Information	Questioning individuals or otherwise soliciting information at a level beyond mere curiosity about a public or private event or particular facets of a facility's or building's purpose, operations, security procedures, etc., in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person.
Testing or Probing of Security	Deliberate interactions with, or challenges to, installations, personnel, or systems that reveal physical, personnel, or cybersecurity capabilities in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person.
Recruiting/Financing	Providing direct financial support to operations teams and contacts or building operations teams and contacts; compiling personnel data, banking data, or travel data in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person.
Photography	Taking pictures or video of persons, facilities, buildings, or infrastructure in an unusual or surreptitious manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person. Examples include taking pictures or video of infrequently used access points, the superstructure of a bridge, personnel performing security functions (e.g., patrols, badge/vehicle checking), security-related equipment (e.g., perimeter fencing, security cameras), etc.
Observation/Surveillance	Demonstrating unusual or prolonged interest in facilities, buildings, or infrastructure beyond mere casual (e.g., tourists) or professional (e.g., engineers) interest and in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person. Examples include observation through binoculars, taking notes, attempting to mark off or measure distances, etc.
Materials Acquisition/Storage	Acquisition and/or storage of unusual quantities of materials such as cell phones, pagers, radio control toy servos or controllers; fuel, chemicals, or toxic materials; and timers or other triggering devices, in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person.
Acquisition of Expertise	Attempts to obtain or conduct training or otherwise obtain knowledge or skills in security concepts, military weapons or tactics, or other unusual capabilities in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person.
Weapons Collection/Discovery	Collection or discovery of unusual amounts or types of weapons, including explosives, chemicals, and other destructive materials, or evidence, detonations or other residue, wounds, or chemical burns, that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person.
Sector-Specific Incident	Actions associated with a characteristic of unique concern to specific sectors (e.g., the public health sector), with regard to their personnel, facilities, systems, or functions in a manner that would arouse suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable person.

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[REDACTED] For all other inquiries, please contact th [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E)
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¹ ABC | 3 January 2020 | (U) World Braces for 'dramatic escalation' in tensions after key Iranian general killed (U) | (U) | <https://abcnews.go.com/International/world-braces-dramatic-escalation-tensions-key-iranian-general/story?id=68051827>

² USA Today | 3 January 2020 | (U) Timeline: How tensions escalated with Iran since Trump withdrew US from nuclear deal | (U) | (U) | <https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/2020/01/03/us-iran-conflict-since-nuclear-deal/2803223001/>

³ ABC | 3 January 2020 | (U) World Braces for 'dramatic escalation' in tensions after key Iranian general killed (U) | (U) | <https://abcnews.go.com/International/world-braces-dramatic-escalation-tensions-key-iranian-general/story?id=68051827>

⁴ [NPR | 4 January 2020 | (U) Timeline: How the U.S. Came to Strike and Kill a Top Iranian General | (U) | (U) | <https://www.npr.org/2020/01/04/793364307/timeline-how-the-u-s-came-to-strike-and-kill-a-top-iranian-general>]

⁵ [Evening Standard | 4 January 2020 | (U) Qasem Soleimani: Timeline of Events Leading to US Killing of Iranian General | (U) | (U) | <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/qasem-soleimani-airstrike-timeline-iran-iraq-a4326311.html>]

⁶ [FOX | 3 January 2020 | (U) Replacement Named for Gen. Qassem Soleimani | (U) | (U) | <https://www.foxnews.com/world/irans-supreme-leader-qassem-soleimani-replacement>]

⁷ [Haaretz | 5 January 2020 | (U) Iran Has Already Replaced Soleimani, Here is Everything we Know About Esmail Ghaani | (U) | (U) | <https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/iran-has-already-replaced-soleimani-here-is-everything-we-know-about-esmail-ghaani-1.8353694>

⁸ [The New York Times | 5 January 2020 | (U) Iraq Calls for Expulsion of US Troops over Deadly Airstrike | (U) | (U) | <https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2020/01/05/world/middleeast/ap-ml-iraq-us.html>

⁹ [Newsweek | 5 January 2019 | (U) Iran Fully Withdraws from Nuclear Deal and Criticizes European Response to Soleimani's Killing | (U) | (U) | <https://www.newsweek.com/iran-fully-withdraws-nuclear-deal-criticizes-european-response-soleimanis-killing-1480475>]

¹⁰ The Epoch Times | 5 January 2020 | (U) Iran to Target US 'Military Sites', White Following General's Death: Officials | (U) | (U) | https://www.theepochtimes.com/top-iranian-general-issues-stark-warning-to-us-trump-america-started-the-war_3194185.html

¹¹ [USA TODAY | 4 January 2020 | (U) Iran Official on Soleimani Killing: 'The Response for Military Action is Military Action' | (U) | (U) | <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2020/01/04/iran-iraq-united-states-qasem-soleimani-trump/2804237001/>]

¹² [White House | 8 April 2019 | (U) Statement from the President on the Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization | (U) | (U) | <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-designation-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-foreign-terrorist-organization/>]

¹³ DHS | 4 January 2020 | (U) National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin | (U) | (U) | https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ntas/alerts/20_0104_ntas_bulletin.pdf

¹⁴ [FOX | 5 January 2020 | (U) Iranian MP Threatens to 'Attack the White House' | (U) | (U) | <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/iranian-mp-threatens-to-attack-the-white-house-report>]

¹⁵ [USA Today | 4 January 2020 | (U) Iran Official on Soleimani Killing: 'The Response for a Military Action is Military Action' | (U) | (U) | <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2020/01/04/iran-iraq-united-states-qasem-soleimani-trump/2804237001/>]

¹⁶ [The New York Times | 3 January 2020 | (U) Homeland Security Sees 'No Specific, Credible Threat' From Iran, but Warns of Cyberattacks | (U) | (U) | <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/us/politics/homeland-security-iran-threat.html>]

- ¹⁷ The Washington Institute | 17 April 2018 | (U) Examining Iran's Global Terrorism Network | (U) | (U) | <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/examining-irans-global-terrorism-network>
- ¹⁸ [Washington Post | 4 January 2020 | (U) Iran has Vowed Revenge Against the U.S. But it Seems to be in No Hurry | (U) | (U) | https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iran-has-vowed-revenge-against-the-us-but-it-seems-to-be-in-no-hurry/2020/01/04/150283e8-2e62-11ea-bffe-020c88b3f120_story.html
- ¹⁹ Yahoo | 18 November 2019 | (U) Saudi-led coalition says Yemeni rebels hijacked vessel | (U) | (U) | <https://news.yahoo.com/saudi-led-coalition-says-yemeni-163021117.html>
- ²⁰ The United States Institute of Peace | 16 September 2019 | (U) Timeline of Houthi Attacks on Saudi Arabia | (U) | (U) | <https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/sep/16/timeline-houthi-attacks-saudi-arabia>
- ²¹ The Guardian | 14 September 2019 | (U) Major Saudi Arabia oil facilities hit by Houthi drone strikes | (U) | (U) | <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/14/major-saudi-arabia-oil-facilities-hit-by-drone-strikes>
- ²² [The Washington Post | 4 January 2020 | (U) Iran Has Vowed Revenge Against the U.S. but it Seems to be in No Hurry | (U) | (U) | https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iran-has-vowed-revenge-against-the-us-but-it-seems-to-be-in-no-hurry/2020/01/04/150283e8-2e62-11ea-bffe-020c88b3f120_story.html]
- ²³ [The Washington Post | (U) Iran has Invested in Allies and Proxies Across the Middle East. Here's Where they Stand After Soleimani's Death | (U) | (U) | <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/03/iran-has-invested-allies-proxies-across-middle-east-heres-where-they-stand-after-soleimanis-death/>]
- ²⁴ [PBS | 4 January 2020 | (U) Iran General Steps out of Soleimani's Shadow to Lead Proxies | (U) | (U) | <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/iran-general-steps-out-of-soleimanis-shadow-to-lead-proxies>]
- ²⁵ NBC | 19 September 2019 | (U) Hezbollah plot terror attacks on U.S. landmarks | (U) | (U) | <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/new-jersey-man-charged-helping-hezbollah-plot-terror-attacks-u-n1056716>
- ²⁶ (U) | DOJ | 19-157 | 16 May 2019 | Ali Kourani Convicted In Manhattan Federal Court For Covert Terrorist Activities On Behalf Of Hezbollah's Islamic Jihad Organization | Extracted information is U | Overall document classification is U
- ²⁷ DOJ | 8 June 2017 | (U) Two Men Arrested for Terrorist Activities on Behalf of Hezbollah's Islamic Jihad Organization | (U) | (U) | <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-men-arrested-terrorist-activities-behalf-hizballahs-islamic-ijhad-organization>

(b) (7)(E)

From: [REDACTED] (b) (6) >
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 11:28 AM
Subject: Fwd: FW [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] "
Attachments: [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) "

----- Forwarded message -----
From [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Date: Wed, Jan 8, 2020 at 8:13 AM
Subject: FW [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] "
To: NIPP-GF [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sector stakeholders,

Please see the below information and attache [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] "

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Government Facilities Sector Program Manager
Office of Intergovernmental Affairs
Federal Protective Service
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
800 North Capitol St. NW, Suite 300

- (o) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
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(b) (7) (E)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 1:39 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: FASANO, ADELE; FREEMAN, MICHAEL T
Subject: FW: Blaine POE Questions from Members
Attachments: Heightened Vigilance IP.docx Withheld in Full (b) (7)(E) form for Iran Threat and UPDATED GUIDANCE On BEST PRACTICES in the FIELD

DX (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),

Please find attached SFO's comprehensive readout and two attachments.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Supervisory Program Manager
Border Security and Facilitation
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Seattle Field Office
Office (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cell (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 7:01 AM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOFFMAN, TODD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ;
HOWE, RANDY (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Subject: RE: Blaine POE Questions from Members

Forgot to add, we need this well in advance for OFO leadership to review and ask subsequent questions.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 10:00 AM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) TODD A HOFFMAN
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) RANDY J HOWE

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >

Subject: RE: Blaine POE Questions from Members

Mike,

Leadership has a call this afternoon at 5:30 to discuss this. I know there has been a lot of piecemeal responses to inquiries yesterday. We need you to provide a comprehensive read out of what transpired to include a detailed timeline starting after C1s call Friday.

It needs to include guidance given from the Field Office to the ports and then port leadership to the troops, staffing issues (detailed breakdown CBPOS, managers (b) (7)(E)) and why they occurred, engagement by the PD and port management throughout, when did you begin to course correct, how was this accomplished, how the exams were required to be conducted (b) (7)(E)),etc....

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 3:33 PM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Re: Blaine POE Questions from Members

Mike,

I think we need a complete comprehensive response painting the picture of what had occurred from the beginning to help address all these piecemeal requests. Like we would do for an official congressional correspondence letter. We need to be clear what occurred Otherwise we will continue to have questions come in.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 3:25:44 PM
To: FREEMAN, MICHAEL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Fwd: Blaine POE Questions from Members

Can you work on #3 highlighting staffing, increased vigilance, etc.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 3:19:12 PM

To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E)

Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ; HOFFMAN, TODD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Re: Blaine POE Questions from Members

Clarification. # 1&2 were addressed by the previous information. We will prepare a response to #3 tomorrow.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 3:07:16 PM

To (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E) >

Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; HOWE, RANDY J (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; OFO-FIELD LIAISO (b) (7)(E)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOFFMAN, TODD (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: RE: Blaine POE Questions from Members

Good Afternoon,

Please see the additional questions in the attachment under Line 7 that staffers from HSGAC would like to address. Please let me know the responses that I can move forward with.

Thank you in advance,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Office of Congressional Affairs | U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20229

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (main line) (b) (7)(E)


From [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 12:54 PM
To [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) >; HOWE, RANDY [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] OFO-FIELD LIAISO [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) >; HOFFMAN, TODD A
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Re: Blaine POE Questions from Members

Thank you!

On Jan 7, 2020, at 12:47 PM [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) > wrote:

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

What is the current staff level at the Blaine Port of Entry - Peace Arch? SFO staffing numbers below.



How has the staff level changed over the last five years? See above chart

What has the average wait time been for each month over the last year? See attachment (wait time in minutes)

In regards to the response to CHS, we recommend deferring till after the hill brief later today to see how C1 wishes to address this to ensure consistency.

[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Executive Director Operations
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (office)
[REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (cell)

From [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 7, 2020 11:39 AM
To: OFO-FIELD LIAISO [REDACTED] (b) (7)(E) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HOWE, RANDY J

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Blaine POE Questions from Members

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) /OFO,

Attached are the combined follow up questions so far from Hill staff. These are all the follow ups OCA has received so far, but if additional are received we will continue to update this spreadsheet and send, unless they are duplicates. As you are able, please send the responses back to OCA so we can respond to staff.

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Office of Congressional Affairs
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Direct Line (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

<Wait times 2020.xlsx>

<Blaine POE Questions from Members Updated.xlsx>

CBP000031

CBP000040

CBP000041

CBP0000042

CBP0000032

CBP0000033

CBP0000034

CBP0000035

CBP0000036

CBP0000037

CBP0000038

CBP0000039

CBP0000350

CBP0000351

CBP0000352

CBP0000353

CBP0000354

CBP0000355

CBP0000356

CBP0000357

CBP0000358

CBP000017

CBP0000018

CBP000019

CBP000020

CBP000021

CBP000022

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on behalf of WATCH CBP INTEL

Sent: Wednesday, January 8, 2020 6:14 PM

To: WATCH CBP INTEL

Subject: (b) (7)(E)

Attachments: (b) (7)(E)

FROM: CBP-OI-CETD-NIW

SUBJECT: For Your Situational Awareness - (U//FOUO (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7) (E)

(b) (7) (E)

From: [FASANO, ADELE](#)
To: [THOMAS, ZACHARY C](#); [WILLIAMS, KENNETH](#); (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); [SCHMELZ, JASON W](#)
Cc: [FREEMAN, MICHAEL T](#); [BROWN, LISA BETH M](#); [SAAR, DIRK J](#)
Subject: C1/C2 guidance on Iranian security threat
Date: Friday, January 3, 2020 8:48:00 PM

The following is a summary of call with C1 and C2 earlier today.

CBP will be issuing a non-classified message this evening on the Iranian threat. I will forward once it is received.

DHS has convened department heads and they are reviewing the national terrorism advisory system guidelines and some time over the weekend S1 will issue a message on threat conditions. It should be in the form of a security bulletin.

The message is increased vigilance and situational awareness of our front line, on and off duty. This should be messaged in musters.

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(E)

All leadership has been put on notice to be available over the weekend in the event further guidance is issued.

I believe we have solid measures in place that meet all the above requirements and the enhanced security posture is to be maintained until advised otherwise.

I will pass on additional information when received.

Adele J. Fasano
Director, Field Operations
Seattle Field Office
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Office)